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Under One Heaven
In the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, we take as our theme 
a concept emphasised by Xi Jinping 习近平, the leader of China’s party-
state, in October 2013 when he spoke of the People’s Republic being part 
of a Community of Shared Destiny 命运共同体, officially translated as a 
Community of Common Destiny. The expression featured in Chinese 
pronouncements from as early as 2007 when it was declared that the 
Mainland and Taiwan formed a Community of Shared Destiny. Addressing 
the issue of China’s relations with the countries that surround it at the 
inaugural Periphery Diplomacy Work Forum held in Beijing on 24 October 
2013, Xi Jinping further developed the idea when he summed up the 
engagement between the People’s Republic and its neighbours by using 
a series of ‘Confucian-style’ one-word expressions: positive bilateral and 
multilateral relationships were to be based on amity 亲, sincerity 诚, 
mutual benefit 惠 and inclusiveness 容.
Shared Destiny has become a catchall category for the country’s re-
gional and broader global engagement at a time when the People’s Repub-
Mingyun 命运, the ‘Destiny’ in ‘Shared Destiny’,  by Nathan Woolley
He who does not understand fate is incapable of behaving as a gentleman ... .   
He who does not understand words is incapable of understanding men.
— Confucius in The Analects, 20.3, translated by Simon Leys
The character ming 命 has the meaning of ‘a decree’ or ‘a command’. In early Chinese texts, 
it could also denote an act of investiture or reward directed toward a subordinate. The sense 
of submission attendant on this ties ming to the related meaning of ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, often 
more specifically in the sense of the predetermined nature of life and one’s allotted lifespan. 
The supposed moral nature of destiny gives ming a place in debates concerning decision, 
duty and the institution of proper government. This is reflected in the term tianming 天
命, ‘Mandate of Heaven’, used when talking about the superior moral power of a ruler who 
claims legitimacy in managing human affairs. For both individuals and the state, destiny can 
be an expression of the Mandate of Heaven. 
Yun 运 has the meaning of ‘to carry’ or ‘to transport’, but also ‘to revolve’ or ‘to move around’. 
It can refer to cycles in life or the cosmos, as in the seasons or the rise and decline of 
dynasties. In these changes or rotating phases, yun also refers to the vagaries of the times, 
and thus to fortune, the variable and impermanent nature of luck and what it brings. The 
term mingyun 命运 thus encapsulates the various tensions between fate and luck, as well as 
predetermination and individual volition.
lic of China is under the leadership of a focused, powerful and articulate 
leader. It provides substance and diplomatic architecture to the revived 
concept of All-Under-Heaven or tianxia 天下, one which assumes a belief 
that China can be a moral, political and economic great power.
In the China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising 
China, we noted the efforts by Chinese international 
relations thinkers to rejig dynastic-era concepts and 
expressions so that the Communist Party can assert 
uniquely ‘Chinese ideas’ in world affairs. Otherwise 
vainglorious attempts to promote such formulations 
are now backed up by immense national wealth, and 
they may gain some traction. The historian Wang 
Gungwu 王赓武 has written incisively about All-
Under-Heaven in contemporary China; among his 
observations is the following: 
From China’s point of view, talk of a ‘peaceful rise’ suggests that a future 
rich and powerful China might seek to offer something like a modern 
vision of tianxia. This would not be linked to the ancient Chinese 
empire. Instead, China could be viewed as a large multinational state 
that accepts the framework of a modern tianxia based on rules of 
equality and sovereignty in the international system today.
… this overarching Confucian faith in universal values was useful to give 
the Chinese their distinctiveness. As an ideal, it somehow survived the 
rise and fall of dozens of empires and provided generations of literati 
down to many modern intellectuals with a sense of cultural unity till 
this day.
Worrying about China
But there is anxiety associated with tianxia and its Shared Destiny as well. 
These grand notions do not address the many concrete problems associat-
ed with the pace and direction of the country’s reforms, about which many 
Wang Gungwu
Source: Flickr1
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Chinese analysts expressed frustration in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s inves-
titure as the head of China’s party-state and army in 2012–2013. In essays 
and long analytical works they raised concerns about the perceived policy 
malaise of the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 – Wen Jiabao 温家宝 decade of 2002–2013. 
They wanted the new leadership to confront the need to transform further 
the country’s political and economic systems, address pressing social is-
sues, take an active role in the information revolution and be decisive in 
improving the regional and global standing of the People’s Republic. 
In the late 1980s, as a decade of China’s Reform and Open Door policies 
began to remake the country, anxieties over social change, economic 
inequalities, environmental degradation, weakness on the global stage 
and a sclerotic political system generated the first major wave of post-
Mao ‘crisis consciousness’ 忧患意识, or what Gloria Davies calls ‘worrying 
about China’. As the events of 1989 and beyond would prove, people had 
good reason to be worried. Even during the excitement and popular mood 
of national self-congratulation in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
a new wave of ‘China worry’ was sweeping the People’s Republic. 
Both publicly and privately, commentators expressed doubts about 
the ability of the political class — the leaders of the Chinese Communist 
Party — to deal with the vast array of challenges that China faced as a 
major world economy and potential world power: were they even moving 
China in the right direction? As in so many earlier eras, the second decade 
of the twenty-first century sees Chinese thinkers ‘worrying about China’: 
its scale, its problems and its future. At the same time, more than ever 
before, these issues have a global impact. Whether with regard to the 
environment, social change, political movements or economic growth, 
what happens in China is of growing concern to people everywhere. 
Among the many critics who painted the Hu–Wen decade as lacklustre, 
there were those who wanted a stronger Communist Party, one with more 
purpose and capable of taking action against endemic corruption and the 
moral decline caused by the commercialisation of both the economy and 
society. Some were nationalists who opposed ‘pro-Western influences’ that 
PUBLIC APPEARANCE, by Geremie R Barmé
In March 2014, President Xi Jinping and 
China's First Lady, Peng Liyuan 彭丽媛, em-
barked on a series of state visits, including 
to Belgium. Peng, who previously enjoyed a 
successful career as a singer, is known for 
her personal style and engaging manner. 
She was particularly prominent during the 
couple's European tour for her wardrobe.
'First Lady Diplomacy' and the dress 
of leaders' wives have a chequered history 
in the People's Republic. Wang Guang-
mei 王光美, wife of president Liu Shaoqi 
刘少奇, attracted considerable attention 
when she wore a white cheong-sam/qipao 
and a pearl necklace during a state visit to 
Indonesia in April 1963. A few years later, 
she was subjected to cruel parody by Red 
Guards in the Cultural Revolution and suf-
fered public humiliation by being dressed 
in a mock cheong-sam and made to wear a 
necklace made out of ping-pong balls dur-
ing a mass denunciation rally.
Jiang Qing 江青, Mao Zedong's wife and paragon of the Cultural Revolution, was known 
for her austere style of dress. She even had a hand in designing a 'national costume' 国服 for 
women in 1974 to parallel the 'Mao suit' (known in Chinese as the Sun Yat-sen or 'Zhongshan 
suit' 中山装).     
The wives of party-state leaders have enjoyed a renewed public profile since Deng 
Xiaoping 邓小平, then among other things Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
visited the US in 1979 with his wife, Zhuo Lin 卓琳. It was Jiang Zemin 江泽民, however, Chi-
na's president and party leader from 1989 to 2002, who formalised First Lady Diplomacy, 
even though his wife, and that of his successor Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, left little impression on 
international audiences.
Peng Liyuan is the first leader's spouse since Jiang Qing to make a fashion statement 
and, in the March 2014 trip to Belgium, she appeared in a heavily embroidered traditional- 
style ensemble. For his part, Xi Jinping wore a reimagined Zhongshan suit, the four pockets 
of the Mao jacket being replaced by two pockets and a concealed pocket on the chest with 
a Western-style pocket square. The Chinese media extolled the First Couple for sporting 
'Diplomatic Lovers' Wear' 外交情侣装.   
China’s President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan  
in formal wear during their visit to Belgium
Photo: press.cn
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encouraged the dangerous rise of civil society. Their views were countered 
by those who hoped that a change in leadership would usher in a period 
of extensive political and legal reforms, greater official accountability and 
media openness. Still others believed that a program of limited reforms 
managed by a strong party was the best hope for China’s future. In our 
two previous China Story Yearbooks, we outlined many of these hopes, 
and their fates, be they for a revival of Mao-era austerity, mass politics 
and ideological control or for constitutional reform and new limits on the 
Party’s power. But whatever their ideological bent, and whether those who 
worry about China worry from within or without, they are all aware that 
the solutions will relate, one way or another, to China’s Shared Destiny 
with the rest of the world.
The Prosperous Age
Even as the latest wave of ‘crisis consciousness’ was 
cresting, the rising standard of living and unprece-
dented level of general prosperity also fostered an 
opposite sense — this one heartily embraced by the 
party-state — that China had entered a shengshi 盛
世, a ‘Prosperous Age’, or an ‘Age of Harmonious 
Prosperity’ 和谐盛世. In 2005, during the Central 
Chinese TV Spring Festival Gala 春节联欢晚会 — 
the most watched television event in the Chinese calendar and an annu-
al moment of celebratory, national cultural unity — one of the featured 
dance performances was called ‘Grand Celebration of the Prosperous Age’ 
盛世大联欢. Two years later, the Taiwanese historian and writer Li Ao 
李敖 declared in a speech at Tsinghua University in Beijing that China was 
enjoying its first true Prosperous Age shengshi 盛世 since the Han 汉 and 
Tang 唐 dynasties. (Ever the contrarian, Li pointedly overlooked the zenith 
of the Qing 清 period, 1644–1911, commonly recognised as the third great 
shengshi of Chinese history.) Also in 2007, the nationally famous singer 
Song Zuying 宋祖英 sang in a paean to the Seventeenth Congress of the 
Taiwanese writer Li Ao 
Source: Flickr1
Party that China was now ‘Walking Towards an Har-
monious Prosperous Age’ 走向和谐盛世. 
Yet as applied to the ‘golden ages’ of the Han, Tang 
and Qing dynasties, shengshi refers to universally 
acknowledged periods of remarkable social grace, 
political rectitude and cultural richness. The self-
proclaimed Prosperous Age of today’s People’s 
Republic has been nearly a century in the making; its 
achievement is far more contentious.
The following semi-official statement provides a 
shorthand, popular definition of the term ‘Prosperous 
Age’ as it is presently used in the People’s Republic:
A nation can be said to be enjoying a Prosperous Age when it has re-
alised certain achievements both in terms of its domestic affairs and 
international politics.
Internally it features economic prosperity, scientific and technological 
advancement, intellectual creativity and cultural efflorescence; inter-
nationally it features military might; booming trade and considerable 
influence.
The general definition of a Prosperous Age includes the following 
measures:
Unparalleled military strength
Unsurpassed economic prosperity
Unsullied political life
Unprecedented scientific and technological advancement, and
Unprecedented international exchanges.
盛世，即一个国家内政外交均有建树时的状况：
内政方面：经济繁荣，科技发达，思想活跃，文化昌盛；
外交方面：军事强大，贸易繁荣，影响力大等等。
盛世的界定，一般来说为以下标准：
Song Zuying
Source: Flickr1
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军事空前强大
经济空前繁荣
政治空前清明
科技空前发达
对外交流空前活跃.
Common sense would suggest that to declare a particular period or an 
era — especially one of rapid socio-cultural change — to be a Golden or 
Prosperous Age before it is over is ill-advised. (It also begs the question 
whether frenetic economic activity is the ne plus ultra of human endeav-
our.) Heroic figures, pivotal historical moments, crises and ‘tipping-points’ 
are usually far clearer in retrospect. In China’s modern history, however, 
both governments and individuals have been hasty to announce and hail 
enlightenments, renaissances and revivals. The current mood is exuber-
ant albeit anxious. 
Leading the China Dream
Upon assuming the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party 
in November 2012, Xi Jinping announced the leitmotif of what is expected 
to be the decade of his rule. It was the ‘China Dream’ 中国梦. Unlike the 
American Dream, the China Dream was less about individual aspiration 
than the dream of an economically, socially, politically, militarily and cul-
turally revitalised Chinese nation. It is a dream that has been dreamt in 
China since the late-nineteenth century.
The speed with which Xi not only took the reins of power covering 
the Party, the state and the military surprised many observers both inside 
and outside China, as did his rapid establishment of supra-governmental 
bodies called Leading Small Groups 领导小组 to oversee his agenda in a 
range of policy areas. 
Such groups, large and small, short-term and semi-permanent, have 
waxed and waned over the years. However, there is a history in post-1949 
China of strong leaders establishing their own Leading Small Groups to 
push through change in the face of bureaucratic inertia or opposition. In 
the mid-1960s, Party chairman Mao Zedong 毛泽东 established a Central 
Cultural Revolution Leading Group 中央文革领导小组 to dismember both 
party and state mechanisms that he perceived as obstructing his radical 
socio-political agenda; he wanted the group to reinvigorate the revolu-
tion and crush bureaucratic obfuscation. As a result, by the early 1970s, 
the Party and the state were in such disarray that Mao had to bring Deng 
Xiaoping 邓小平, a man who had early on fallen foul of his Cultural Rev-
olution Leading Group but a capable bureaucratic manager, back from 
obscurity to help run the country.
Deng himself established a series of leadership-like groups to for-
mulate and implement policies for a country damaged by so many years 
of political extremism, educational collapse and administrative malaise. 
Although Deng was purged again in 1976, he returned to power and be-
came the first major leader of the post-Mao era. The bureaucrats he had 
employed in leadership groups to rebuild a functioning state from the 
rubble of the Cultural Revolution would eventually guide the country into 
the new era of Reform and Opening Up inaugurated in late 1978. These 
achievements were documented in great (if highly fictionalised) detail 
in the forty-eight-hour docu-drama, Deng Xiaoping During the Historical 
Transition 历史转折中的邓小平. The series aired throughout China in 
August 2014 to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Deng’s birth and 
to celebrate his achievements in turning the coun-
try away from Maoist ideology and launching the 
reforms that continue to transform the Communist 
Party-led People’s Republic of China.
Directed by Wu Ziniu 吴子牛, a member of 
the once avant-garde Fifth Generation of Chinese 
film-makers, the series also extolled the establish-
ment of China’s first Special Economic Zone in Shen-
zhen under what it showed to be the far-sighted and 
sagacious leadership of Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋, an ally 
Director of Deng Xiaoping 
During the Historical Transi-
tion, Wu Ziniu
Source: scol.com
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of Deng Xiaoping — and the father of Xi Jinping, China’s 
new paramount leader.
Deng, in his day, worked hard to dismantle the 
personality cult of Mao Zedong, and to ensure through 
the forging of an ethos of collective leadership that new 
mini-Maos would not appear. The party-state leaders 
who followed generally adhered to that approach (even 
if Deng himself enjoyed an extraordinary level of one-
man power until his demise in 1997). Xi Jinping, however, appears to be 
going in the opposite direction. In titular terms alone, he has amassed 
more titles and formal powers than any leader in the five generations of 
party leadership since the 1940s including Mao. He may well have more 
titles than any ruler of China since the Qing dynasty’s Qianlong 乾隆 
emperor in the eighteenth century, one whose Prosperous Age Xi Jinping 
and his cohort are said to have realised and are planning to surpass. He is 
now effectively head of ten party-state bodies, from the Party and army, 
as well as the People’s Republic itself, to seven small leading groups. Only 
two years into power ‘Big Daddy Xi’ 习大大, as the official media has taken 
to calling him, had become China’s CoE, ‘Chairman of Everything’.
Yet speculation remains rife as to Xi’s motivations, and whether his 
neutering of large swathes of the state bureaucracy (the nemesis at times 
of powerful predecessors such as Mao, and Deng as well) did not narrow 
policy options, and damage crucial institutional support in the median- to 
long-term. 
One among Many
Why has Xi Jinping acted with such pressing haste to amass power, impose 
his will on the system and encourage something reminiscent of a person-
ality cult? And why is the mainland media presenting him more as prim-
us than China’s primus inter pares? He is omnipresent: making speeches; 
posing for photographs with soldiers, workers, foreign leaders; demon-
Xi Jinping’s father, Xi 
Zhongxun
Source: molihua.org
Chairman of Everything
Xi Jinping was appointed General Secre-
tary of the Party’s Central Committee in 
November 2012. He assumed top state 
leadership roles, as President of the Peo-
ple’s Republic and Chairman of the Cen-
tral Military Commission, the following 
March.
He currently heads a number of 
smaller decision-making bodies within 
the Central Committee. The Central Lead-
ing Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs has traditionally been led by the 
General Secretary since Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 took office, but Xi’s leadership was only publicly 
revealed on 13 June 2014, when the Xinhua News Agency 新华通讯社, which had already 
broken with tradition by publishing multiple reports on the group’s traditionally closed-
door meetings that year, printed an article that provided titles for Xi and Deputy-Director 
Li Keqiang 李克强.
As General Secretary, Xi also assumed leadership of the Central Leading Group for 
Taiwan Affairs, as well as the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs and its congruent 
sister organisation, the Central Leading Group on National Security.
In November 2013, the Third Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee established the 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC) to consolidate decision-making on national 
security issues, a decision that Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang 秦刚 said ‘should 
make terrorists, extremists, and separatists nervous.’ The Politburo appointed Xi Jinping to 
head up the CNSC on 24 January 2014.
Three additional leading groups were formed in the wake of the Third Plenum and its 
emphasis on deepening reform. The Central Leading Group for All-Around Deepening Re-
form, established in December 2013, the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and 
Informatization, established in February 2014, and the Central Leading Group for Deepen-
ing Reform on National Defense, established in March 2014, are all led by Xi.
• General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee 中共中央总书记 
• President of China 国家主席
• Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission（党、国）中央军委主席
• Head of Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs 中央财经领导小组
• Head of Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs 中央对台工作领导小组
• Head of Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs (head of sister organisation, the 
Central Leading Group on National Security) 中央外事工作领导小组（中央国家安全工作
领导小组）
• Chairman of Central National Security Commission 中央国家安全委员会
• Head of Central Leading Group for All-Around Deepening Reform 中央全面深化改革领导
小组
Chinese President and Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission Xi Jinping visits the troops in Fujian 
province, on 30 July 2014. The visit came just days 
before Army Day, which falls on 1 August and marks the 
founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Photo: Li Gang/Xinhua
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strating his ‘common touch’ 
by showing up (relatively) 
unannounced in neighbour-
hoods and cheap restaurants. 
Official commentators ana-
lyse and praise his language 
for its erudition and canny 
use of classical quotations, 
the state-run press holds up 
his celebrity-singer wife Peng 
Liyuan 彭丽媛 as a fashion 
icon and model of Chinese 
womanhood. The propaganda 
onslaught behind Xi’s popu-
larity is savvy and social media-friendly. His elucubrations are already en-
shrined as the fifth milestone in the Party’s body of theory as ‘Xi Jinping’s 
Series of Important Speeches’习近平系列重要讲话; and there is even a mo-
bile phone app named Study Xi 学习to facilitate people who want to delve 
into his wisdom on the fly and follow his official itinerary.
In February 1956, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced 
the Cult of the Individual (or Personality Cult) that had thrived under the 
then recently deceased general secretary of the Party and premier Joseph 
Stalin. Khrushchev included in his condemnation such features of the cult 
as the repeated use of quotations from Stalin’s speeches and sayings that 
were used by bureaucrats as justifications for political action, the crushing 
of all forms of opposition by the secret police, an exaggeration of the role 
of the leader in Party history, the production of songs, entertainments and 
other public declarations of loyalty and adoration of the leader and so on. 
Some might reason that under Xi Jinping China is not witnessing a revived 
personality cult, indeed, the popularity of Big Daddy Xi still lacks the hys-
teria and adulation achieved by the Mao cult in the 1960s, but signs of 
what German thinkers once called the Führerprinzip (a belief that certain 
China’s First Lady Peng Liyuan and Xi Jinping arrive in 
Moscow in March 2013
Source: Dai Ou/Flickr1
gifted men are born to rule; 
that they deserve unswerving 
loyalty; and, that they take ab-
solute responsibility for their 
leadership) are in evidence. 
This is hardly surprising in 
a country where the Crown 
Jurist of the Third Reich Carl 
Schmitt enjoys considerable prestige among left-leaning thinkers. 
As we noted in our China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, Xi 
Jinping says China must learn to tell The China Story better. But under 
his dispensation, in an increasingly ideologically policed China, there is 
an unsettling possibility that everyone may have to repeat the same sto-
ry. In recent years, independent creative writing and reportage has flour-
ished in China, so it is hardly surprising that now the pumped up deci-
bels of the official China Dream as well as the crafted China Story of the 
party-state threaten to drown out the recent polyphony of the country’s 
online graphomaniacs.
Will such renewed attempts to replace the many with the one enjoy 
success? It is worth noting that Xi has led the Communist Party’s Polit-
buro in a number of study sessions devoted to Dialectical Materialism; 
it is equally sobering to recall what Simon Leys (the pen name of Pierre 
Ryckmans, the Australian-Belgian Sinologist who passed away in August 
2014) said about this underpinning theory of the Marxist–Leninist state a 
quarter of a century ago (notwithstanding Slavoj Žižek’s dogged burlesque 
defence of an ideal Marxism–Leninism):
Dialectics is the jolly art that enables the Supreme Leader never to 
make mistakes — for even if he did the wrong thing, he did it at the 
right time, which makes it right for him to have been wrong, whereas 
the Enemy, even if he did the right thing, did it at the wrong time, 
which makes it wrong for him to have been right.
A street poster in Shanghai promoting ‘The China Dream’
Source: flickr.com/hj223
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7–11 December: Tour of the South
Xi Jinping’s first major appearance as Gen-
eral Secretary of the Communist Party is 
during a tour of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan 
and Guangzhou, following in the footsteps 
of reformist leader Deng Xiaoping and in the 
imperial Ming and Qing tradition known as 
a Tour of the South 南巡. Xi commits to fur-
ther reform and opening up. He also visits 
military troops and the Internet giant Ten-
cent’s Shenzhen headquarters. 
29–30 December: Impoverished villages in 
Fuping county, Hebei province
Xi is photographed sitting cross-legged on a 
kang 炕 (traditional rural northern Chinese 
fire-heated bed) talking with villagers.
2013
2–5 February: Villages and Communities in 
Gansu Province
Xi promises to improve living conditions in 
China’s less developed northwest, home to 
many non-Han peoples. 
22–30 March: Russia, Tanzania, South Afri-
ca and Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
Xi’s first foreign tour as president is a nine-
day state visit to four countries. The choice 
of countries suggests Xi’s aspirations in the 
diplomatic sphere are to develop a coun-
terweight to US and European influence. 
During the tour, Xi attends the fifth BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Afri-
ca) summit in Durban, South Africa. In both 
Russia and Africa he speaks of communities 
of shared destiny. 
31 May–6 June: Trinidad and Tobago, Costa 
Rica and Mexico
State visits to talk trade and natural resources. 
7–8 June: USA
Xi visits US President Barack Obama on hol-
iday at the Sunnylands private estate near 
Palm Springs, California, for two days of 
informal talks. 
11–12 July : Xibaipo, Hebei 
Xi makes a symbolic visit to a (rebuilt)for-
mer revolutionary base and popular ‘Red 
tourism’ site. He urges China to ensure that 
‘the colour of Red China will never change’. 
28 August: Aircraft Carrier, Liaoning 
Province
Xi visits the Liaoning, China’s only aircraft 
carrier, which is still undergoing testing and 
crew training, at its base in the northeast-
ern province of Liaoning.
3–13 September: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and St Peters-
burg, Russia
Xi breaks from a tour of central Asian 
countries to attend the G20 summit in St 
Petersburg. He also attends the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation summit in Bish-
kek, Kyrgyzstan. In Astana, Kazakhstan, Xi 
proposes a Silk Road economic belt across 
central Asia. 
2–8 October: Malaysia and Indonesia
Xi courts Malaysia with a huge trade pact 
and closer military ties. He also visits Indo-
nesia and attends the APEC Summit in Nusa 
Dua, on Bali island.
28 December: Beijing, Steamed Buns
Xi queues for a simple meal of steamed 
buns 包子 in a branch of a low-end, state-
owned Beijing restaurant chain. Photo-
graphs and video footage of the event go 
viral on the Chinese Internet.
XI AT THE HELM: AN ITINERARY, BY AIDEN XIA 夏克余
2014
6–8 February: Sochi Winter Olympics 
Xi is an enthusiastic guest at the Winter 
Games. 
25 February: Walking around Beijing 
hutongs in the Smog 
After five days of heavy smog in Beijing, 
Xi is photographed walking around some 
of the city’s hutong alleys and talking with 
residents without a face-mask. State media 
headlines and social media promote the 
images under the rubric ‘breathing togeth-
er, sharing one destiny’. 
22 March–1 April: Netherlands, France, 
Germany, and Belgium
On state visits to four European countries, 
Xi attends the third Nuclear Security Sum-
mit in The Hague and a G7 meeting on the 
side. 
27–30 April: Xinjiang
Xi vows to ‘strike first’ against terrorism 
during a visit to the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region, which he calls China’s 
‘frontline of terror’. State media quotes him 
saying that China must ‘make terrorists be-
come like rats scurrying across a street as 
everybody shouts “beat them!” ’ He visits 
a village and a school near Kashgar, chats 
with Uyghurs, inspects troops and watches 
military training. 
20–21 May: Shanghai CICE Meeting and 
Russia Gas Deal 
Xi meets Russian President Vladimir Putin 
in Shanghai where they attend the Fourth 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence- 
Building Measures in Asia  and oversee the 
signing of a thirty-year gas deal between 
China and Russia estimated to be worth 
US$400 billion. 
3–4 July: South Korea
Xi leads a delegation to South Korea in-
cluding representatives from more than 
one hundred Chinese companies including 
Baidu and Alibaba. 
13–23 July: Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Vene-
zuela and Cuba
En route to Brazil, Xi stops over on Rhodes 
Island to meet the Greek Prime Minister 
and discuss their countries’ deepening ties. 
In Brazil, Xi attends the sixth BRICS summit 
in Fortaleza and spends three days with Pu-
tin and other BRICS presidents. 
30 July: Troops in Fujian Province 
Xi visits troops stationed in Fuzhou, Fujian 
province, a key military location across the 
straits from Taiwan. Xi vows to strike hard 
against corruption in the military ahead 
of the eighty-seventh anniversary of the 
founding of the PLA on 1 August. 
21–22 August: People’s Republic of Mon-
golia 
During a two-day state visit to Mongolia, Xi 
agrees to give Mongolia access to China's 
northern ports and the two countries agree 
to double annual bilateral trade. 
12–19 September: Tajikistan, The Maldives, 
Sri Lanka and India
Xi attends the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation summit in Dushanbe, meeting 
Putin before the summit opens. Other 
countries in the group are Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Xi then 
proceeds on a South Asian tour, with the 
final stop his first state visit to India.  
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In previous years, when China’s many stories 
proliferated, ‘crisis consciousness writers’, 
including Deng Yuwen 邓聿文 and Rong Jian 
荣剑, enumerated lists of ten problems facing 
China. Here we posit our own Ten Reasons for 
Chairman Xi’s unseemly haste since taking the 
reins of power:
1. Chinese leaders have long identified the 
first two decades of the new millennium 
as a period of strategic opportunity 战略 
机遇期 during which regional conditions 
and the global balance of power enable 
China best to advance its interests.
2. Given his history as a cadre working at var-
ious local, provincial and central levels of 
the government Xi Jinping is more aware of 
the profound systemic crises facing China 
than those around him.
3. He is riding a wave of support for change and popular goodwill to 
pursue an evolving agenda that aims to strengthen party-state rule 
and enhance China’s regional and global standing.
4. He faces international market and political pressures that are com-
pelling China to confront and deal with some of its most pressing eco-
nomic and social problems, in particular the crucial next stage in the 
transformation of the Chinese economy.
5. His status as a member of the Red ‘princelings’, or revolutionary 
nomenklatura, encourages the personal self-belief if not hubris that 
his mission is to restore the position of the Communist Party as China’s 
salvation. Believing in the theory that history is created by ‘Great 
Men’, he considers himself l’homme providentiel whose destiny is to 
lead the nation and the masses — a kind of secular Messiah complex.
6. Unless he can sideline sclerotic or obstructive forces and elements of 
the system, he knows he will not achieve these goals.
Deng Yuwen (top); Rong Jian (bottom)
Source: news.takungpao.com (top);  
dhnews.zjol.com.cn (bottom)
7. He is aware of the seriousness of the public crisis of confidence in the 
Party engendered by decades of rampant corruption.
8. He is sincere in his belief in the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist worldview, 
which is tempered by a form of revived Confucian statecraft that is 
popularly known as ‘imperial thinking’ 帝王思想.
9. Resistance to reform (including of corrupt practices) by the bureau-
cracy can only be countered by the consolidation of power.
10. The consensus among his fellow leaders that China needs a strong 
figurehead to forge a path ahead further empowers him.
In the process of expanding his power, Xi and his Politburo colleagues 
were handed a windfall when, in early 2012, the Chongqing security boss 
Wang Lijun 王立军, said to be in fear of his life after falling out with the 
city’s powerful Party Secretary Bo Xilai 薄熙来 and his (as it turned out) 
homicidal wife, Gu Kailai 谷开来, fled to Chengdu to seek asylum at the 
American Consulate. These bizarre events gave the incoming leadership a 
chance to purge a potentially dangerous (and popular) political rival all in 
the name of dealing with corruption and the abuse of power. Following the 
consolidation of his power, Xi proceeded to undertake a gradual elimina-
tion of prominent party and army leaders implicated in corrupt dealings 
(some would note that it was surprising that, given their prominent role 
in central politics, neither he nor his predecessor, Hu Jintao, had effective-
ly addressed the problem before). By September 2014, some forty-eight 
high-level Communist Party cadres, military officials and party-state 
bureaucrats (that is, those ranked at deputy provincial 
or ministerial level or above 副省、副部、副军级以上
干部) had been swept up in the post-Eighteenth Party 
Congress anti-corruption campaign led by Xi and Wang 
Qishan 王岐山, Secretary of the Party’s Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection. The highest level targets 
of the purge were the Hu–Wen-era Party Politburo mem-
ber Zhou Yongkang 周永康 and the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) General Xu Caihou 徐才厚. As this Yearbook 
PLA General Xu Caihou 
Source: tw.aboluowang.com
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
U
nd
er
 O
ne
 H
ea
ve
n 
G
er
em
ie
 R
 B
ar
m
é
xxviii
xxix
was going to press, Zhou was sentenced to life in jail for bribery and re-
vealing state secrets (terminal cancer allowed Xu to escape prosecution).  
Tigers Too Big to Cage
It is noteworthy that all forty-eight ‘Tigers’ 老虎, that is high-level corrupt 
officials, are reportedly from ‘commoner’ 平民 families with peasant or 
similarly humble origins. None came from the ranks of Xi’s peers, the ‘Red 
Second Generation’ 红二代 — children of the Communist Party founders 
from the Yan’an era through to the early People’s Republic. Neither were 
they of the ‘Office-holders' Second Generation’ 官二代 — the children 
of members of the first generation of high-level cadres (then defined as 
above Rank Thirteen in the Twenty-four Rank Cadre System 二十四级干
部制) and members of the inaugural National People’s Congress and the 
National People’s Political Consultative Committee in 1954. (Although Bo 
Xilai belonged to the Red Second Generation and was a Politburo member, 
he fell foul of the system before Xi Jinping launched his campaign to kill 
tigers and swat flies.)
And so while an impressive number of the progeny of the Party’s 
gentry are rumoured to be implicated in corrupt practices, they appear 
to have enjoyed a ‘soft landing’ in the anti-corruption campaign: being 
discreetly relocated, shunted into early retirement or quietly ‘redeployed’. 
It’s all very comfy: business as usual.
What has been rather more unexpected, however, is that after nearly 
two years of the campaign, members of the privileged families of the 
party-state went on the record to state why they are above the grimy 
business of corruption. Members of this group have been of interest to 
The China Story Project for some years, and they featured in ‘Red Eclipse’, 
the conclusion to our China Story Yearbook 2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse. In 
the closed system of China’s party-state these seemingly defunct members 
of the ageing party gentry, their fellows and their families should not 
be underestimated; they cannot be dismissed, as some would have it, as 
marginal figures or has-beens. Nor is it wise to overlook the fury that 
their hauteur and unthinking air of superiority provokes among those 
members of the bureaucracy without such lofty connections, or among 
China’s aspirational classes more generally.
 In particular, members of the Red Second Generation, along with 
optimists of various backgrounds, privately argue that Xi Jinping has 
amassed power as a stopgap measure to enable him to deal with fractious 
Party colleagues. Among other things, and to assuage hardline attitudes 
at senior levels, he has conceded to repressive policies across the board 
of a kind not seen since the early months of Jiang Zemin’s 江泽民 decade 
of tenure from 1989. Over time, and with the inauguration of a new Polit-
buro in 2017, it is reasoned, Xi will reveal his reformist agenda and guide 
China towards a major political transition. ‘Gorbachev Dreaming’ of this 
kind has offered respite for wishful thinkers for a quarter of a century. It 
continues to kindle hope even among some of the most hopeless.
Sagacious Revivalism
For the nomenklatura, the notions of All-Under-Heaven and Shared Des-
tiny underpin the role of the Party in the state; they see these ideas as 
closely aligned with the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist ideology that justifies 
the Party’s leading role. While the formulation Shared Destiny might be 
relatively new, party thinkers have always emphasised that the Party gives 
political expression to a community of shared aspirations and val-
ues. In earlier eras the vanguard of this community was the rev-
olutionary workers and peasants, and later the worker-peasant- 
soldier triumvirate of the Mao era. In the post-1978 reform era, Deng 
Xiaoping added intellectuals to the community and the Jiang Zemin dec-
ade of the 1990s folded business people and capitalists into its embrace 
as well. Under Hu Jintao, who led the party collective in the first decade 
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Tigers Explain Tigers
Ye Xiangzhen 叶向真, also known as Lingzi 凌子, Deputy 
Head of the All-China Confucius Academy 中华孔子学会
副会长, member of the Fourth Generation of film-makers 
and eldest daughter of Marshall Ye Jianying 叶剑英 (one of 
the founders of the PLA):
The Red Second Generation witnessed the frugal-
ity and struggles of their parents’ generation, the 
fact that they were willing to shed blood and mar-
tyr themselves for the nation. They are profoundly 
influenced by their fathers and, relatively speaking, 
are not easily corruptible.
Zhou Bingde 周秉德, former Deputy Chief of the China News 
Agency and niece of former premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来:
The reason that bureaucrats from a Red Second Generation 
background are only very rarely involved in corruption is 
that they have inherited the tradition from their parents of 
placing the People and the Nation above all.
Tao Siliang 陶斯亮, the pre-1966 Party elder Tao Zhu’s 陶铸 daugh-
ter, Deputy Director of the China Mayors’ Association 中国市长 
协会:
Through revolution and the heritage of blood our parents 
bequeathed to us the Red Gene 红色基因. I don’t believe 
that this gene will ever lose its lustre, because we will carry 
it forward. I’m willing to admit that I’m a Red Second 
Generation because that’s just what I am, [a member of] 
the second generation of revolutionaries. It is time for us to 
play our natural, positive role and support General Secretary 
Xi Jinping in carrying out the anti-corruption campaign 
pursuing reform to the end.
Ye Xiangzhen. The Ye family 
remains one of China’s most  
powerful in both politics and 
business
Photo: Sina.cn
Zhou Bingde is the 
niece of Zhou Enlai
Photo: powerapple.com
Tao Siliang 
Photo: zhts20062006.lofter.
com
Hu Muying 胡木英, the daughter of Party prop-
agandist and writer extraordinaire Hu Qiaomu 
胡乔木, and the organiser of The Children of Yan’an 
北京延安儿女联谊会:
The Centre under General Secretary Xi Jinping 
has raised high the banners of ‘Opposing the 
Four Winds’, Anti-Corruption Pro-Frugality and 
Mass Line Education. These Three Banners are 
backed up by real action against the ill-winds 
and pernicious miasma that has suffused 
our world for many years, and he has taken the 
knife to both Tigers and Flies.
This is a Life and Death Struggle! I sincerely 
hope that our Red Second Generation will 
clearly recognise the [gravity of the] situation, 
and during this struggle firmly support and 
closely coordinate with our Central Committee 
led by General Secretary Xi Jinping so that we 
can contribute our meagre energies, carry 
on the revolutionary legacy of our fathers’ 
generation of party members, pass on and 
enhance the positive energy of the past, 
discover and support all of society’s healthy 
energies, not create interference by means 
of distracting broadsides, not create more 
problems than we help resolve, not believe 
in or spread rumours, not interfere with the 
strategy of the Centre and, like our fathers 
before us, and for the sake of the enterprise of 
the Party and the greater good of the People, to 
cast aside our individual needs, overcome our 
present or historical resentments and grudges, 
unite as one and work to make China wealthy 
and strong and realise the great dream of the 
renaissance of the Chinese nation.
‘It is for real now! The breeze is blow-
ing away the evil air,’ said Hu Muying 
when she convened The Children of 
Yan’an at Spring Festival in 2014. Hu 
Muying is the daughter of the late Hu 
Qiaomu, a former politburo member 
and writer who served both Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
Photo: dvpd.com.cn
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of the twenty-first centu-
ry, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party finally became 
a party of ‘all the people’ 
— an expression Mao and 
his colleagues denounced 
as revisionist in the 1960s 
when accusing the Soviet 
Union of having lost its 
revolutionary edge. But it 
is just this claim, that the 
Party represents the inter-
ests of the ‘Chinese nation’ 
中华民族 including all the 
communities and strata 
of Chinese society, that 
forms the bedrock of Par-
ty legitimacy today. A re-
newed emphasis on the 
collective, on Party probi-
ty, on traditional values over Western norms, on quelling the boisterous 
Internet, repressing dissent with a vigour not seen since the post-4 June 
1989 purge, uprooting the sprouts of civil society and persecuting people 
of conscience in every sphere, have even led some Beijing wits to call Xi 
Jinping’s China ‘West Korea’ 西朝鲜.
Party education and propaganda, or ‘publicity’ as China’s propagan-
dists prefer to call it these days, is suffused with ideas of collective and 
Shared Destiny. The cover of this Yearbook includes many of their favour-
ite terms in a word cloud in the shape of the Chinese character 共 ‘com-
mon’ or ‘co-joined’. From the Red Samaritan Lei Feng 雷锋 to the model 
martyr party member Jiao Yulu 焦裕禄, to PLA heroics, the ethos of the 
collective suffuses the public life of the People’s Republic. The contributors 
Emulate Comrade Jiao Yulu, Comrade Mao Zedong’s Good Student
Source: chineseposters.net
to this Yearbook examine this topic from various angles. Paradoxically, it 
was under the rubric of collectivity during the Maoist era that the greatest 
damage was inflicted on Chinese individuals and families. Today, China 
promises that its revived collective mentality, shored up by a piecemeal 
use of traditional political thinking, is the only way to realise national 
goals, even as many observers note that the collective aspirations articu-
lated and pursued by the state will come at a high cost, perhaps making it 
impossible for Chinese society to become mature, modern, self-aware and 
politically responsible even as it becomes rich and prosperous. 
In its stead, we see another Chinese leader drawing inspiration not 
only from modern political ideology but also from the tradition of state 
Confucianism to promote their vision for China. In our 2013 Yearbook, 
Civilising China, we noted attempts in the 1930s by the Nationalist lead-
er Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 to modern-
ise the Republic of China by employing 
ideas and values from the Confucian 
past in his New Life Movement 新生活 
運動. Today, Xi Jinping refers to the 
body of thinking and practice that was 
used by dynastic leaders for over two 
millennium to re-introduce Confucian 
ideas about virtue, morality, hierarchy, 
acceptable behaviour, social cohesion 
and prosperity (the countervailing ele-
ments of Confucianism that supported 
dissent, criticism of excessive power 
and humanity are quietly passed over). 
A punctilious Xi Jinping has also called 
for the institution of new state ceremo-
nies that will intermesh with numerous 
new regulations regarding how public 
officials should comport themselves 
Jiao Yulu, the model cadre
Source: chineseposters.net
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and use public funds. In such pronouncements we find echoes of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s 1943 wartime book China’s Destiny《中國之命運》 (most proba-
bly ghost-written by Chiang’s party theorist, T’ao Hsi-sheng 陶希聖). 
Prior to Chiang Kai-shek’s talk of destiny, joint concerns and re-
gional harmony, in 1940 the Japanese imperial government, which 
made it clear that as Asia’s superior nation/race/military power/econ-
omy Japan was best placed to lead the region by expelling Western im-
perialism and imposing its own rule, announced that it would construct 
a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere 大東亞共榮圏. The sphere 
would realise an age-old Japanese version of the tianxia vision of 
All-Under-Heaven. In Japanese this was called hakkō ichiu 八紘一宇, Eight 
Realms Under One Rule. It is hardly surprising then that with renewed 
talk of creating in East Asia a harmonious region or a Community of 
Shared Destiny, some recall the grand rhetoric, and failed ambitions, of 
that earlier era.
In November 2014, Xi Jinping returned to the topic of the Commu-
nity of Shared Destiny during the APEC Summit held in Beijing. As this 
theme becomes further embedded in Chinese official discourse, and as 
China more confidently engages in global governance, an abiding element 
of China’s Maoist era — that of the collective outweighing the individual in 
every sphere of activity — will continue to shape the country’s behaviour 
internally, as well as externally. While many in Asia and the Pacific may 
indeed concede that they are 
bound by an economic shared 
destiny to the People’s Repub-
lic, it is hardly certain that 
China’s neighbours or trade 
partners will want to share 
entirely the increasingly con-
fining vision of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
Eight Realms Under One Rule
hakkō ichiu 八紘一宇 
Source: blog.goo.ne.jp/nihon-revival
China’s Destiny: Quotations from Generalissimo Chiang 
To make China strong and independent, it is necessary that 
all citizens, from the highest to the lowest, must be united in 
one purpose; that we rouse ourselves for thorough reform, 
eliminate frivolity by insisting upon honesty, and discourage 
indolence by upholding active endeavor. Our thinking must 
be realistic, our living disciplined; our duties must be per-
formed with a sense of responsibility, and our actions must 
be orderly; and we must seek the truth through practical 
work, and progressively strive for improvement. Only in this 
way can China stand on a footing of equality in the Family of 
Nations and share the responsibility for permanent world 
peace and the liberation of mankind.
Our Chinese nation must crystalise into a solid, rocklike 
body of national defense, needless to say, no individual may 
enjoy the ‘freedom’ of a loose grain of sand. …[I]n the rela-
tion between the individual and the state, whether during or 
after the war, ‘individual freedom’ of the type of loose grains 
of sand cannot be tolerated.
If China’s adult citizens cannot unite on a large scale, our unity cannot long endure, 
and we shall experience the humiliation and shame of being ‘a pan of loose sand’  
[一盤散沙] and be laughed at for our ‘five minutes of boiling blood’ [五分鐘的熱血].
If our internal affairs are unified, if the strength of our state is centralized, and if, in ad-
dition, all the citizens can join in a united effort, then China’s destiny may be epitomized 
by the following words: ‘Be sincere and united, uphold the Government and obey the 
law’; and in that event, China’s destiny will be independence and liberty.
It has been previously stated that the inherent virtues of the Chinese people consist of 
the ability to endure humiliation, accept responsibility, understand thrift, and possess 
a sense of honor. Because the Chinese people possess these virtues, they are not afraid 
of strong enemies, and do not take advantage of minorities and the weak, but rather 
apply their traditional principle of magnanimity, and treat others as they wish to be 
treated themselves. For this reason they have been for thousands of years the leaders 
of the people of Asia in ‘preserving the perishing and sus-
taining those that might be destroyed’, and in ‘helping the 
weak and assisting the fallen’. As a consequence, there is 
no historical evidence of economic exploitation or of po-
litical domination of the peoples of Asia during the period 
when China was strong and prosperous; nor was there any 
imperialism or colonialism.
[A]fter China has become independent and strong, she will 
definitely not wish the sufferings she has endured to be 
inflicted upon other countries, and furthermore, after the 
overthrow of Japanese imperialism, she will not even con-
sider assuming the mantle of Japanese imperialism with 
the idea of ‘leading Asia’.
Nationalist Party leader Chiang  
Kai-shek’s 1943 wartime book  
China’s Destiny 
Photo: bbs.tiexue.net
Chiang Kai-shek
Source: chenmodemaque.blog.163.
com
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The China Story Yearbook
China Story Yearbook is a project initiated by the Australian Centre 
on China in the World (CIW) at The Australian National University 
(ANU). It is part of a broad undertaking aimed at understanding The 
China Story 中国的故事, both as portrayed by official China, and 
from various other perspectives. CIW is a Commonwealth Govern- 
ment–ANU initiative that was announced by then Australian prime 
minister, the Hon Kevin Rudd MP, in April 2010 on the occasion of the 
Seventieth George E Morrison Lecture at ANU. The Centre was created to 
allow for a more holistic approach to the study of contemporary China: 
one that considers the forces, personalities and ideas at work in China 
while attempting to understand the broad spectrum of China’s socio- 
political, economic and cultural realities. CIW encourages such an approach 
by supporting humanities-led research that engages actively with the social 
sciences. The resulting admix has, we believe, both policy relevance and 
value for the engaged public.
 The Australian Centre on China in the World promotes a New 
Sinology, that is a study of China underpinned by an understanding of 
the disparate living traditions of Chinese thought, language and culture. 
Xi Jinping’s China is a gift to the New Sinologist, for the world of the 
Chairman of Everything requires the serious student of contemporary 
China to be familiar with basic classical Chinese thought, history and 
literature, appreciate the abiding influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas and 
the dialectic prestidigitations of Mao Zedong Thought. Similarly, it requires 
an understanding of neo-liberal thinking and agendas in the guise of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 具有中国特色的社会主义. Those 
who pursue narrow disciplinary approaches to China today serve well the 
metrics-obsessed international academy, but they may readily fail to offer 
greater and necessary insights into China and its place in the world.
Most of the scholars and writers whose work features in Shared 
Destiny are members of or are associated with the Australian Centre on 
China in the World. They survey China’s regional posture, urban change, 
politics, social activism and law, economics, the Internet, cultural mores 
and arts, history and thought during the second year of Xi Jinping’s tenure 
as party-state leader. Their contributions cover the years 2013–2014, updat-
ed to December 2014, and offer an informed perspective on recent develop-
ments in China and what these may mean for the future. 
Shared community, shared values, the imposition of collectivity — it is 
under such a system that difference is discriminated against, policed and co-
erced. The account in this Yearbook is a sobering one. We position our story 
between two plenary sessions of the Chinese Communist Party, the Third 
Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2013, which focused 
on economics, and which is the topic of Chapter 1 by Jane Golley, and the 
final chapter by Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi, which concentrates on 
the new legal regime under Xi Jinping, the theme of the Party’s Fourth Ple-
num in October 2014. In Chapter 2, Richard Rigby and Brendan Taylor look 
more closely at Xi’s foreign policy, an area which saw some major missteps 
in 2013 and 2014, perhaps due to what we might well call the Maoist style 
of Xi and his advising generals. This approach has been celebrated in the 
official Chinese media as a form of ‘foreign policy acupuncture’ 点穴外交. I 
would suggest that the general tactics used — action, reaction, recalibration, 
withdrawal — is a disruptive style that recalls Mao’s famous Sixteen-charac-
ter Mantra 十六字诀 on guerilla warfare: ‘When the enemy advances, we re-
treat; when the enemy makes camp we harass; when the enemy is exhausted 
we fight; and, when the enemy retreats we pursue’ 敌进我退，敌驻我扰，敌
疲我打，敌退我追. It is an approach that purposely creates an atmosphere 
of uncertainty and tension. To appreciate the mindset behind such a strategy 
students of China need to familiarise themselves with such Maoist classics as 
On Guerilla Warfare《论游击战》and On Contradiction《矛盾论》. 
Chapter 3, by Jeremy Goldkorn, looks at the cordoning of the Chinese 
Internet from a world wide web that proffers a community of shared infor-
mation, while in Chapter 4, Gloria Davies considers how official China talks 
to and about itself.  In Chapter 5, Carolyn Cartier examines the shared desti-
nies of people flooding Chinese cities from the countryside and the common 
spaces shared by Chinese tourists and immigrants around the world.  
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Chapters are arranged thematically and they are interspersed with 
information windows that highlight particular words, issues, ideas, statis-
tics, people and events. Forums, or ‘interstices’, expand on the contents of 
chapters or offer a dedicated discussion of a topic of relevance to the year. 
These include an overview of the classical literary and cultural references 
in Xi Jinping speeches by Benjamin Penny; an essay on rules that seek to 
codify family values, in particular filial piety, by Zou Shu Cheng 邹述丞; a 
look at confusing times for foreign business in China by Antony Dapiran; 
a meditation on the concept of the right to speak or huayuquan 话语权 
by David Murphy; portraits of Sino-Russian and Sino-European relations 
by Rebecca Fabrizi; a discussion of the United Front work of the Party by 
Gerry Groot; the politics of protest in Taiwan by Mark Harrison; official 
policy on the arts by Linda Jaivin; Chinese cinema by Qian Ying 钱颖; con-
temporary Chinese art by Chen Shuxia 陈淑霞; Chinese families going 
global by Luigi Tomba, and, finally, the topic of shared air by Wuqiriletu. 
The Chronology at the end of the volume provides an overview of the year 
under discussion. Footnotes and the CIW–Danwei Archive of source mate-
rials are available online at: http://thechinastory.org/dossier/.  
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The Cover Image
The Yearbook cover consists of a word cloud 
in the shape of the character 共 gong, ‘shared’, 
‘collective’ or ‘common’, followed by the three 
other characters that make up the expression 
Shared Destiny 共同命运, the theme of this 
book.
The word cloud features expressions and 
official clichés that have gained purchase, or 
renewed currency in the Xi Jinping era. For 
example, the top left-hand corner of the char-
acter gong includes such terms as: ‘self-culti-
vation’ 修身, taken from the Confucian clas-
sic The Great Learning《大学》; ‘breathing 
the same air’ 同呼吸; ‘sincerity and trust’ 诚
信; and, ‘advancing together’ 共同前进. Or, in the top right-hand corner: 
‘self-reliant and self-strengthening’ 自立自强; ‘exploit the public to benefit 
the private’ 假公济私; and, ‘mollify people from afar’ 柔远人. Other terms 
date from the Maoist era (1949–1978) of the People’s Republic or earlier, 
expressions that feature in Xi’s remarks on the Community of Shared Des-
tiny, or in pronouncements contained in his ever-expanding ‘series of im-
portant speeches’.
As mentioned earlier, the Xi era is a boon for the New Sinologist: in 
today’s China, party-state rule is attempting to preserve the core of the 
cloak-and-dagger Leninist state while its leaders tirelessly repeat Maoist 
dicta which are amplified by socialist-style neo-liberal policies wedded 
to cosmetic institutional Confucian conservatism. The Yearbook word 
cloud cover, which employs the white-on-red palette used for billboards 
featuring party slogans and exhortations, was designed by Markuz Wernli 
and succinctly reflects this exercise in the incommensurable.
Edited by Geremie R  Barmé with Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn
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the shape of the character 共 gong
Artwork: Markuz Wernli
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ALL THAT IS OLD
Classic Xi Jinping: On Acquiring Moral Character 
·  BENJAMIN PENNY
Institutionalising Filial Piety 
·  ZOU SHU CHENG 邹述丞
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In September 2013, Reuters reported ‘three independent sources’ as say-
ing that Xi Jinping believes China is 
‘losing its moral compass’ as a result 
of the country’s extraordinary eco-
nomic growth and the national mania 
for making money. Xi believes that 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism 
can help to provide a moral bulwark 
against corruption. One of Reuters’ 
sources claimed that Xi realises his 
anti-corruption campaign can only 
‘cure symptoms’ while ‘reform of the 
political system and faiths are needed 
to cure the disease of corruption’. 
Former president Hu Jintao had 
famously claimed that Confucianism 
would help construct a ‘harmonious 
society’. In diagnosing a moral illness 
at the heart of contemporary China 
CLASSIC XI JINPING: ON  
ACQUIRING M O R A L  C H A R AC T E R
Benjamin Penny
and prescribing a treatment of faith, 
Xi seems to go one step further. This 
does not herald a wholesale liberal-
isation of the party-state’s approach 
to religion. Rather, Xi reportedly said 
that while ‘traditional cultures will not 
be comprehensively popularised … 
attacks on them will be avoided’. For 
the leader of an officially atheist ruling 
party to make these statements is, if 
true, extraordinary.
Xi’s respect, even reverence, for 
traditional Chinese cultural traditions 
(and their usefulness in the present) 
extends to Chinese literature and phi-
losophy: he leavens his political es-
says, speeches and commentaries on 
contemporary society with quotations 
in literary Chinese from both pre-mod-
ern and ancient texts. No leader in 
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China has so ostentatiously drawn from the Chinese literary tradition since the 
People’s Republic of China’s first, Mao Zedong. 
In May 2014, the People’s Daily 人民日报 helpfully published six feature arti-
cles grouping Xi’s chosen quotations under the headings of ‘cultivating morality’, 
‘learning’, ‘the virtues of officials’, ‘All-Under-Heaven’ 天下, ‘the foundations of 
the people’ and ‘the principles of government’. The People’s Daily editor provides 
the source for each quotation, a translation into modern Chinese and briefly dis-
cusses its relevance to China today, with a focus on the appropriate values and 
behaviour of party and public officials. This first of the six feature articles, selec-
tions from which are translated here, appeared in the People’s Daily on 8 May 
2014. 
Xi Jinping’s use of classical aphorisms as promoted by the People’s Daily 
Source: paper.people.com.cn
Wherever the will urges, no-
where is too far to venture:
Neither mountains nor seas can 
contain it.
If there is will, no barrier can 
stop it:
The best armies and toughest 
armour are no defence.
The Complete Anthology of 
Aphorisms, Qing dynasty
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 
National Organisational Work Confer-
ence, 28 June 2013.
Commentary: 
Why does one become an official? 
What is being an official for? Is it just 
to secure a job for life and profit from 
a steady flow of cash? Or is it to take 
hold of an official seal and use power 
for personal gain? Or is it to serve the 
people? One’s values determine the 
answer to these questions. Leading 
cadres all face the three big questions: 
‘Who is it for?’, ‘Who can I rely on?’ 
and ‘Who am I?’ Before answering 
these three questions, they must first 
ask themselves, ‘Where is my will?’
As if we were on the brink of a 
deep gulf,
As if we were treading on thin 
ice. 
The Book of Songs,  
Zhou dynasty,  
translated by James Legge
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech at 
the celebratory conference mark-
ing the eightieth anniversary of the 
establishment of the Central Party 
School, and the opening ceremo-
ny of the 2013 Spring Festival term, 
1 March 2013.
Commentary: 
When Xi Jinping quoted these words 
he was explaining that leading cadres 
of the Party should always revere the 
authority that is granted to them by 
the people and respect the confidence 
that is placed in them by the organisa-
tion. They should use that power with 
great caution and never become even 
the least bit lazy.
The Chairman says: Xi Jinping quotes the classics
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There is nothing more visible 
than what is secret, and noth-
ing more manifest than what is 
minute. Therefore the superior 
man is watchful over himself, 
when he is alone.
The Record of Ritual  
Western Han dynasty, 
 translated by James Legge
Quoted in Xi Jinping, ‘Seeking Out 
the Elevated Realm of “Watching Over 
Oneself When Alone” ’ from his New 
Conversations in Zhejiang 之江新语, 
2007.
Commentary: 
In their letters of repentance many 
corrupt officials say that sooner or 
later, after first taking a bribe, they 
felt ill-at-ease: this unease is the root 
of goodness. If they had promptly 
restrained their greed and guarded 
their good heart, they would not have 
slipped into the abyss. ‘Watching Over 
Oneself when Alone’ has been a mod-
el for people past and present. Con-
stantly consult your conscience to see 
whether you feel guilt.
We consider people to be people 
because of speech. If a person is 
unable to speak, how can he be 
considered a person? We consider 
speech to be speech because of 
trust. If something is spoken with-
out trust, how can it be considered 
speech?
The Guliang Commentary on the 
Spring and Autumn Annals,  
Warring States period
Quoted in Xi Jinping, Act on Real 
Cases, Escape from Old Models, 2006.
Commentary:
People are social animals who relate 
through speech. This is what separates 
people from the animals. Speech ena-
bles the transmission of information. 
We understand each other through 
continuous interchange, and it is how 
we express confidence in each other. 
Trust is the foundational morality of 
social interaction. In reality, we come 
across many people who are good at 
making unfounded opinions sound 
wise, but those opinions can never be 
trusted as they are not grounded in 
reality. The more beautiful the words, 
the more there is an overdraft on trust.
Following goodness is like 
climbing a mountain, following 
evil is like being swept away in 
a landslide.
The Discourses of the States, 
Warring States period
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 
Symposium for Outstanding Youth 
Delegates from All Walks of Life, 4 May 
2013.
Commentary: 
If people are strictly disciplined almost 
any problem can be overcome. But if 
there is no external supervision, it is 
very hard to overcome moral inertia 
and always to be aware of nurturing a 
good heart. If people want to abandon 
evil and follow good, they have to have 
a powerful faith in their hearts for a 
bulwark. They also need good teachers 
and helpful friends for mutual criti-
cism. They must be strong in their res-
olution, and careful with the friends 
they make. This is especially important 
for young leading cadres.
Classical clichés: moon, bamboo, scrolls and scholars 
Source: cpc.people.com.cn
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The commander of the forces of 
a large state may be carried off, 
but the will of even a common 
man cannot be taken from him.
The Analects, Zhou dynasty 
translated by James Legge
Quoted in Xi Jinping, ‘A Discussion on 
Taking up a Government Post’, March 
1990, from Cast off Poverty, 1992.
Commentary:
In this crucial period of reform we of-
ten face doubts and evasions, and see 
people looking on from the sidelines. 
If leading cadres hold true to their 
ambitions then all obstacles can be 
surmounted and we can advance with 
courage. If not, then how will we ass-
ume the heavy responsibility of history?
To be above the power of riches 
and honours to make him dis-
sipated, of poverty and mean 
condition to make him swerve 
from principle, and of power 
and force to make him bend.
Mencius, Warring States period, 
translated by James Legge
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech at 
the celebratory conference mark-
ing the eightieth anniversary of the 
establishment of the Central Party 
School, and the opening ceremo-
ny of the 2013 Spring Festival term, 
1 March 2013.
Commentary: 
In this new period, leading cadres are 
faced with many dangerous and diffi-
cult tasks, but also many temptations. 
To handle the easy situations without 
showing arrogance and the difficult 
situations without complaint, they 
must first ask themselves where ‘the 
anchor of morality and justice’ is in 
their hearts.
Calm the World — Classical Chinese Governance and Wisdom, 
a publication inspired by Xi Jinping’s aphorisms, published by 
the People’s Daily Overseas Publishing House in 2015 
Photo: pph166.com
You may shatter rock but you 
cannot take away its hardness, 
you may grind cinnabar but you 
cannot take away its redness.
The Springs and Autumns  
of Mister Lü, Qin dynasty
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 
Meeting for Summarising the First 
Stage of the Mass Line Educational 
Campaign and Planning the Second 
Stage. 
Commentary: 
Hardness is an intrinsic quality of 
rock, and red is the natural colour of 
cinnabar. It is impossible to change 
these characteristics with force. Ap-
plying this to people, is it possible for 
leading cadres to withstand trials and 
tribulations in today’s comprehensive 
deepening of reform? Faced with com-
plex situations and all kinds of induce-
ments they must first ask themselves, 
‘What are the intrinsic qualities of a 
Communist Party member?’
The gentleman constantly 
examines himself for transgres-
sions
Kangcangzi, Tang dynasty
Quoted in Xi Jinping, ‘Being a Man and 
Being an Official’ from his New Conver-
sations in Zhejiang, 2007.
Commentary: 
Capable men are tolerant so they are 
unwilling to point out your short- 
comings. Lesser men flatter you as they 
have a favour to ask. Relatives will sub-
mit to your whims because they cher-
ish you. Over time, these conditions 
can easily give rise to an illusion of 
perfection. The process of cultivation 
must be like looking into a mirror, con-
stantly reflecting on yourself, inspect-
ing yourself for insufficiencies. 
Classical Aphorisms of Xi Jinping, published by the 
People’s Daily Overseas Publishing House in 2015 
Photo: theory.people.com.cn
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Cultivate the heart and regulate 
the body, then you will be able 
to govern All-Under-Heaven.
Wang Anshi, Commentary on  
the ‘Great Plan’ section of the 
Book of History, Song dynasty
Quoted in Xi Jinping, ‘Being a Man and 
Being an Official’ from his New Conver-
sations in Zhejiang, 2007.
Commentary: 
The Chinese understand that however 
exquisitely organised a political sys-
tem is, it must be put into practice by 
real people. The cultivation level of 
individuals is the most basic thing.  Be-
ing able to ‘cultivate the heart and reg-
ulate the body’ is an essential accom-
plishment for those in government, 
and a prerequisite for seeking a career 
as an official. Nowadays, when the 
central authorities employ people they 
pay great attention to both ability and 
integrity, and are primary concerned 
with virtue. In this they follow practic-
es that come directly from the wisdom 
of the ancients.
Remaining hard and strong af-
ter 1000 buffetings and 10,000 
beatings, no matter that you 
are blown in all directions.
Zheng Banqiao, ‘Bamboo Rocks’, 
Qing dynasty
Quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech when 
inspecting Peking University, 4 May 
2014.
Commentary: 
Bamboo grows tall even in soil that 
is infertile, and remains stubborn 
and tough when buffeted and blown 
around. In this new period, leading 
cadres face all sorts of dilemmas in 
reform, and all manner of temptation 
to make a profit. China’s development 
faces complex international and do-
mestic circumstances. We must base 
ourselves in historical conditions and 
contemporary realities, stay sure on 
our path of development, and remain 
confident in our ideology and institu-
tions.
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A drunken man surnamed Dong walked into a Chongqing po-
lice station one evening in late 2013, 
shouting, ‘I’m denouncing my son in 
the name of righteousness!’ 大义灭亲. 
His son’s ‘crime’ was to have invited 
his mother, who had abandoned the 
family ten years earlier, to his thirtieth 
birthday dinner. Mr Dong had stormed 
out of the dinner and gone straight to 
the police station. He felt entitled to 
denounce his son for neglect because 
the traditional supreme Confucian vir-
tue of ‘filial piety’ 孝, the responsibility 
of sons and daughters to respect and 
look after their parents, is enshrined 
in the amended Law of Protection of 
the Rights and Interests of Elderly Peo-
ple 老年人权益保障法, which came into 
effect on 1 July 2013. The 2013 law was 
an amendment of the original 1996 
law of the same name that identified 
the rights and responsibilities of old-
er citizens. These include the respon-
sibility of the state to provide welfare 
as well as social programs that utilise 
the expertise and knowledge of the el-
derly.
INSTITUTIONALISING 
FILIAL PIETY
Zou Shu Cheng 邹述丞
The burden of filial piety
Source: China Youth Newspaper, edu.163.com
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
In
st
itu
tio
na
lis
in
g 
Fi
lia
l P
ie
ty
 
Zo
u 
Sh
u 
Ch
en
g 
邹
述
丞
16
17
Legal cases involving parents de-
nouncing their children for ‘unfilial’ 
behaviour date back to the Qin dynas-
ty (221–206 BCE). Fifteen major city 
governments based a 2013 public ed-
ucation campaign about the new law 
on the famous ‘Twenty-four Filial Acts’ 
二十四孝 of the Yuan dynasty (1271–
1368), exemplary and occasionally gro-
tesque filial behaviours (a son tasting 
his father’s faeces to assess his health, 
for example) promoted through graph-
ic representation.  
Practical considerations guide 
today’s law. In 2013, there were more 
than 200 million people over the age 
The 2013 law states its purpose 
as ‘promoting the Chinese nation’s 
virtues of respecting the elderly, nur-
turing the elderly and assisting the 
elderly’ 弘扬中华民族敬老养老、助老 
的美德. Key provisions relate to the 
responsibility of children to their 
parents. The law also increases con-
cessions on basic services, improves 
access to social services and pensions 
and encourages local governments to 
shoulder more of the burden of care, 
recognising that the long-standing 
one-child policy means most elderly 
parents in the future will only have 
one child to look after them.
Stone sculpture of a filial son, Fenggang county, Guizhou province 
Source: gz.xinhuanet.com
of sixty in China, some fifteen percent 
of the population. By 2030, roughly 
one in four Chinese will be over sixty. 
Widespread media speculation about 
a pension fund deficit created panic 
and led the Ministry of Human Re-
sources and Social Security to claim in 
February 2014 that the fund was 400 
billion yuan in surplus. Still, the case 
highlights some of the challenges the 
country faces.
Critics of the filiality law argue 
that the primary responsibility for 
aged care ought to lie with society, not 
individuals, many of whom may be in-
capable of looking after their parents. 
Although the law divvies up respon-
sibility for caring for the elderly be-
tween individuals, local and national 
governments, the burden falls most 
heavily on those born in the 1980s and 
beyond. Others, including micro-blog-
gers, claim the law sets the bar too 
high, leaving most children vulnerable 
to accusations of being ‘unfilial’ — a 
complaint made about the original 
Yuan-dynasty precepts as well. 
As for Dong, it turned out that he 
was only fifty-eight. His son is safe for 
another two years, at least legally. 
Filial piety set in stone
Source: haiwai.people.com.cn
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MARKUZ CH 1
GREAT EXPECTATIONS
Jane Golley
THIRD PLENUMS, typically held a year 
after the instalment of a new team of Com-
munist Party leaders, had delivered major 
breakthroughs in the past. Deng Xiaoping fa-
mously initiated the process that would be-
come known as Reform and Opening Up at the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Commit-
tee in December 1978. And both President Xi 
Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang had signalled 
a strong commitment to reigniting the reform 
process. The pressure was on.  
Image: The Square and Circle Mansion, Shenyang, Liaoning province
Source: Aaron Sorell/Flickr
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The Resolution and the Neo-Liberal China Dream 
On 12 November 2013, the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Commit-
tee passed a ‘Resolution Concerning some Major Issues in Comprehensive-
ly Deepening Reform’ (henceforth ‘the Resolution’). That the Resolution 
assigned a ‘decisive’ role for the market in China’s economy caused much 
excitement, with analysts scouring the lengthy document for evidence of 
how this would be achieved. Writing in the China Leadership Monitor in 
March 2014, Barry Naughton, a specialist in the Chinese economy at the 
University of California, San Diego, declared that the Third Plenum had 
‘basically fulfilled the expectations placed on it’, becoming ‘a milestone in 
a prolonged process of restoring credibility and momentum to market-ori-
ented economic reform’.
Naughton explained that the Resolution was not a comprehensive 
blueprint for reform, but rather a ‘vision statement plus a To-Do list’. 
The vision, as he saw it, emphasised ‘the need to redefine the relation-
ship between government and market, and to reduce direct government 
intervention in the economy’. He argued that this was reflected in many 
of the ‘Sixty Decisions’ that appear in the Resolution’s sixteen sections. 
These included guaranteeing property rights (No. 5), fair and transparent 
regulation of markets (No. 9), uniform regulations for the selling of land 
for development in urban and rural areas (No. 11), perfecting financial 
market mechanisms (No. 12), accelerating the construction of free trade 
zones (No. 25) and implementing user-pay systems for resource and en-
vironmental management (No. 53). In each of these, and many more be-
sides, the rhetoric of a decisive role for markets has begun to take practical 
shape, even if the difficult task of implementation remains.
A number of Western (and some Chinese) analysts celebrated the ap-
parent confluence of China’s reform agenda with neo-liberal ideas about 
how economies should be run. There appeared to be enough evidence 
in the Resolution to enable Daniel Rosen from the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies in the United States, for example, to conclude 
that: ‘Overall, the Plenum results present a necessary but not a sufficient 
roadmap to economic development convergent with the interests of other 
economies, including the United States.’
Yet there is no perfect consensus about what these interests are, 
despite the frequent use of language that implies there is. At a meeting of 
the G20 finance ministers in Washington DC in March 2014, Joe Hockey, 
the Treasurer of the conservative ruling Australian Liberal Party, said that 
all nations should be urging China to move to full deregulation and open 
trading of its currency, claiming that ‘We all want it to move quicker… .’ 
(my italics)
Ronald McKinnon, Emeritus Professor of International Macroeconom-
ics at Stanford University, however, argues forcefully that exchange rate 
stability, not flexibility, is optimal for China. He also contends that floating 
the RMB would do little to improve macroeconomic problems elsewhere. 
For McKinnon, the possibility that the Resolution might not produce ‘dra-
matic breakthroughs’ on interest rates, the exchange rate and the capital 
account (the net change in private and public investments flowing in and 
out of the country), as Naughton suggests is likely, may not be such a bad 
thing after all.
Joe Hockey at the meeting of the G20 finance ministers 
Photo: cairnspost.com.au
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While the Plenum provided some degree of satisfaction for the neo- 
liberal camp, as Daniel Rosen put it, ‘there is plenty of language in the Ple-
num Decisions which is less consistent with this happy story’ (my italics). 
If you read the Resolution hoping to find evidence that China is on the 
‘right path’ as defined by neo-liberals, you’ll be disappointed. It isn’t. 
The Resolution and China’s Political-Economic 
System
The first section of the Resolution lays out the guiding ideology for reform. 
It stresses that the process of reform and opening up is a ‘new magnificent 
revolution’ to ‘develop and strengthen self-confidence in the system of So-
cialism with Chinese Characteristics under the leadership of the Party’. 
The comprehensive deepening of reforms must take guidance, it insists, 
from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping The-
ory, as well as the Three Represents (Jiang Zemin’s theory that the Party 
must develop the advanced productive forces in China’s economy, pro-
mote advanced socialist, Marxism-based culture and serve the ‘People’) 
and Scientific Development (which emphasises balance in the construc-
tion of a Socialist Harmonious Society). It not only acknowledges the ide-
ological contributions of all of Xi Jinping’s predecessors, but insists that 
they not be ignored.
 The four key principles of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
are: single-party rule, public ownership of land, a dominant role for state 
ownership and state economic planning. All of these resonate throughout 
the Resolution. I do not see this ideology as being purely rhetorical. It pro-
vides a fundamental basis for understanding where China is headed. 
The principle of single-party rule is not open for discussion. The doc-
ument reiterates the centrality of the Party’s leadership roles in sections 
such as ‘Strengthening the Construction of the Socialist Democratic Politi-
cal System’ (VIII), ‘Strengthening and Restricting Supervision Systems for 
the Operation of Power’ (X) and the final section on ‘Strengthening and 
Improving the Party’s Leadership over the Comprehensive Deepening of 
Reform’ (XVI).
 This final section calls for the establishment of a Communist Party 
Central Leadership Small Group (LSG) for the Comprehensive Deepening 
of Reform, which will have responsibility for the general design, overall 
co-ordination and implementation of reform. This LSG model has already 
spread throughout the Chinese political system — the provinces, prefec-
tures, cities and central ministries — with Xi expecting the government to 
take the lead in economic reform at all levels (see Introduction ‘Under One 
Heaven’, p.vi)
Naughton describes the LSG model as ‘mobilising through Communist 
Party channels in order to ensure that the government does less’. He then 
comments: ‘This is a peculiar approach to economic reform, and it might 
not work’ (my italics). Reflecting on nearly four decades of gradual and 
experimental reforms that, under its rule, have generated the longest peri-
od of sustained growth in history, the Party could be forgiven for thinking 
that it just might. 
 Section II of the Resolution on ‘Persisting in and Perfecting Basic 
Economic Institutions’ explicitly calls for ‘persisting in the dominant posi-
The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighteenth Central Committee concludes in Beijing
Photo: Xinhua
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tion of public ownership’. The section lays out the range of reform meas-
ures that will be directed towards ‘incessantly strengthening the vitality, 
control and influence of the state-owned economy’. These include estab-
lishing clearly-defined property rights, strengthening state-owned asset 
supervision, raising the share of state-owned income to be returned to 
public finances and improving company governance structures. 
 Public ownership of land, like state ownership of the means of pro-
duction, is an anathema to neo-liberals. For the Party, however, privatisa-
tion of land is not an option. The Resolution grants greater autonomy to 
rural households to increase their income from land rights, so they can 
invest in and expand their on- and off-farm enterprises. Under the prin-
ciple of ‘persisting in the collective ownership of rural land’, farmers will 
enjoy greater rights with regard to the possession, use, profit, transmis-
sion and mortgaging of land — but notably and explicitly not ownership. 
 Not everyone in the world finds this problematic. Peter Ho, Professor 
of Chinese Economy and Development at Delft University of Technology in 
the Netherlands, for example, maintains that China’s evolving land man-
agement system stems from endogenous interactions between state and 
other market participants. He asserts that ‘despite the lack of formality, 
security and transparency, land has been and still is a core driver of 
China’s capital accumulation and development over the past decades’. 
Whether you accept Ho’s argument or not, and regardless of the many 
flaws in this system (on which more below), reforms simply will not lead 
to full-scale private land ownership in the foreseeable future.
Finally, the entire Resolution will inform the next Five-Year Plan (to 
be released in 2016): it is in itself a critical component of China’s state 
economic planning, the fourth principle of Socialism with Chinese Char-
acteristics.  
So, does the Third Plenum represent a milestone in China’s reform 
and development of the last three and a half decades? Does a decisive role 
for market forces as promoted in this Plenum mean much more than the 
‘fundamental’ role they were given in the Third Plenum of 1993? Wasn’t 
The Rise of Chinese Internet Finance 
by Aiden Xia
One area of applied science and business 
where China is a world-leading innovator and 
early adopter of new technologies and ideas 
is Internet-based financial services. These 
range from ‘wealth management products’ 
理财产品 to mobile phone payment systems. 
Baidu 百度, Alibaba 阿里巴巴 and Tencent 
腾讯 (aka the BAT companies, see Chapter 
3 ‘The Chinese Internet: Unshared Desti-
ny’, p.106) all operate mobile phone apps by 
which users can send money electronically to 
friends, or pay taxis, restaurants and shops. 
The technology and platforms are already in place for large numbers of Chinese people to use 
their phones as virtual wallets. The only obstacles are government regulations and the reluc-
tance of companies and merchants to accept a new form of payment. There is enthusiasm in 
some quarters of the government for the innovation that technology companies will bring to fi-
nance: the big Internet companies are successfully applying for a growing range of licences that 
permit them to operate credit cards and other financial services. However, the very newness 
of the industry means regulators remain wary; for example, in March 2014, the central bank 
demanded Tencent and Alibaba halt their mobile payments systems, citing concerns over the 
security of their verification procedures. As of publication of this Yearbook, those payment sys-
tems are working again, but the authorities have not issued clear guidelines for such services. 
The BATs also all offer online investment products that have so far yielded better interest 
rates than bank savings accounts. Alibaba’s Yu’ebao 余额宝, launched in 2013, was the first 
Internet-based fund. By June 2014, it claimed one hundred million users with 574.1 billion 
yuan under management. The company says most investors are under the age of thirty, and 
that they enjoyed an average annualised yield of 5.5 percent. The funds are friendly to small 
investors: some individuals invest as little as one hundred yuan. The companies invest a 
large part of the funds in intermediate- or long-term deposits at commercial banks to take 
advantage of high interest rates. 
Many traditional funds that hold a portfolio of shares in listed Chinese companies have 
begun to offer investment packages via online marketplaces like Alibaba’s Taobao. As for the 
Internet company products, minimum entry requirements for these are also very low.
Another category of Internet finance is peer-to-peer or P2P lending. Websites such as 
PPDai.com allow investors with cash to connect with individuals and small businesses who 
need loans.
Finally, China has a thriving market in Bitcoin. The Central Bank barred financial institu-
tions from handling Bitcoin transactions in December 2013, ending a speculative boom by 
making it difficult for Chinese people to get cash into or out of the Bitcoin system. But the 
cryptocurrency itself is not illegal and there are still enthusiasts and startup Internet compa-
nies offering related services such as the Bitcoin marketplace BtcChina.com. 
This building in Shenyang, Liaoning province, is 
known as the Square and Circle Mansion. It was en-
visioned by its Taiwan designer C Y Lee & Partners 
to convey the city’s financial aspirations. It is in the 
shape of an ancient Chinese coin, known as a bi 币
Photo: Aaron Sorell/Flickr
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the Party’s decision to reform and open up the economy from 1978 all 
about strengthening the role of markets anyway? The details contained 
in the Resolution lead Naughton to conclude that: ‘In ways that we are 
just beginning to fathom, China in 2014 is very different from China in 
2012.’ For me, the continuity with the past is just as striking despite the 
ambitious and comprehensive reform agenda that the Resolution sets out. 
 My line of reasoning above is consistent with that of the political 
economist Christopher McNally of Chaminade University of Honolulu, 
who has analysed China’s efforts to rebalance its political economy — 
which is essentially what the Third Plenum reform agenda is all about. 
As he notes, many observers, including Yasheng Huang 黄亚生, whom I 
discussed in last year’s Yearbook, believe that only free markets can create 
an efficient, equitable and sustainable political economy. Yet as McNally 
points out:
Local Government Debt: ‘No Money. Really, No Money’, by Jeremy Goldkorn
China has a total of 41,636 towns and townships, fourth-level administrative units under 
counties and districts. Collectively, these have outstanding debts of 307 billion yuan, and 
owe 11.6 billion yuan in guarantees and 46.1 billion in aid payments, according to a report 
released by the National Audit Office in August 2014. The report also showed that 3,465 
town and township governments have debt ratios (the ratio of total debt to total assets) 
exceeding one hundred percent.
The extent of local government debt has been in the news for some time. On 4 August, 
Xinhua’s Economic Information Daily 经济参考报 described how this has become a danger-
ous problem. In visits to ten provinces across China, newspaper reporters discovered not 
only that the old practice of land-based borrowing is proving unsustainable in a cooled-
down economy, but also that some local authorities, who are struggling to repay old out-
standing debt, are unable to borrow more in order to deliver basic services. One reporter 
described hearing the head of an urban district in northern China tell a creditor: ‘There’s 
no money. Really, no money. If you don’t believe me, check it out with the finance bureau.’
A development zone official in Liaoning province told the newspaper: ‘Because of fall-
ing land prices, our financial revenue this year will drop by at least twenty-five percent. 
And we’re not the worst-off — lots of places are in worse shape than us.’ The newspaper 
named as an example a new prefecture-level city in southern China that was established 
just twelve years ago but was already 700 million yuan in debt by last year. One official 
said: ‘Without any money, we have to sell land, even 
if the price is low. If the capital chain is broken, and 
we’re blacklisted by financial institutions, we’ll be 
even worse off.’
Thanks to stricter lending regulations, loans are 
difficult to come by even for governments that are 
in relatively good financial shape. This is not nec-
essarily a bad thing in the context of the ‘bad loan 
problem’. But it is hard on local governments. As the 
vice-mayor of a prefecture-level city in Hunan told 
the newspaper: ‘Bank financing is increasingly hard 
to get, which forces the government to spend all day 
searching for additional collateral… . Lots of places are being forced to use intermediary 
agencies with grimly high interest rates, as high as fifteen percent for short-term bridge 
financing. The money you get lands in the account minus interest, and the rest goes to 
repay the old [loans].’
To deliver services, officials revealed, county, city and district governments are levying 
fees, collecting excessive taxes and performing other financial trickery. 
There’s no easy solution in sight.
Instead of a singular reliance on liberalization measures, the Chinese 
government seems to be intent on statist solutions, including efforts 
to recentralize, standardize and better regulate various aspects of the 
political economy. This parallels earlier major reform initiatives in 
China that have consistently balanced liberalization measures with 
concerted effort to sustain and strengthen state control. I therefore 
argue that Chinese policies … are highly unlikely to follow a liberal 
US-inspired approach, as advocated by Huang and many observers 
in the West. Quite to the contrary, China is pursuing a model of state 
capitalism.
McNally tells it how it is, rather than how he thinks it should be. He 
describes ‘Sino-capitalism’ as a hybrid political-economic system that com-
bines socialist and capitalist principles with Western neo-liberalism, Asian 
developmentalism and ‘Dengist gradualism’ in ways that reflect Chinese 
Local government debt in China has 
reached crisis point. Some local author-
ities are unable to borrow money to 
deliver basic services since they have old 
debts that they cannot afford to pay 
Source: bwchinese.com
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historical legacies and cultural norms. The resulting dual system is cen-
tred on the three ‘institutional spheres’ of the state, political guanxi net-
works and globalisation. It combines a top-down, state-controlled econ-
omy with a bottom-up, market-driven private economy and constitutes a 
unique form of ‘state-led, state-co-ordinated and state-guided capitalism’. 
The concept of Sino-capitalism is compatible with, but also more compre-
hensive than, the four principles laid out in ‘Socialism with Chinese Char-
acteristics’. As such, it provides an excellent basis for forming realistic 
expectations about where China is coming from, and where it is headed.
The ‘National New-Type Urbanisation Plan’ 
(2014–2020)
China’s particular pattern of urbanisation — referred to as ‘Urbanisation 
with Chinese Characteristics’ by party officials, or what I call ‘Sino-
capitalist urbanisation’ — provides further insight into the challenges 
facing China’s leaders in 2014 and beyond, as they try to reform the system 
without fundamentally changing it.
In 1949, official party ideology claimed that ‘cities would lead the 
countryside’ in both economic and political terms, with industry leading 
agriculture and workers leading peasants respectively. Initially, the Party 
conceded that rural–urban relations would be unavoidably exploitative 
and unequal. In the (unspecified) longer term, these inequalities would 
disappear. The introduction of the hukou 户口 system of household 
registration in the late 1950s cemented these inequalities, strictly 
separating Chinese people into two distinct groups — those with rural 
hukou residency and those with urban hukou residency. By preventing 
rural to urban migration, this system limited urban population growth. 
 Another critical feature of the Maoist economic system was the public 
ownership of land. All urban land was state owned. Rural collectives could 
possess, use and benefit from the rural land assigned to them, but could 
not dispose of it. According to the first Constitution of the People’s Republic 
(adopted in 1954), the state had the right to expropriate collectively owned 
rural land if it was deemed in the public interest. In the decades that 
followed, industrialisation proceeded without urbanisation: in 1980 just 
19.4 percent of China’s population lived in urban areas, even lower than 
the 19.7 percent in 1960, while industry’s share of GDP increased from 
28.3 percent to 43.9 percent over the same period. 
 By contrast, during the reform period, the pace of urbanisation has 
been dramatic: the urban population increased by 47 million in the 1980s, 
110 million in the 1990s and 211 million in the 2000s. In the space of three 
decades, the percentage of China’s population living in the cities went 
from 19.4 percent to 49.9 percent. The unleashing of market forces and 
the globalisation of China’s economy have both played important roles in 
this, particularly in coastal provinces where rapid industrialisation has at-
tracted millions of rural migrant workers and billions of dollars of foreign 
direct investment. These have fuelled export-led economic growth, while 
setting in motion a cumulative process of urban expansion. 
 By both shaping and constraining the pattern of urbanisation, the 
state has managed, by and large, to avoid some of the problems that have 
plagued other urbanising countries — such as high urban unemployment, 
urban poverty and urban slums. But Sino-capitalist urbanisation has also 
Urban construction
Photo: Aaron Webb, Guangzhou/Flickr
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created some major, unresolved problems, of which China’s top leaders are 
well aware. In March 2014, the Central Committee and the State Council 
released ‘The National New-type Urbanisation Plan’ for 2014–2020 (hence-
forth ‘The Plan’). Building on the directives contained in the Third Plenum 
and a joint report by the World Bank and the Development Research Cen-
tre of the State Council of China (‘Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive 
and Sustainable Urbanisation’), the Plan considers urbanisation key to the 
country’s modernisation drive and at the centre of its ongoing efforts to 
rebalance the economy towards domestic demand. 
 The Plan candidly acknowledges some of the major contradictions 
that the reform process has created for the pattern of urbanisation to date. 
Chief among these is the hukou system, through which the state assigns 
or denies people the right to live legally in one place or another. This pre-
vents rural migrant workers from integrating properly into urban areas, 
for without urban hukou, they have limited access to basic public services 
in education, employment, health care, pensions and housing. 
Even though some 260 million migrant workers have made their way 
into Chinese cities in recent decades, because of the hukou system many of 
these have been ‘temporary’ or circular migrants, eventually returning to 
their rural homes to raise families or care for ‘left behind’ children and el-
derly parents. Hundreds of millions of other would-be migrants are either 
unable to or discouraged from migrating in the first place by their ineli-
gibility for urban hukou, despite the lure of higher wages in urban areas. 
The hukou system is therefore a major contributor to rural-urban income 
inequalities today. It has also limited the pace of urbanisation, which at 
fifty-four percent in 2013 lies well below that of other countries with sim-
ilar levels of per capita income (counting only those that have permanent 
urban residency, the rate is even lower at just thirty-six percent).
The second major contradiction is that ‘land urbanisation’ has 
proceeded at a faster rate than ‘population urbanisation’. City-level 
governments have relied excessively on the expropriation of rural land 
to promote urban construction. As a result, development zones and 
industrial parks that cover vast areas proliferate: between 2000 and 
2011, urban ‘built-up’ areas expanded by 76.4 percent, far higher than 
the urban population growth of 50.5 percent. This poses risks to local 
government finances, results in sub-optimal population densities, and 
significantly reduces the amount of arable land, threatening national food 
and ecological security.
Sociologist Sally Sargeson pushes this contradiction even further with 
her view that China’s urbanisation process constitutes ‘violence as devel-
opment’. Her argument begins with the revenue shortfalls and economic 
Local governments have expropriated more than 4.2 million hectares of rural land for urban growth between 
1990 and 2008
Photo: Lee Wu (Western Regions)/Flickr
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growth targets of local governments, which prompted them to expropriate 
more than 4.2 million hectares of rural land for urban growth between 
1990 and 2008, making eighty-eight million villagers landless. While ac-
knowledging that many villagers became landless by choice, Sargeson viv-
idly depicts the various forms of ‘violence’ that have accompanied China’s 
urbanisation process. These range from the physical and sometimes force-
ful removal of people from their land to disruptions to their ‘socially-ex-
pected life course, capacity to contribute to their families, social and famil-
ial standing and self-respect’. This suggests that at least some of China’s 
urbanisation process has not been driven by market forces from the bot-
tom up, but by a number of forces operating from the top down instead.
Not all rural communities have fared so badly. In ‘The Guangdong 
Model of Urbanisation’, the authors Him Chung and Jonathan Unger, 
depict village collectives that have retained collective ownership of their 
land by converting Mao-era socialist units into shareholding companies. 
The companies have capitalised on the rising value of their land, partly 
the result of rapid inflows of foreign direct investment into the province. 
While some villagers have become incredibly wealthy in the process, this 
model is not without its 
problems — for example, 
the ‘haphazard and cha-
otic construction of slum-
like apartment build-
ings’ in the hundreds of 
emerging ‘villages in the 
city’. The result has been 
a ‘major reassertion of 
collective economic ini-
tiative’, as shareholding 
companies juggle their 
multiple roles: ‘The first 
is as the representative 
Haphazard and chaotic construction of slum-like apartment buildings
Photo: Mark Tuinier/Flickr
of all indigenous villages. A sec-
ond is as a power broker situat-
ed between the government and 
the former villages, and the third 
is as a business firm wanting to 
undertake profitable activities.’ 
This is an excellent example of 
Sino-capitalist urbanisation at 
work, and illustrates how it dif-
fers from other models of urban-
isation.
The Plan outlines a compre-
hensive reform agenda for better integrating urban and rural develop-
ment in the future, but not in strong convergence with neo-liberal ideals. 
For starters, there are no plans to abolish the hukou system. Instead, the 
Plan sets a numerical target for urbanisation of sixty percent by 2020. This 
will involve the ‘orderly transformation’ of the rural population into ‘ur-
banites’ with a target of granting a total of one hundred million migrants 
urban hukou by 2020. To accomplish this goal, the Plan divides cities into 
four categories. In ‘fully open’ small cities and ‘orderly’ mid-size cities, 
there will be a relaxation of the hukou system to allow more people ac-
cess to it, while large cities and megacities will continue to manage their 
hukou strictly as in the past. The government has no intention of leaving 
rural-urban migration completely to the market yet. 
 This is understandable given the enormity of the challenges in deal-
ing with the largest migration flow in global history. A ‘big bang’ approach 
to granting urban residency to anyone who wanted it, in any city they 
wished to live, is not a realistic option. The pressure on cash-strapped, 
city-level governments would be far too great. Although new ways for 
them to raise funds are under way — including tax system reforms and 
the establishment of financial institutions to support infrastructure and 
housing — these will clearly take time.
260 million migrant workers have moved to Chinese 
cities in recent decades
Photo: Don/Flickr
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 Instead, hukou reform is likely to continue in the gradual, piecemeal 
and experimental way that has characterised China’s long transition to-
wards a more market-based economy. Chengdu, for example, announced 
a new system of land credits in 2010 that enables farmers to swap their 
rural land for urban housing, allowing all Chengdu citizens, including five 
million farmers, to move freely into the city and register as urban citizens, 
receiving all the benefits that go with that privilege. As Tom Miller points 
out in his 2012 book China’s Urban Billion: ‘If the Chengdu government is 
as good as its word, this would represent a huge breakthrough for hukou 
reform’.
Other experiments include the use of points systems for migrants, first 
introduced in Shanghai in 2004 and then in Guangdong in 2010. Migrants 
who achieve a certain number of points based on their employment, ed-
ucation and other attributes can gain an urban hukou. Although points 
systems may appear efficient, they are likely to create an underclass out 
of (already second-class citizens) rural Chinese who don’t make the grade. 
Land management reforms, meanwhile, will be directed towards 
stringent farmland protection and conservation, safeguarding farmers’ 
land management rights, protecting the livelihood of farmers whose land 
has been requisitioned, and limiting the construction of new urban areas. 
Privatisation of the land is still off the agenda. 
Realistic Expectations May Be the Greatest 
Expectations  
Both the ‘Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively 
Deepening Reform’ and the ‘National New-Type Urbanisation Plan’ indi-
cate that the Party is well aware of the many challenges it faces in guid-
ing China towards more balanced and sustainable growth in the decade 
ahead. Yet, as Yu Yongding 余永定, former Director of the Institute of 
World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
pointed out: ‘Although the resolution’s general message is encouraging, a 
shopping list of reform objectives is not a strategic analysis of the contra-
dictions that are undermining China’s development, let alone an action 
plan for responding to these contradictions. Indeed, for China’s new lead-
ership, the successful completion of the Third Plenum is only the first step 
in a new long march toward a more stable, prosperous future.’ There will 
never be perfect consensus on just where that long march should finish, 
either within the ranks of the Party or beyond. Still, the policies of 2014 
are not so different from the past. It is more useful to have realistic ex-
pectations about what the Xi–Li era can and will deliver, rather than great 
expectations that may well result in disappointment.
Urbanisation in Chengdu
Photo: blichb/Flickr
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MIXED ECONOMIC MESSAGES
A Confusing Year for Business 
·  ANTONY DAPIRAN
Huayuquan 话语权: Speak and be Heard 
· DAVID MURPHY
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A CONFUSING YEAR FOR 
BUSINESS
Antony Dapiran
TIME IN THE business world in China used to be marked by 
progress: each year seemed to bring 
more reforms, more opening up, new 
ventures, new possibilities. This was 
the case throughout the 1990s and 
especially in the years surrounding 
China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001. 
Recent years, however, have 
seen a different kind of progression. 
The last twelve months have featured 
crackdowns, high-profile govern-
ment-instigated cases against foreign 
businesses and a sense that doing 
business in China is getting harder, 
not easier.
 Yet the year had begun with 
much promise. In November 2013, 
the first year of the new Xi Jinping ad-
ministration, the Communist Party of 
China held its Third Plenum. The Third 
Plenum of each five-year Party Con-
gress traditionally focuses on business 
and economics. The Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978 
is generally regarded as the begin-
ning of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and 
Open Door policies, which changed 
the course of modern Chinese history. 
Observers who saw Xi as a reformer 
expected that he would take the oppor-
tunity of the Third Plenum of the Eight-
eenth Party Congress last November 
to provide new impetus to economic 
reform in China following the stasis of 
the previous decade under Hu Jintao.
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
A 
Co
nf
us
in
g 
Ye
ar
 fo
r B
us
in
es
s 
An
to
ny
 D
ap
ira
n
44
45
Shortly before the Third Plenum in November 2013, 
the State Council approved the establishment of 
the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone (FTZ). It is the first 
Hong Kong-like free trade area in mainland China 
Photo: 126.xingshuo.net
The Shanghai FTZ and New Hope 
for Reform
Shortly before the Third Plenum, the 
State Council approved the estab-
lishment of the Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone 上海自由贸易区 (FTZ), raising 
the hopes of the business community 
for further market-led reform. While 
The Economist dismissed the FTZ as a 
‘damp squib’ and its policies too timid 
to lead to meaningful reform, influ-
ential Chinese business journalist Hu 
Shuli 胡舒立, writing in Caixin 财新, 
stated that its significance ‘can not be 
overstated’. Many of the critics of the 
Shanghai FTZ, including commenta-
tors in The Economist, Financial Times 
and The Wall Street Journal, underes-
timated both its important symbolic 
role, and the potentially ground-break-
ing nature of the reforms it embodied. 
The Shanghai FTZ sent a mes-
sage to foreign investors that the Hu 
era was over and China was open to 
foreign investment again. It was also 
a message to Xi’s political rivals, in-
cluding former allies of the ousted Bo 
Xilai, that Xi was in charge now and 
that the style of economic neo-Maoism 
espoused by Bo and his cronies was 
dead, as was the ‘state advances and 
private enterprise recedes’ 国进民退 
approach of Hu Jintao: reforms were 
back on top of the agenda. This helped 
set the scene for the Third Plenum.
The reforms proposed for the FTZ 
are potentially very significant, in par-
ticular the introduction of the ‘negative 
list’ 负面清单 system, which prohibits 
foreign investors from engaging in any 
businesses or industries on the neg-
ative list, but leaves them otherwise 
free to operate any other type of busi-
ness within the FTZ. Some criticise this 
as being little different to the current 
‘Foreign Investment Industrial Guid-
ance Catalogue’ 外商投资产业指导目
录 in place nationwide, which divides 
business sectors into ‘encouraged’, ‘re-
stricted’ and ‘prohibited’ categories, 
and provides that anything not in one 
of those three categories is permitted. 
The items on the current nega-
tive list for the FTZ are indeed entire-
ly consistent with the ‘restricted’ and 
‘prohibited’ categories under the old 
system, forbidding foreign business to 
enter sectors such as Internet and tel-
ecommunication services and restrict-
ing investment in the financial and 
certain other sectors. To this extent, 
it does not allow foreign investors to 
do anything new. However, to dismiss 
the negative list on this basis alone 
profoundly misunderstands its signif-
icance, which is that it sets the limits 
of government power in China for the 
first time. 
In developed nations, and in par-
ticular under Anglo-American legal 
systems such as in the US, the UK and 
Australia, the law follows the princi-
ple of ‘whatever is not prohibited is 
allowed’. However, in China, law and 
regulations operate on exactly the op-
posite underlying assumption: ‘what-
ever is not allowed is prohibited’. If 
you cannot find a legal or regulatory 
source giving explicit permission to do 
something, you cannot do it. Under this 
model, government power is ‘infinite’, 
not circumscribed by the boundaries 
of the written laws. There is also sig-
nificant scope for administrative dis-
cretion to grant ‘special’ approvals.
This is why the negative list is such 
a ground-breaking development. It tips 
the legal paradigm of the People’s Re-
public upside down, limiting the scope 
of government power and therefore 
limiting the scope of administrative 
discretion. To the extent that the FTZ 
serves as a laboratory for future re-
forms to be rolled out across China, 
this may well be its true significance.
The Third Plenum
The Third Plenum did not disappoint. 
Its policy statements, while vague and 
broadly worded, reiterated the na-
tion’s commitment to the path of re-
form and opening up, and denied any 
possibility of a drift back to the new 
leftist economic policies espoused by 
some of Xi’s deposed rivals. 
In particular, the Plenum’s em-
phasis on the state exercising its role 
in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a 
‘shareholder’, a new policy of ‘mixed 
Hu Shuli is an influential Chinese business journal-
ist and editor-in-chief of Caixin Media
Photo: Weibo
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ownership’ 混合所有制 for SOEs en-
couraging private investment in public 
sector businesses and a focus on the 
‘decisive role’ 决定性作用 of the mar-
ket and market pricing mechanisms 
由市场决定价格的机制 suggested an 
unprecedented move towards market-
isation and corporatisation of the SOE 
sector. This renewed push for reform 
rendered subsequent events even 
more puzzling.
The Crackdown: ‘Selective and Sub-
jective Enforcement’?
The past year has seen an intensify-
ing crackdown on foreign business 
operations in China. The government 
has targeted foreign investors in cam-
paigns against corruption, monop-
olies, price-fixing and other unfair 
trade practices, often when there are 
arguably worse offenders among do-
mestic companies who have gone un-
punished.
To identify just a few of the more 
prominent examples:
• Food safety checks have focused on 
foreign fast-food operators.
• US technology giants Microsoft and 
Qualcomm have both been subject to 
government raids and anti-monopo-
ly investigations.
• Price-fixing investigations have tar-
geted foreign automotive manufac-
turers, resulting in reduced prices for 
vehicles and spare parts.
• The government has banned 
SOEs from employing Amer-
ican management consult-
ing firms such as McKinsey 
and Boston Consulting on the 
grounds of protecting ‘state 
secrets’.
• Bloomberg faces continued 
difficulties in its business ac-
tivities in China, with state-
owned financial institutions 
delaying or cancelling orders 
for Bloomberg data terminals 
Peter Humphrey, a Shanghai-based British private investigator, 
was employed by GlaxoSmithKline to identify the whistle-blow-
er who had reported its alleged corrupt practices to the author-
ities. Humphrey confessed on state broadcaster CCTV to having 
illegally bought and sold private information on Chinese citizens
Photo: CCTV
after the company’s news arm pub-
lished a series of investigative reports 
in 2012 on the financial interests of 
the families of Chinese leaders.
The American Chamber of Com-
merce in China surveyed its members 
and issued a report in September 2014 
charging that China was less welcom-
ing of foreign business than before, 
and that foreign companies were be-
ing singled out for ‘selective and sub-
jective enforcement’. Chinese govern-
ment spokespeople responded that 
the accusations were ‘groundless and 
baseless’ and that the Chinese govern-
ment actions were ‘transparent, fair 
and done in accordance with the law’.
The ongoing anti-corruption 
campaign, a flagship and extremely 
popular policy of Xi’s administration, 
has also had a significant impact on 
foreign businesses. Some of this was 
expected: luxury goods companies 
have seen a sharp drop-off in sales, for 
example (see Chapter 5 ‘Urban, Mobile 
and Global’, p.204). Some came as a 
surprise: the government has banned 
government officials from accepting 
scholarships to attend MBA programs. 
And as the campaign has continued, 
Chinese and foreign businesses have 
had to learn to navigate a new way of 
building relationships in an environ-
ment in which 
hospitality and 
gift-giving is now 
effectively im-
possible.
Sex and Drugs
All of these 
themes — the 
targeting of for-
eign businesses, 
the anti-corruption crackdown, the 
lack of transparency and the unpre-
dictable nature of the Chinese legal 
and regulatory system — converge in 
the case that has most dramatically 
gripped the attention of the foreign 
business community in China in the 
past year: that of UK pharmaceutical 
company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).
The GSK story has all the hall-
marks of an airport thriller: an inter-
nal whistle-blower raises allegations 
to senior management that the compa-
ny is engaging in the systematic brib-
ery of healthcare professionals in Chi-
na. The whistle-blower alleges that the 
mastermind is the CEO of GSK’s China 
operations, Briton Mark Reilly. The 
whistle-blower’s claims are dismissed. 
Shortly afterwards, a sex video emerg-
es of Reilly with his Chinese mistress. 
Former CEO of GSK’s 
China operations Mark 
Reilly was arrested for 
bribery of healthcare 
professionals
Photo: news.com.au
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GSK then retains ChinaWhys, a private 
investigation company run by Peter 
Humphrey and his wife Yu Yingzeng 
虞英曾, both foreign citizens, to inves-
tigate this ‘security breach’. GSK also 
announces that their internal investi-
gation of the bribery allegations has 
found no evidence of wrongdoing. 
In the second act, Chinese author-
ities arrest several senior GSK China 
executives and accuse the company 
of extensive bribery and corruption. 
They prohibit Reilly from leaving 
China while he ‘assists authorities in 
their investigations’. They also arrest 
Humphrey and Yu, charging them 
with ‘illegally obtaining private infor-
mation’ relating to the whistle-blower, 
who may or may not be a former gov-
ernment relations officer at GSK with 
strong local party connections.
The investigation into GSK Chi-
na is ongoing, and it is expected the 
Chinese authorities will file formal 
charges. The allegation is that GSK ex-
ecutives worked with local intermedi-
aries such as travel agencies to organ-
ise sham conferences and to over-bill 
for travel, training or other expenses, 
which enabled the GSK executives to 
obtain official invoices, called fapiao 
发票. The GSK executives used the 
fapiao to obtain cash reimbursements 
from GSK, which they allegedly then 
paid as bribes to hospital officials and 
doctors to use or prescribe GSK drugs. 
The Chinese authorities have said 
that as much as US$490 million went 
into such bribery over a period of five 
years.
In the meantime, China Central 
Television showed Humphrey, in pris-
on garb, confessing to having illegally 
bought and sold the private informa-
tion of Chinese citizens (see Forum 
‘Orange as the New Black’, p.316). 
Humphrey and Yu were convicted and 
sentenced to prison in August 2014 — 
two years for her, two and a half for 
him. The court was not impressed 
with their argument that they were 
unaware that what they were doing 
was illegal, and that both foreign and 
domestic private investigation firms 
commonly engage in such practices.
Why GSK?
There are many ways to interpret the 
GSK case.
The foreign and Chinese media 
generally regard the case as part of the 
government’s attempt to clean up the 
country’s systemically corrupt health-
care sector, using GSK to send a mes-
sage to the industry as a whole to fall 
into line. According to this ‘killing the 
rooster to frighten the monkeys’ 杀鸡
惊猴 narrative, the audience is pri-
marily domestic, and GSK is the soft 
foreign target that can be pursued to 
make a point without unduly disturb-
ing domestic patronage networks. It 
is also politically expedient: it permits 
the government to demonstrate to the 
Chinese public that it is not handing 
any free passes to foreign companies 
that are misbehaving. 
However, there is another narra-
tive, for which the primary audience is 
global. One of the Party’s fundamental 
strategic objectives is to achieve status 
for China as a ‘great power’. Success 
would cement the Party’s legitimacy as 
China’s rightful rulers. 
National power is commonly 
measured in terms of economic, mili-
tary and cultural (or ‘soft’) power, and 
in all these areas China has been clos-
ing the gap with the US and other ma-
jor powers. However, another aspect 
of power, frequently overlooked by 
commentators but not lost on China, is 
that of regulatory power. 
Regulatory power is the power to 
regulate actors outside a state’s own 
borders. It is US regulatory power that 
has companies around the world con-
cerned not to breach the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and ensuring 
that their securities offerings do not 
breach the US Securities Act. The reg-
ulatory power of the US and the EU re-
quire companies everywhere who are 
contemplating mergers or acquisitions 
to obtain anti-trust clearances from 
the US Federal Trade Commission and 
the EU Competition Commission. 
China sees the global respect paid 
to these regulators — and the regulato-
ry power they exercise — and wishes 
to enjoy similar respect, power and 
influence. Seen in this context, inves-
tigations and enforcement actions 
against foreign businesses is not about 
‘discrimination’ for the benefit of Chi-
nese companies. Nor are such actions 
intended solely to score political points 
with the Chinese public. Rather, their 
purpose is to demonstrate China’s ex-
ercise of regulatory power to an in-
ternational audience. There is every 
reason to expect continued and more 
muscular exercise of such power in 
future. 
The New China Risk 
There is one final lesson for foreign 
businesses in the GSK/ChinaWhys 
case. Foreign business people have, 
rightly or wrongly, tended to regard 
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themselves as enjoying a kind of im-
munity in China. The ‘China rules’ by 
which they operated their businesses, 
with a nod and a wink from local au-
thorities over a banquet or karaoke, 
led some to believe that they were 
enjoying a continuation of the extra- 
territorial system of the nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century ‘foreign 
concessions’, whereby China’s nation-
al laws did not apply to foreigners.
This has meant that human rights 
in China, particularly with regard to 
the operation of its justice system, was 
rarely personal for foreigners in Chi-
na. The business community found it 
easy to gloss over abuses in its pursuit 
of profit. 
Now, foreign executives are be-
ing detained, charged with breach-
es of laws of which they were not 
aware, tried in an unpredictable and 
non-transparent judicial system and 
imprisoned. Suddenly, human rights 
is frighteningly relevant to those doing 
business in the People’s Republic. 
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HUAYUQUAN 话语权: 
SPEAK AND BE HEARD
David Murphy
HUAYUQUAN 话语权 is the right to speak and be heard, or to speak 
with authority. It is also the power to 
lead and guide debate, or to set the 
parameters of acceptable discourse. 
In the past few years, prominent Chi-
nese intellectuals have adopted this 
second understanding of huayuquan to 
explain, with mounting urgency, how 
the country’s lack of influence in inter-
national financial, trade, security and 
media institutions translates to unfair 
treatment in China’s interactions with 
the world. 
China’s lack of huayuquan in glob-
al commodities markets is a particular 
focus of anxiety. The People’s Republic 
has become the largest global consum-
er of commodities ranging from soya 
beans to copper. Some analysts per-
ceive this escalating dependence on 
the importation of raw materials as 
exacerbating China’s vulnerability to 
exploitation. They believe foreign sup-
pliers of these goods and their finan-
cial and government backers have 
used their influence over global mar-
ket institutions to rig prices to China’s 
detriment.  
Much analysis published in Chi-
nese academic journals and industry 
newsletters is devoted to denounc-
ing global cartels. But there is also a 
growing body of commentary in Chi-
na explaining how factors defining 
the structural architecture of global 
trade inherently disadvantage Chi-
nese customers. These factors include 
the predominance of the US dollar as 
a trading currency and the influence 
of Western-based financial institu-
tions on commodity indexes. 
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Some commentators, like Fudan 
University professor Huang He 黄河, 
contend that global financial markets, 
laxly regulated by Western powers, 
encourage speculation in commodities 
markets, which distorts prices at the 
expense of Chinese buyers.
In a 2013 article in Foreign Af-
fairs Commentary 外交评论 Huang, a 
political economist, also accuses the 
dominant, English-language global 
media of conniving to manufacture a 
‘China threat’. This allegedly involves 
Western news organisations acting on 
behalf of their corporate and govern-
mental masters, deliberately misrep-
resenting China’s objections to unfair 
treatment as constituting aggressive 
attacks on market freedom. On these 
and other topics these writers employ 
the concept of huayuquan to link the 
interests of Chinese firms trading in 
global markets with China’s ability to 
speak and be heard by the institutions 
that guide global trade and commerce.
 China’s dependence on imported 
iron ore is a case in point. Huang be-
lieves that open financial markets and 
the free flow of capital, as well as the 
rapid development of Chinese futures 
markets would strengthen China’s 
huayuquan. He blames China’s disor-
ganised and fragmented import sector 
and its relatively closed and immature 
financial sector for the raw deals he 
thinks China has had to put up with 
both when the old benchmark negoti-
ation system set iron ore import prices 
and in the arrangements that 
have succeeded it. In his view, 
for China to enjoy a huayuquan 
commensurate with its rising 
stake in commodities markets, 
the futures markets that de-
termine global prices of iron 
ore and other commodities for 
which China is the principal 
buyer should be located in Chi-
na. This would require Beijing 
to remove restrictions on the 
movement of capital across bor-
ders. It is one of many steps he 
In this cartoon people are talking into a Weibo 微博 micro-
phone. The caption says: ‘We all have the right to speak and 
be heard’
Source: Zhou Hansheng/manhua365.com
believes must be taken to ‘build a sys-
tem that allows China to be heard glob-
ally, so that the normal demands of 
China can be made with its own voice’.
Others call for a more actively de-
fensive strategy. On the same question 
of iron ore, for example, Jiao Yushu 焦
玉书, a consultant to the China Metal-
lurgical Mining Enterprise Association, 
pushes for import substitution. He be-
lieves that domestic exploration and 
production of iron ore ‘must exceed 
the fifty percent threshold needed to 
break the global cartel’. This thinking 
appears to be gaining favour in policy 
circles. In March 2014, the State Coun-
cil commissioned a plan to lift domestic 
iron ore production dramatically over 
the next ten years — despite Premier 
Li Keqiang’s declaration of a ‘war on 
pollution’ just weeks before. 
 Wang Jionghui 王炯辉, a senior 
aide to the president of mining giant 
Minmetals, rejects import substitu-
tion, insisting that the costs of bringing 
more low-quality Chinese iron ore to 
market would push prices even higher. 
As global iron ore capacity expands, he 
expects that the larger international 
firms could ‘band together to restrict 
production, artificially creating a con-
striction of supply, maintain high pric-
es and thus seize monopoly profits’. 
For Wang, the solution lies in China 
sourcing thirty to forty percent of its 
imported iron ore from what he calls 
‘overseas bases’, mines in which there 
is Chinese investment. He predicts that 
over ten years, savings ‘would exceed 
US$220 billion’. 
What Huang, Wang and Jiao 
have in common is a conviction that 
China’s lack of huayuquan is a quan-
tifiable liability. To strengthen China’s 
huayuquan is to redress the injustice 
inherent in the global status quo. The 
increasing use of huayuquan in Chi-
nese discussions around international 
trade parallels and aligns with a more 
robust foreign policy. The urgency 
with which huayuquan is invoked, 
however, comes more from a height-
ened sense that the lack of it imposes 
economic costs.
In this cartoon a cleaner is seen sweeping away 
‘rumours’
Source: opinion.people.com.cn
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MARKUZ CH 2
WHOSE SHARED DESTINY?
Richard Rigby and Brendan Taylor
THE ‘COMMUNITY OF SHARED DESTINY’ 
is not a completely new concept in Chinese 
foreign policy — the Communist Party first 
used the term in 2007 in relation to cross-
Strait relations. But it is one that has gained 
greater prominence over the past year. A key 
development during this period was Xi Jinping’s 
October 2013 keynote speech at the ‘Workshop 
on Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring 
Countries’ 周边国家外交工作座谈会, during 
which he elaborated on the ‘shared destiny’ 
theme (sometimes translated into English as 
‘common destiny’): it was then that the term 
officially entered the Chinese foreign policy 
lexicon.
Image: Clashing martitime interests in the South China Sea
Source: vnexpressnews.net
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China is hardly alone in embracing foreign policy concepts that lack pre-
cision. Think of then US deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick’s call on 
China in 2005 to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and the call of then 
president Hu Jintao’s contemporaneous formulation for a ‘harmonious 
world’, for example, or Kevin Rudd’s 2008 vision of an ‘Asia-Pacific Com-
munity’ and ‘harmonious world’. At its heart, the concept of a ‘communi-
ty of shared destiny’ is essentially about ensuring peace and stability in 
China’s external strategic environment through the development of good 
relations with neighbouring countries. Ironically, it is difficult to recall a 
period, in recent history at least, where there has been such a substantial 
gap between Beijing’s public rhetoric and what it has been doing in prac-
tice, with the result that it has alienated, alarmed and infuriated many of 
its neighbours.
For some commentators, the ‘com-
munity of shared destiny’ represents a 
direct response to the US ‘pivot’ or strat-
egy of ‘re-balancing’. Yet, as recently as 
June 2013, hopes were high that even 
China and the US might have been able 
to work towards a ‘common destiny’ 
when presidents Xi and Barack Obama 
held their so-called ‘Sunnylands Sum-
In June 2013, presidents Obama and Xi met for a two-day informal summit at the 
Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in California 
Source: The White House
China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning went 
into commission on 25 September 2012. Ru-
mours are rife that China is in the process 
of building a second aircraft carrier
Source: reddit.com
mit’ in California. Some observers even went so far as to liken the meeting 
to the Mao–Nixon diplomacy of the 1970s in terms of its geopolitical sig-
nificance. Ultimately, however, the outcomes of the summit were modest 
and relations between Beijing and Washington took on an increasingly 
competitive edge over the following twelve months. In December 2013, 
for instance, a standoff occurred in the waters of the South China Sea be-
tween an American Aegis cruiser, the USS Cowpens, and vessels escorting 
the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning. Chinese official media responses to 
this standoff asserted that ‘Washington has to understand that Beijing has 
the right to grow its national defence capacity in accordance with its own 
legitimate demands to protect national interests’.
New Models?
Relations between Beijing 
and Washington became 
even tenser in 2014. In May, 
the US Justice Department 
took the unprecedented step 
of indicting five officers of 
the PLA from the so-called 
‘Unit 61398’ in Shanghai, on 
charges of hacking into the 
networks of American com-
panies dealing with aero-
space, telecommunications, 
information technology, 
satellite and other sensitive 
areas, also including Westinghouse Electric and US Steel Corp. The charges 
were largely symbolic given that the US does not have an extradition trea-
ty with China — and in any case, China denies the army unit even exists. 
PLA ‘Unit 61398’ has allegedly hacked into the networks of  
more than 140 Western firms in pursuit of corporate secrets to  
support the Chinese government’s political and economic aims
Source: wantchinatimes.com
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Nevertheless, Beijing responded within hours 
of the indictment, denouncing the charges and 
calling in the US Ambassador to China, Max Bau-
cus. One month later, the Shangri-La Dialogue — 
an annual Asian security summit that is a use-
ful barometer for reading the state of relations 
between Beijing and Washington — displayed 
deepening tensions. There, PLA Deputy Chief 
Wang Guanzhong 王冠中 delivered ‘unscript-
ed’ remarks describing an earlier speech by US 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to the gathering as ‘full of hegemony and 
threats’. Taken together, the rhetoric associated with another of Xi Jinping’s 
central foreign policy concepts, or the ‘New Model of Great Power Rela-
tions’ 新型大国关系, seems far from the reality of Sino-US relations during 
the previous twelve months.
A policy paper published under the auspices of the Korean-based 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies in March 2014 advocates applying the 
concept of the New Model to the Sino-Japanese relationship. However, 
over the past twelve months, tensions between the two historical great 
powers of East Asia have deepened and may even descend into conflict. In 
November 2013, China controversially declared a new Air Defence Identi-
fication Zone (ADIZ) 防空识别区 over the East China Sea and covering the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. By February 2014, senior US military 
officials were accusing the PLA of preparing to fight a ‘short, sharp war’ 
against Japan designed to seize the disputed islands. 
Sino-Japanese Understanding
Relations worsened in April 2014 when the Shanghai Maritime Court 
seized a Japanese cargo ship, Baosteel Emotion, in relation to an unpaid 
compensation claim dating back to the mid-1930s, when Japan leased two 
Wang Guanzhong
Source: hk.crntt.com:
Silent Contest, by  Jeremy Goldkorn
Silent Contest 较量无声 is a low-budget gung-ho film produced by the General Logistics  
Department of the PLA and the National Defence University in mid-2013. It surfaced on the 
Internet in October 2013 only to be deleted soon after. Set to a portentous musical score, 
the film decries the collapse of the Soviet Union and accuses America of undermining the 
rise of China through military exchanges, consular activities, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGO) and the propagation of Western values as well as Christianity. Among others 
it attacks the Ford Foundation, the Fulbright Scholarship program, the Carter Center, law 
professor and judicial reform activist He Weifang 贺卫方, eighty-four-year-old liberal econ-
omist Mao Yushi 茅于轼, electronic music and luxury brands as all harmful to the rule of the 
Communist Party and China’s future. The central thesis of the film is that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was not caused by the end of the Cold War but rather the other way round, in 
other words, infiltration, ideological softening and sympathy for Western ideas destroyed 
the Soviet Union. Although the production date is unknown, the two-part ninety-three min-
ute film is assumed to have been made sometime after Xi Jinping’s inauguration as state 
leader in March 2013.  
The central thesis of the film harks back to the 1950s Cold War policies of John Foster 
Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles, who promoted peaceful evolution as well as covert 
activities to undermine countries in the socialist camp.
Tensions between Beijing and Washington escalated during the course of 2014
Source: tieba.baidu.com
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Chinese ships and later lost them at sea. Baosteel Emotion’s Japanese own-
er, Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd, swiftly resolved the conflict by paying the US$29 
million required to secure the release of the ship. A potentially far more 
deadly encounter occurred in May 2014 when Chinese SU-27 fighters re-
portedly flew as close as thirty metres from a Japanese surveillance plane 
operating near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a tactic the Japanese alleged 
was repeated again in mid-June. 
Peninsula Matters
Over the last year Beijing has also man-
aged to alienate two of its other key North-
east Asian neighbours, South and North 
Korea. In the case of the South, this was 
somewhat puzzling given that Beijing and 
Seoul seemed to be drawing closer in their 
mutual antipathy and suspicions toward 
Japan. The fact that the recently elect-
ed Park Guen-hye is the first South Korean president to speak Stand-
ard Chinese fluently only reinforced this growing intimacy. Yet Chi-
na’s ADIZ declaration upset Seoul: it covered not just the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands but also another set of disputed islets which the 
Koreans called Ieodo and the Chinese Suyan Rock. Seoul respond-
ed by expanding its own ADIZ and summoning the Chinese Defence 
attaché to lodge a protest. This issue reignited in May 2014 when Chinese 
and Russian forces staged a major joint military exercise approximately 
fifty kilometres from Ieodo/Suyan Rock. Seoul was further disenchanted 
with Beijing in May when it discovered more than 1,000 Chinese fishing 
vessels operating illegally in South Korean waters — a development that 
some commentators interpreted as China taking advantage of President 
Park’s decision, following the Sewol ferry sinking disaster, to dismantle the 
South Korean Coast Guard.
Park Guen-hye was sworn in as South 
Korea’s first female president in 2013. She 
is the daughter of former South Korean 
President Park Chung-hee
Source: 3news.co.nz
President Xi’s July 2014 visit to South Korea led to a downplaying of 
these tensions and also to commentary suggesting that China was intent 
upon driving a wedge between the United States and one of its key North-
east Asian allies. This possibility was apparently not lost on senior Amer-
ican officials. Testifying before Congress in June, for instance, Assistant 
Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Russel described Xi’s visit 
as ‘an extraordinary milestone’. The persistence of the existential North 
Korean threat to the South suggests that the prospects for an imminent 
strategic shift on Seoul’s part are remote at this juncture. Indeed, poll-
ing conducted by the Asan Institute suggests that, while perceptions of 
China are warming, the US remains South Korea’s most popular country 
and most important ally. If anything, the real historic significance of the 
Xi trip lay in the fact that he was the first Chinese leader to visit the South 
having not first visited the North.
The continued downturn in China’s 
relations with its longstanding North Ko-
rean ally continued to surprise. A signifi-
cant factor was North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-un’s execution of Jang Sung-taek — 
his uncle and the reclusive regime’s point 
man on China policy. One of Jang’s crimes 
was reportedly his closeness with China. 
Beijing appeared to have been completely 
blindsided by this development. Then, in 
March 2014, reports emerged that a North 
Korean missile test, of which Pyongyang 
had failed to warn Beijing in advance, 
missed a commercial Chinese jetliner carrying 220 passengers by a num-
ber of minutes. In May 2014, the Japanese press reported the existence of 
leaked Chinese contingency plans preparing for the collapse of North Kore-
an regime. Although Beijing vociferously denied these reports, Sino-North 
Korean relations grew even more strained.
Sino-North Korean relations deteriorate: In 
December 2013, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-un ordered the execution of Jang Sung- 
taek — his uncle and key policy advisor on 
China policy
Source: Unknown
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All at Sea
China’s relations with the Philippines and Vietnam have also deteriorat-
ed badly during the last twelve months over other maritime disputes, 
these related to the South China Sea (which the Philippines calls the West 
Philippine Sea). Manila incurred Beijing’s wrath in March 2014 when it 
proceeded, in the face of strong Chinese opposition including threatened 
economic sanctions, to challenge China’s territorial claims in the South 
China Sea through a United Nations tribunal. Beijing flatly refused to 
take part in this arbitration process. Chinese paramilitary vessels con-
tinued to harass Filipino fishermen in the disputed areas and, in March 
2014, blockaded Filipino military forces stationed at the disputed Second 
Thomas shoal. 
Tensions similarly intensified between Beijing and Hanoi in May 2014 
when the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation deployed 
MH370, by Linda Jaivin
On 8 March 2014, the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing lost 
contact with air traffic control less than an hour after its departure. The plane was carry-
ing twelve Malaysian crew members and 227 passengers from fourteen nations — 152 
of them from China. A search team organised by the Malaysian, Chinese and Australian 
governments, aided by Japan, the US, South Korea and Vietnam, searched from the coast 
of Vietnam to the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, without discovering any debris. 
Relatives and friends of the missing passengers in China grew increasingly distressed 
and angry with the Malaysian government’s handling of the affair, including its perceived 
lack of transparency and delays in passing on information, and staged protests. Chinese 
state media also voiced criticism of Malaysia, and Chinese social media flared with anti- 
Malaysian sentiment. 
One plausible theory held that the plane was flying on autopilot, but ran out of fuel 
and crashed somewhere near the Australian coast — which still doesn’t explain why it 
was on autopilot or turned away from its course in the first place. Evidence in a report 
by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in late June revealed an unexplained power 
outage early in the flight that may have been caused by tampering from the flight deck. 
In late June, the Malaysian government called pilot Zaharie Shah a ‘prime suspect ’, 
after investigators discovered that he had used his personal flight simulator to prac-
a deep sea oil rig in the vicinity of the disputed Paracel Islands 西沙群岛, 
with a supporting force of at least eighty ships including military vessels. 
Both the Chinese and Vietnamese sides claimed that the other’s ships had 
been ramming their own. Large-scale anti-China protests erupted in Viet-
nam targeting Chinese-owned businesses, causing a number of fatalities 
and serious injuries to Chinese nationals, and necessitating the evacuation 
by Beijing of more than 3,000 of its citizens.
In October 2013, meanwhile, President Xi visited Malaysia on a trip 
that was hailed by the Chinese media outlet Xinhua as ushering in ‘a new 
era in Sino-Malaysian ties’. In 2014, the two countries would celebrate for-
ty years of formal diplomatic relations. However, the mysterious disap-
pearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 with more than 150 Chinese 
nationals on board has strained mutual good will. China’s citizens were 
vocal in their anger at the lack of information coming from Kuala Lum-
tise journeys over the Indian 
Ocean. But there is no other 
evidence, no clear motive, 
and the case remains far 
from solved.
On 14 July, sixteen family 
members of victims went to 
the Malaysia Airlines’ office 
in Shunyi, Beijing to demand 
to see official video footage 
of passengers boarding the 
flight, which the airline had 
previously refused to release. The South China Morning Post reported that police arrived 
and detained all of them, and that two other female relatives of passengers alleged they 
were beaten by police officers ‘after asking for the release of two other relatives — a father 
and daughter — who had been detained on a separate occasion’. The grieving families’ 
demand is simple — in theory, at least: if the passengers are alive, they want to see them; 
if they are dead, they want to see the bodies. 
On 25 March 2014, family members of passengers on board flight 
MH370 marched on the Malaysian Embassy in Beijing demanding 
answers from the authorities
Source: Zhang Lintao
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pur and its mishandling of the search. Their frustration was shared by the 
Chinese authorities, who themselves often had to rely on media reports in 
the absence of official communications. 
A map of Beijing’s South China Sea claims included in Chinese pass-
ports and depicting those claims as encompassing the Natuna waters pro-
voked an equally hostile reaction from the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. In 
March 2014, Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant deputy to the Indonesian 
chief security minister for defence strategic doctrine, noted that China’s 
claim now incorporated the waters around the Natuna Islands, which 
are part of the Riau Islands province of Indonesia. This prompted Jakarta 
to beef up its military presence in the South China Sea in the weeks and 
months that followed. 
Threats and Opportunities
Relations between China and Australia 
also took a tumble from the high point 
they enjoyed in April 2013 when the two 
countries established a formal ‘strategic 
partnership’. In September of that year, 
the newly elected Coalition government 
under Tony Abbott issued a statement 
in conjunction with the US and Japan, as 
members of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, expressing their opposition 
to the use of force to change the status quo in the East China Sea. The 
Australian response to China’s November 2013 ADIZ declaration was even 
more robust (and more sharply worded than that of even the US), with 
Canberra summoning the Chinese Ambassador to express its displeasure. 
When Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Beijing the follow 
week, her frowning Chinese counterpart Wang Yi 王毅 publicly rebuked 
her and accused Australia of ‘jeopardising mutual trust’ and ‘affect[ing] 
Sino-Australian relations worsen in 2013. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi de-
nounced Australia’s criticism of China’s 
new air defence zone established over 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
Source: diplomattimes.tv
Russia–China Pipeline, by Jeremy Goldkorn
On 21 May 2014, on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
in Asia (CICA), Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping looked on as Gazprom and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement for Russia to supply natural gas to China. 
The deal had been under negotiation for around a decade. Putin described the thirty-year, 
US$400 billion deal as ‘epochal’. 
For Russia and China, who have long viewed each other as ideal energy partners, the 
mutual benefits appeared to be clear. Russia gained a new customer for its gas at a time 
when its relationship with the United States and Europe had become increasingly tense in 
the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. China, meanwhile, is highly motivated to find 
sources of cleaner energy and the government had already pledged to more than double 
the country’s natural gas consumption by 2020.
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller told the media in Shanghai that the deal is Gazprom’s biggest 
ever. Russian news agencies said the contract, calling for thirty-eight billion cubic metres of 
gas a year from 2018, specified a price of about US$350 per thousand cubic metres, which 
is at the low end of what Gazprom currently charges export customers.  
The potential pipelines that will be used to deliver Russian natural gas to China under the new deal signed by 
Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation in May 2014
Source: RT/Gazprom
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the sound growth of bilateral relations’. An April visit by Abbott to Chi-
na (along with Japan and South Korea) appeared to go some way toward 
arresting this downward slide. With 600 business people in tow, Abbott’s 
visit even led to speculation that long-stalled Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
negotiations between China and Australia could be finalised by the end 
of the year. However, trilateral statements issued by Australia, Japan and 
the US on the sidelines of the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue — this time in 
relation to the South China Sea — continued to highlight ongoing tensions 
in the relationship between Beijing and Canberra. Officially, Australia still 
sees China’s rise as an opportunity rather than a threat (notwithstanding 
polling which indicates the majority of Australians see it as both), and the 
Australian Prime Minister and senior government figures continued to re-
iterate the importance of the bilateral relationship. 
While serious people in the Australian Department of Foreign Af-
fairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
worked hard to stabilise relations, a farcical but unwelcome episode was 
provided by businessman and MP Clive Palmer, of the eponymous Palm-
er United Party, and his Senate colleague Jacqui Lambie (see Forum ‘PUP 
Barking’, p.90). Angered by a falling out with his Chinese business partner, 
Palmer declared publicly that the Chinese were ‘mongrels’ who ‘shot their 
own people’. Lambie opined that Australia should double the size of its 
military given the threat of a ‘Chinese Communist invasion’. Prime Min-
ister Abbott and Foreign Minister Bishop were quick to condemn these 
remarks, and this was noted by the Chinese MFA spokesperson, while ex-
pressing China’s ‘strong indignation and severe condemnation’ of ‘Palm-
er’s insulting remarks’. The Global Times was less restrained, and follow-
ing some fierce words concluded that China should reappraise its view 
of Australia, while noting it was a distant trade partner, a destination for 
Chinese tourists and a place where Chinese children could learn English 
‘with a bit of an accent’. The episode ended with Palmer writing not one 
but two letters of apology to the Chinese Ambassador.
A Deal in the 
Making?
The only major coun-
try with which Chi-
na’s foreign relations 
do not appear to have 
gone backwards 
over the past year 
is Russia. Xi Jinping 
even chose Russia as 
the destination for 
his first foreign visit 
as president. During 
that visit he pledged 
to President Vladimir Putin that he would ‘closely coordinate [with him] 
on international regional affairs’. Then, in May 2014, Putin visited China, 
where he signed a deal that was a decade in the making for Russia to sup-
ply China with up to thirty-eight billion cubic metres of gas per year for 
thirty years starting in 2018.
Putin also attended the fourth summit of the CICA in Shanghai. CICA 
is a multilateral organisation whose most influential members are China 
and Russia and which is being chaired by China from 2014 to 2016. Xi used 
his keynote address to the 2014 CICA summit to propose a new ‘Asian secu-
rity concept’: that Asia’s problems should be solved by Asians themselves, 
not by external powers such as the United States. Putin’s visit coincided 
with the aforementioned week-long military exercise between Chinese 
and Russian forces in the East China Sea. 
Most international relations analysts outside China and Russia sug-
gest that there is less than meets the eye to the warming of relations be-
tween Beijing and Moscow and warn against over-exaggeration. Even if 
one accepts that Sino-Russian relations have made some gains over the 
Relations between China and Russia strengthen: Presidents Putin and Xi, 
shown here at the 2014 APEC Summit held in Beijing. Their growing per-
sonal relationship emulates their countries’ converging interests in trade, 
investment and geopolitics 
Source: People’s Daily Online
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last year, the more pressing question is why Beijing’s relations with so 
many of its other neighbours have gone backwards.
Shared Destiny or Grand Strategy Disaster?
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus. Brad Glosserman, executive di-
rector of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
in Honolulu, for instance, characterises Beijing’s current foreign policy 
approach as a ‘grand strategy disaster’ driven by a desire to secure the 
resource and energy needs required to fuel the country’s continued eco-
nomic growth. Rory Medcalf of Australia’s Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, by contrast, sees it as a ‘premature power play’ by a Chinese lead-
ership that has misjudged the extent of its still growing power and influ-
ence. The Australian defence analyst Hugh White, meanwhile, attributes 
Chinese foreign policy over the last year to a carefully calibrated effort to 
test suspect US alliances and strategic partnerships with the goal of under-
mining American power and influence in the Western Pacific.
If the reasoning behind Chinese foreign policy behaviour remains 
hotly contested, its potential consequences are clearer — and unsettling. 
The last twelve months have seen China forcefully assert its own inter-
ests vis-à-vis those of its neighbours and become more isolated as a conse-
quence, particularly as its neighbours begin to co-ordinate their strategies 
in response. It is true that it is still early days for President Xi’s leadership. 
As Zhai Kun 翟崑, formerly of the China Institute of Contemporary Inter-
national Relations (CICIR) has observed in an essay analysing Xi’s foreign 
policy approach: ‘it is extremely difficult for the new leaders to make cor-
rect situational judgments and balance the timing, strength and rhythm 
of decision-making and implementation in a dynamic and smart way. Di-
plomacy is an art of experience and skills are gained through long-term 
practice. There is much to expect in this regard.’
By the same token, Xi’s actions in this and other areas are not those 
of a fledgling leader struggling to find his way. The heated exchanges wit-
nessed between China and both the US and Japan at the June 2014 Shangri-
La Dialogue could well be a sign of things to come. If over the coming year 
the gap between China’s stated policies of good neighbourliness and the 
reality as perceived by others widens rather than narrows, the rhetoric 
of a ‘community of shared destiny’ may increasingly beg the questions: 
‘Whose community? Whose destiny?’
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SANDCASTLES IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA
Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
ACCORDING TO WESTERN media reports and official sources in the Philippines and Vietnam, China is building artificial islands on reefs and protruding rocks 
in the South China Sea to bolster its territorial claims. In response to questions at 
a Foreign Ministry press briefing on 6 June 2014, spokesman Hong Lei 洪磊 said, 
‘Anything China does on any of the islands or atolls is within its sovereign rights’.
Controversially, China has been building artificial islands in the South China Sea to increase its territorial claims
Source: Philippines Foreign Ministry
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The Chinese have also accelerated the construction of new buildings on 
already inhabited islands in the area. Other media reports claim that the Chinese 
government is paying fishermen subsidies to live on previously uninhabited 
islands and installing GPS devices with emergency communication systems in 
fishing boats that ply disputed waters.
 
This is an artist’s impression of a new airport and runway on an island in the South China Sea
Source: dqt.com.cn
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XI GOES TO MODI
SINCE THE ELECTORAL victory of Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi in May 2014, China has been 
cultivating an amicable relationship 
with Asia’s other giant. On a two-day 
state visit to India, 17–18 September 
2014, Xi Jinping committed China to in-
vesting US$20 billion in India over the 
next five years. Early reports had the 
figure at US$100 billion, which would 
have dwarfed the US$35 billion deal 
secured by Modi in Japan at the end 
of August. Nonetheless, US$20 billion, 
a figure that includes both public and 
private investment, and will cover the 
construction of high-speed rail links 
and other infrastructure, represents a 
substantial increase from the US$400 
million that China has invested in 
India over the past decade. Bi-later-
al trade between the two countries, 
meanwhile, is expected to reach US$1 
trillion by 2050. 
On 18 September 2014, even as 
officials were distributing happy-look-
ing photos of Xi and Modi relaxing in a 
garden with their wives to the media, 
800 Chinese soldiers crossed the Line 
of Actual Control (LAC) under the aus-
pices of building a ‘provincial road’ in 
Ladakh. The LAC has separated Chi-
nese-held land from Indian territory 
since the 1962 border conflict between 
the two nations. The violation elicited 
a strong response from India, which 
dispatched 1,500 troops to the area. 
The Indian media reported on the in-
cursion while Xi was still in the coun-
try. Xi addressed an emergency meet-
ing of the country’s top military brass 
when he arrived back in Beijing on 21 
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September, sparking speculation in the foreign media that he had been unaware 
of the PLA troop movements. If so, the incident highlights problems in China’s 
military chain of command. 
Unsurprisingly, the two sides made no tangible progress on the sensitive 
issue of border agreements. If trade and investment are hotting up, state-to-
state relations remain relatively cool. Issues such as India’s hosting of the Dalai 
Lama in Dharamsala, China’s strong alliance with India’s rival Pakistan and on-
going border conflicts have historically plagued Sino-Indian relations. Xi’s visit, 
ground-breaking for a Chinese leader, was a small step in a new direction. That 
direction was perhaps confirmed at a regional meeting on Afghanistan in Beijing 
on 31 October, about which Ananth Krishnan writing for India Today noted: ‘Chi-
na has appeared to rethink its long-held reluctance to discuss regional concerns, 
particularly in New Delhi and Kabul, on cross-border terrorism emanating from 
Pakistan.’
In September 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted a visit by Xi Jinping. China has been cultivat-
ing an amicable relationship with India since Modi came to power in May 2014
Source: ptinews.com
Another strategic alignment 
with China was announced ten days 
earlier on 21 October, when India 
and twenty other countries agreed 
to become founding members of the 
China-backed Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), a move seen 
as aimed at reducing the dependence 
on the Western-dominated World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund.  
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PRESIDENT XI JINPING’S tour of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela in July 2014 confirmed the importance of China’s foreign policy to the region once 
thought of as America’s backyard. During the trip, Xi attended a meeting of the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) group of emerging powers at 
Fortaleza, Brazil, as well as the first summit between China and the Community 
of Latin America and the Caribbean States (CELAC) in Brasilia, Brazil. Xi expand-
LATIN AMERICA
Rebecca Fabrizi
China unlocks the door to stronger relations with Latin America: railways
Source: news.sina.com.cn
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ed China’s bilateral strategic partnerships and co-operative agreements with Lat-
in American countries during the ten-day journey. But his most pressing task was 
to revitalise economic relations with key trading partners in the region. 
Between 2000 and 2013, trade between China and Latin America skyrock-
eted from US$12 billion to over US$261 billion, while total Chinese investment 
in the region is now approximately US$65 billion. By 2016, China is likely to sup-
plant the European Union as Latin America’s second-largest trading partner after 
the US. 
However, the pace of growth in trade has slowed in recent years, mainly due 
to an economic downturn in China and protectionist policies in Latin America 
that have stymied the flow of cheap Chinese manufactured goods into the region. 
Xi’s visit allowed China to work through trade and investment issues with Latin 
American nations, especially with its biggest trading partner in the region, Brazil. 
Through CELAC, China has also offered up a US$20 billion infrastructure fund to 
construct railways across South America, ostensibly to lower the costs of trade, 
just as it has done in Africa. 
The strength of China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Latin America
Source: blog.sina.com.cn/sinolatinist
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PUP BARKING 
Linda Jaivin
ON 18 AUGUST 2014, Clive Palmer, a maverick Australian business-
man, Member of Parliament and lead-
er of the Palmer United Party (PUP), 
appeared on the popular and unscript-
ed, live-to-air Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation show Q&A, in which pol-
iticians and others answer audience 
questions. In response to a question 
regarding allegations of improper 
electoral funding, he launched into an 
off-piste attack on China that clearly 
shocked his fellow panellists and au-
dience members: referring to ‘Chinese 
mongrels’, he explained: ‘I’m saying 
that because they’re Communist, they 
shoot their own people, they haven’t 
got a justice system and they want to 
take over this country. And we’re not 
going to let them.’ He accused the Chi-
nese government of wanting ‘to bring 
workers here to destroy our wage sys-
tem’, take over Australian ports ‘and 
get our resources for free... . I don’t 
mind standing up against the Chinese 
bastards and stop them from doing it’. 
The Chinese response was imme-
diate: protests in front of Parliament 
House in Canberra, and anger on Chi-
nese social and official media alike. 
The Global Times 环球时报 published 
an op-ed calling it a ‘vicious attack’. 
But it saw in it a larger pattern: ‘Chi-
na must be aware that Palmer’s ram-
pant rascality serves as a symbol that 
Australian society has an unfriendly 
attitude toward China’. While ac-
knowledging that members of the gov-
ernment had scrambled to condemn 
Palmer’s remarks, it likened them to 
‘bitter remarks against China’ made 
‘without any reason’ by Prime Minis-
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ter Tony Abbott and Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop. It didn’t specify what 
these were but they undoubtedly re-
ferred to the vociferous criticisms of 
both China’s claims and actions with 
regard to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands and Abbott’s claim that Japan 
was Australia’s ‘best friend in Asia’. 
The Global Times said that these 
‘prancing provocateurs’ needed to 
learn the ‘price they pay when they 
deliberately rile us’ and called for 
China to marginalise Australia in 
its global strategy, including that of 
business. The Global Times concluded: 
‘Australia is a remote business partner, 
and a place where the Chinese can 
take a trip and learn some English. 
These basic understandings should 
be the starting points for China to re-
orientate Sino-Australian relations.’
 On 25 August, Palmer sent a 
letter to the Chinese ambassador to 
Australia to ‘sincerely apologise for 
any insult to the Chinese people’ and 
regretted any  ‘hurt or anguish’ caused 
by his comments. 
Palmer has been involved in a 
long-running and acrimonious busi-
ness dispute with a Chinese compa-
ny. He held rather different views in 
2009, pillorying then prime minister 
Kevin Rudd’s China policy and feder-
al government restrictions on Chinese 
investment in Australia: ‘Suddenly 
there’s a great cry in Australia about 
Reds under the bed… . We’ve got the 
opportunity to grab that if our politi-
cians could only be fair and treat the 
Chinese people and Chinese govern-
ment with the dignity they deserve.’
Outspoken MP and leader of the Palmer United Party, Clive Palmer, had to write a letter 
of apology to the Chinese Ambassador in Australia after the comments he made on live 
television in August 2014
Photo: Alex Ellinghausen
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XI, PUTIN AND THE TROUBLE 
WITH CRIMEA 
Rebecca Fabrizi
ALTHOUGH BEIJING has a long history of falling in and out of 
alliances with Moscow, Xi Jinping is 
giving the relationship a high and pos-
itive profile. He appears to admire the 
Russian leader, who he has character-
ised as having a similar personality to 
his own: ‘我和您性格很相似’. He made 
Russia his first destination for a foreign 
trip after becoming president, and his 
first foreign visit of 2014. Addition-
al bilateral meetings at international 
summits such as BRICS (the association 
of the major emerging economies of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation 上海合作组织 and the G20, 
as well as Putin’s state visit to China in 
May 2014 mean Xi has spent more time 
with Putin than any other foreign head 
of state. Xi’s attendance at the Winter 
Olympics in February in Sochi was a 
first for a Chinese president.
Amidst all this cosiness, the sud-
den Russian annexation of Crimea by 
referendum presented China with a 
conundrum. On the one hand, China’s 
relationship with this useful partner 
within the P5 (the permanent five 
members of the UN Security Council) is 
strategically important and favourable 
to itself. On the other, non-interference 
in the internal affairs of another state 
is a central principle of China’s foreign 
policy. Besides, and crucially, given its 
own issues with Taiwan, Tibet and Xin-
jiang, it does not support self-determi-
nation. The US State Department was 
not the only foreign observer to note 
the parallels. 
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 China’s official line was suitably 
vague: ‘There are reasons for what 
is happening in Crimea.’ It asked the 
parties to resolve the issue without vi-
olence, a worthy sentiment, but only 
possible if the Ukraine gave in. Beijing 
knew it had succeeded in balancing it-
self on the fence when both Russia and 
Ukraine thanked the People’s Republic 
for its stance.
 Yet, The New York Times report-
ed in September that: ‘Just before Rus-
sia annexed the Ukrainian region of 
Crimea last March, Mr. Xi called Mr. 
Putin and urged him to find a political 
settlement, according to Shi Yinhong, a 
professor of international relations at 
Renmin University of China in Beijing.’ 
There has been no hint of this in pub-
lic. State media has even sided with 
Russia over the downing of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17, criticising Austral-
ia, the US and other western countries 
for their ‘one-sided accusation’. But, 
as The Times article states, the conflict 
has been good for China in that it has 
been able to secure better terms from 
Russia for delayed energy deals and 
defence sales. As for territorial ques-
tions of precedent: the large authori-
tarian power got its way with limited 
collateral damage, and nobody was 
able to do much about it.  
President Xi has spent more time with Russian President Putin than any other foreign head of state
Source: Xinhua
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CHINA AND EUROPE 
Rebecca Fabrizi
IN APRIL 2014, Xi Jinping made the first ever visit by a Chinese head 
of state to the European Institutions 
in Brussels. In a speech cum Chinese 
history lesson at the Collège d’Europe 
in Bruges, Xi called on Europeans to 
‘work together for all flowers of hu-
man civilization to blossom together’. 
 That same month, China’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs issued a poli-
cy paper on the European Union (EU) 
titled ‘Deepen the China–EU Com-
prehensive Strategic Partnership for 
Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Coop-
eration’. It said the partnership was 
important ‘in China’s efforts to pursue 
peaceful development and multi-po-
larity [in] the world’. It did not require 
a cynical reading to note that the paper 
distinguished the EU from the US and 
promoted a bilateral relationship that, 
in the name of ‘multi-polarity’, could 
potentially divide the ‘West’ and strike 
a blow at US interests. Whatever the 
underlying thinking behind China’s 
policies towards Europe, the EU re-
mains China’s biggest trading partner 
and both sides remained committed to 
developing that relationship. 
New visa policy
Source: hiberlin.com
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 China’s Europe policy has long 
been to engage with the EU and its in-
stitutions in Brussels while maintain-
ing equally active bilateral relations 
with its larger member states. China 
likes the fact that the EU is big and rich 
yet has no military aspirations in Asia. 
But Europe has no illusions that it is 
China’s top foreign affairs priority. Chi-
na must devote considerable time and 
energy to handling sometimes-tetchy 
relations with fourteen land neigh-
bours including Russia (see Forum ‘Xi, 
Putin and the Trouble with Crimea’, 
p.94), the other ASEAN nations, Japan 
and the US. This results in competition 
between member states of the EU as 
they vie for China’s attention, challeng-
ing the cohesiveness of the EU’s policy. 
The Chinese government encourages 
this competition, meting out special 
favours to European countries by turn, 
though Germany — Europe’s econom-
ic powerhouse — remains a preferred 
partner. 
 In December 2013, ministers of 
EU member countries approved the 
deal struck by European Commission 
negotiators in August that year to end 
the biggest trade dispute in history: an 
anti-dumping case stemming from Chi-
na’s subsidies to solar panel produc-
ers. Chinese diplomats in the EU said 
privately that Chinese bureaucrats had 
finally accepted that not every Europe-
an issue could be worked out in Berlin. 
In this case, it took an hour-long tele-
phone conversation between Premier 
Li and European Commission Presi-
dent José Manuel Barroso to pave the 
way for a negotiated settlement. 
 The year 2013 ended on a high 
note, with the presidents of the Euro-
pean Council — a forum for discussion 
between EU leaders — and the Europe-
an Commission in Beijing for the Six-
teenth EU–China Summit that was for-
mally hosted by Premier Li Keqiang, 
but, unusually, included an equally 
long meeting with Xi Jinping. The new-
style summit document included a 
prospectus on EU–China engagement 
to 2020, listing close to one hundred 
broad-ranging areas for co-operation. 
These included everything from mar-
itime security to emissions trading 
schemes and exchanges in the field of 
low-carbon energy technologies, in-
frastructure development, trade and 
investment, food security and cultural 
and academic exchanges. 
 Although the EU treated the 
prospect of an FTA with circumspec-
tion, China wants an FTA and will 
keep the issue on the table and in the 
press. Despite the breadth of the 2020 
‘roadmap’ and the existence of around 
seventy regular bilateral dialogues 
covering a whole spectrum of govern-
ment business, for China the relation-
ship remains primarily about trade 
and investment. In addition to trade, 
Chinese companies have been actively 
investing in Europe with 120 reported 
acquisitions in 2013 alone. The Brit-
ish Ambassador to China, Sebastian 
Wood, told Xinhua in July 2014 ‘within 
the space of eighteen months we have 
seen as much investment [in the UK] 
from China as we had in the previous 
thirty years’. Negotiations are also un-
derway for a new bilateral investment 
treaty, although the Europeans want 
to secure the sort of access to Chinese 
markets that would make it worth 
their while. This is likely to make the 
negotiations difficult and protracted.
 As the 2013 EU–China Summit 
wrapped up, Li Keqiang, to the 
annoyance of senior officials in 
Brussels, jumped on a plane to 
Romania for another meeting. This 
was with representatives of sixteen 
European countries, including eleven 
EU member states as well as Serbia, 
Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and the 
Republic of Macedonia. Brussels had 
repeatedly asked both sides in this 
‘summit’ not to institutionalise this 
arrangement, now in its second year 
and involving a variety of interim 
ministerial-level meetings. Brussels is 
uneasy both about the creation of such 
a large and unco-ordinated European 
Union subgroup, and the fact that the 
agenda of their meetings is dictated 
entirely by China. But it has indeed 
been institutionalised, as the summit 
for Co-operation Between China 
and Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC), and will continue to 
meet regularly. As with the EU proper, 
there is real interest here on both sides 
in trade and investment opportunities. 
CEEC is also looking into the idea of a 
‘Eurasian land bridge’, an economic 
corridor connecting China, Russia, 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe. 
  This engagement with countries 
that have little political leverage and 
The EU is China’s biggest trading partner
Source: tieba.baidu.com
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are desperate for infrastructure fi-
nancing offers an easy way for China 
to buy into Europe on its own terms. 
Viktor Orban’s Hungary allows on- 
going, permanent residency to anyone 
from China willing to tie up €250,000 
in Special Hungarian Government 
Bonds for five years. Such permanent 
residence, in turn, provides mobili-
ty throughout the Schengen area (all 
EU member countries except Bulgar-
ia, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania, Ireland 
and the UK). And, a positive angle for 
China, but negative for the EU, is that 
discussion of human rights never gets 
onto the agenda of the meetings with 
the CEEC countries. 
 Diplomats from some of the 
countries involved acknowledge the 
risks that dealing with China in this 
way can undercut joint policy posi-
tions. China is offering a US$10 billion 
investment fund for soft loans to the 
countries involved in CEEC that would 
be in direct conflict with EU policy. 
None have yet taken up the offer. At 
the same time, the arrangement gives 
each of the sixteen Heads of Govern-
ment (who could not otherwise guar-
antee any access to the Chinese lead-
ership) a private half-hour meeting 
with the Chinese premier. China may 
well invite others to join CEEC, or sim-
ilar groupings, in future. The People’s 
Republic has already been putting out 
feelers to others, including six south-
ern EU members (Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta), who 
met with Chinese representatives as 
a group at the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations last 
year. 
 Those eleven EU countries in 
the CEEC arrangement maintain that 
the new group is useful for them be-
cause the interests of Germany, France 
and the UK overwhelmingly guide EU 
policy towards China. Nearly half of 
European trade with China is actually 
German trade; the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel enjoys frequent contact 
with Chinese leaders. Hans Kundnani 
of the European Council for Foreign 
Relations wrote that ‘Europe’s future 
relationship with China will be deter-
mined by Germany’s rapidly evolving 
bilateral relationship with China. The 
danger of this new special relationship 
is that it could undermine [broader] 
European strategic and economic in-
terests.’ In fact, there is little differ-
ence between German goals for China 
and overall EU policy, but the intense 
political engagement, with over sixty 
bilateral dialogues between Germany 
and China alone, including a full ex-
ecutive-to-executive consultation pro-
cess not replicated by any other Euro-
pean country, leads to the risk — or at 
least the perception — that China will 
prioritise Berlin over Brussels. Li Ke-
qiang’s first overseas trip, in May 2013, 
took him to Germany, but no other EU 
country. 
 At the moment, France also en-
joys high status with China. Following 
his attendance at the Nuclear Sum-
mit in The Hague from 24–25 March 
2014, Xi Jinping visited Lyon and Paris. 
Putting 2008’s diplomatic spats over 
Olympic torch relays and visits by the 
Dalai Lama behind them, Chinese and 
French leaders cordially celebrated 
fifty years of diplomatic relations with 
a strong push for increased bilateral 
trade and investment, reportedly sign-
ing some fifty deals with a total value 
of €18 billion.
 As for the UK, relations were 
frozen for sixteen months following 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s meet-
ing with the Dalai Lama in London in 
May 2012. Although Xi did not visit 
London on his 2014 trip to Europe, and 
the UK press has reported a rift in the 
Cabinet over UK policy towards China, 
Xi and Cameron did meet in Beijing in 
December 2013. And in June 2014, Li 
Keqiang made a three-day visit to Lon-
don, where he signed deals worth £14 
billion, including ones between BP and 
Royal Dutch Shell on the one hand, and 
the China National Oil Offshore Corpo-
ration on the other. 
 Yet political tensions remained. 
Ahead of Li’s visit, Deputy Prime Min-
ister Nick Clegg told the media he had 
no regrets about meeting the Dalai 
Lama and accused Beijing of ‘system-
atic human rights abuses’. Li spoke of 
wanting to address ‘misperceptions 
and ease misgivings’. Yet, shortly be-
fore the Chinese Premier arrived in 
London, Beijing put out a diplomati-
cally assertive white paper that raised 
questions about Hong Kong’s auton-
omy. There was no evidence that his 
hosts raised the issue during their 
meetings. The joint statement issued 
by both parties at the end of the visit, 
however, did affirm the principle of 
‘One Country, Two Systems’ for Hong 
Kong enshrined in the bilateral 1984 
agreement over Hong Kong’s future 
under Chinese sovereignty. 
 Political frictions aside, accord-
ing to the Pew Research Global Atti-
tudes Project, some forty-eight per-
cent of UK citizens have a favourable 
attitude toward China (compared with 
twenty-eight percent in Germany and 
five percent in Japan, for instance). 
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London’s endorsement of free trade 
also makes the UK a favoured invest-
ment destination for China’s com-
panies in Europe. Nearly half of the 
Chinese students enrolled in tertiary 
institutions in the EU are in the UK.
 British press commentators writ-
ing about Li’s visit to the UK, mean-
while, wondered why the Queen, who 
has barely any political role in the UK, 
appeared to be an important part of 
the itinerary. Rumour had it that Li 
had threatened to cancel the trip if the 
Queen didn’t receive him. If true, some 
suggested it might reveal a continued 
status anxiety on the part of the Chi-
nese leadership. Or maybe it was just 
that if there is one thing that interests 
a Party apparatchik, it is a head of state 
who has lasted unchallenged for over 
sixty-two years.
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THE CHINESE INTERNET: 
UNSHARED DESTINY
Jeremy Goldkorn
UNDER XI JINPING, the party-state is 
reinforcing and extending the walls around 
the Chinese Internet. In early 2014, Xi assumed 
leadership of the newly formed Central Internet 
Security and Informatisation Leading Small 
Group 中央网络安全和信息化领导小组, whose 
members include Premier Li Keqiang and Liu 
Yunshan 刘云山, former director of the Party’s 
Department of Publicity (formerly Propaganda). 
In a report published on 27 February 2014, Xinhua 
News Agency quotes Xi as saying that China should 
‘strive to become a cyber power’.
Image: Robin Li spruiking ‘cloud computing’
Source: tizenindonesia.blogspot.hk
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The Garden of Earthly Delights
Let’s imagine that a man, call him Mr Jin, fell asleep in Beijing in 1994 
— when only small numbers of people in China were first able to access 
the Internet — and awoke twenty years later. The year he fell asleep, the 
most common answer to any enquiry at a Chinese department store was a 
pre-emptive ‘meiyou’ 没有, literally  ‘none’, or ‘whatever it is you want, we 
don’t have it’. If he had the right paperwork or connections and around 
20,000 yuan in cash (a fortune at the time), Mr Jin might have had a mobile 
phone, then called a dageda 大哥大, a clunky brick-like object that busi-
nessmen and gangsters used ostentatiously in public. But when he woke 
up in 2014, Mr Jin could easily purchase a smartphone for as little as a 
few hundred yuan. On his phone or computer screen (a laptop or iPad 
isn’t much more expensive than a mobile), Mr Jin would discover a ver-
itable garden of earthly delights, a shopper’s paradise where surly shop 
assistants had been replaced by scores of websites catering to his every 
possible desire and need, legal and otherwise. 
On Taobao.com or JD.com, for example, with a tap of his finger, Mr Jin 
could purchase second-hand science fiction novels, Gucci handbags, sex 
toys, drones, Red Guard armbands from the Cultural Revolution, obscure 
industrial chemicals, organic vegetables, construction equipment, live 
baby rats for feeding snakes, or a cat scratch pole that resembles Vladimir 
Putin. 
Mr Jin could also hail a taxi (offering a tip during peak hours to ensure 
prompt service) with the Didi Dache 嘀嘀打车 app on his mobile phone, 
pay for a Dairy Queen ice cream or send greetings to nearby strangers 
using WeChat 微信. Some of them might do more than just greet him back: 
the Global Times reported in January that the police had shut down twenty 
million WeChat accounts offering the services of prostitutes.
Open Sesame
Government statistics from June 2014 estimate that China has 630 million 
Internet users, around 500 million of whom connect via mobile phones. It 
is the biggest Internet population in the world. The companies that serve 
them have become global titans: on 18 September 2014, a company called 
Alibaba that was founded by the former English teacher and Hangzhou 
native Jack Ma 马云 listed on the New York Stock Exchange, raising 
US$21.8 billion from international investors, more than Facebook and 
General Motors in their initial public offerings. 
Even before the initial public offering of shares (IPO), Alibaba was 
taking in money beyond the wildest dreams of the thieves in the epony-
mous Arabian Nights tale: US$5.5 billion a year in revenue generated by a 
diverse range of popular services. There is the original English-language 
website Alibaba.com, which helps Chinese companies sell their wares to 
international markets; Taobao.com, an online marketplace where individ-
uals can buy and sell, similar to eBay; and Tmall.com, an online store like 
Amazon. These three services dominate ecommerce in China. 
Alibaba also controls Alipay, the biggest online payments firm in China 
— Paypal, the international leader, is a minor player in China, used most-
ly by the international customers of Chinese companies. Alibaba owns a 
large stake in Kuaidi 快递, the second of two dominant smart phone apps 
for hailing a cab. (Alibaba’s rival Tencent, which also owns WeChat, owns 
more than twenty percent of Didi Dache, mentioned above.) In 2013, Alib-
aba became the first Chinese Internet company to launch an online wealth 
management product 理财产品, Yu’ebao 余额宝, which allows people to 
invest small amounts of money into a fund offering returns of around five 
percent, more than double the interest rates typically offered by Chinese 
banks. As of July 2014, Yu’ebao had around 500 billion yuan under man-
agement, most of it from individual investors. 
Alibaba’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange means that China’s 
three biggest and most important Internet companies have all attracted 
foreign capital. The Chinese Internet industry often refers to this trio 
as BAT: B for the New York-listed search firm Baidu (often glossed as 
‘China’s Google’), A for Alibaba and T for the Hong Kong-listed Tencent, 
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which made its early fortune in instant messaging and gaming, and now 
dominates mobile phone use with WeChat. The BATs are global in scale 
whether measured by market capitalisation, revenues or number of 
users. With the Chinese Internet population heading for what investors 
call one billion consumers, the share prices of the BATs have remained 
high throughout periods of global economic instability. 
BATs on the Wing 
All three BAT companies plan to invest abroad. Baidu has opened a ‘deep 
learning’ (artificial intelligence) lab in Silicon Valley, and hired Andrew 
Ng, a former Google staffer and leading researcher in artificial intelli-
gence as its chief scientist. The company already operates a search engine 
in Japan (though it has yet to become a major player there) and has plans 
for Thai- and Arabic-language search sites, already being tested by small 
groups of users in Thailand and Egypt.
In early July 2014, Baidu founder and CEO Robin Li 李彦宏 was part of 
a delegation of 250 Chinese business people accompanying Xi Jinping on 
a state visit to South Korea. Li gave a speech in which he noted that China 
and South Korea are two out of only four countries in the world with core 
search engine technologies, and that China’s large Internet market and 
South Korea’s advanced broadband and other infrastructure meant that 
by working together they could gain a competitive advantage over US com-
panies. Already, Baidu and Samsung work in close co-operation: Samsung 
Gear uses Baidu voice recognition technology and Samsung mobile users 
can access Baidu Cloud. 
By 17 July, Li was in Brasilia, where Xi Jinping, who happened to be 
on a state visit to Brazil, and Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff launched 
Baidu’s Portuguese-language service at the Palacio do Planalto by pressing 
a computer button at the same time.
Tencent, meanwhile, 
is aggressively market-
ing WeChat throughout 
Africa, India, the Middle 
East, Latin America and 
Europe. In Africa, they 
are working in co-opera-
tion with Naspers, a South 
African media company 
founded nearly a century ago and once a key voice of official South Africa 
in the apartheid years, but which is now a global corporation with inter-
ests in print media, ecommerce and pay TV. Naspers owns a thirty-four 
percent stake in Tencent. Tencent itself holds ten percent of Digital Sky 
Technologies or DST, a Russian investment firm that owns significant num-
bers of shares in Facebook and many other global Internet firms. In 2013, 
Argentine soccer star Lionel Messi signed on as a celebrity product en-
dorser for WeChat. 
As for Alibaba, it perhaps remains the most ambitious of the BATs. Its 
founder Jack Ma wrote in a letter to investors that was released with the 
company’s prospectus:  
In the past decade, we measured ourselves by how much we changed 
China. In the future, we will be judged by how much progress we bring 
to the world.
Internet Investors and Users: Different 
Destinies
Not only are the BAT companies globalised in a way that is unique among 
Chinese industries, but the Internet is the only sector of the economy in 
Argentine soccer star Lionel Messi is a celebrity product endorser 
for WeChat
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which state-owned enterprises have failed to capture any significant mar-
ket share. By contrast, foreign capital plays a major role. Foreign institu-
tional investors own more than forty-five percent of Baidu. Before the IPO, 
the largest shareholders in Alibaba were Softbank, a Japanese investment 
firm with thirty-four percent, and Yahoo with twenty-four percent. South 
Africa’s Naspers is just one of several foreign institutional investors who 
together own more than half of Tencent. 
China places many restrictions on foreign investment in Chinese In-
ternet and media. The major Chinese Internet companies have worked 
around legal limitations by means of something called a ‘Variable Inter-
est Entity’ (VIE). This is a legal structure dreamt up in the 1990s when 
the first wave of Chinese Internet companies, including Sohu, Sina, Baidu 
and Netease courted investment from the US. Under a VIE agreement, a 
Hong Kong- or foreign-registered company enters into a contract with a 
mainland Chinese company that wholly owns the firm’s mainland oper-
ations. Typically, the founding entrepreneurs and their associates retain 
ownership in the company, which is bound by contract to return a share 
of profits to the foreign holding company. 
This legal loophole allows foreign capital a large stake in what is sup-
posed to be a protected industry. But it has some paradoxical and strange 
side effects, as the law also restricts the ability of mainland investors to 
buy overseas equities. The financial news service Bloomberg published 
an article titled ‘Chinese gripe at being left out of Alibaba IPO’ on 15 Sep-
tember 2014. It quoted a disgruntled would-be investor, a retired factory 
worker called Ms Zhou: ‘I’m a little confused about why you can’t invest in 
a Chinese company if you’re Chinese,’ she said. As the article comments, 
‘Though Chinese consumers have driven Alibaba’s success, they’ll largely 
be left out of the company’s stock offering.’ At least one securities analyst 
to whom Bloomberg spoke predicted that this situation will have to change 
in the future.
If investors abroad can buy shares in Alibaba while Chinese citizens 
like Ms Zhou cannot, similarly Brazilians, South Koreans, Japanese can use 
local-language Baidu search engines, while Ms Zhou and her compatriots 
are blocked from accessing globally popular websites such as Youtube, 
Facebook and online media such as The New York Times (see Information 
Window ‘The Rise of Chinese Internet Finance’, p.27). Google famously 
shut down their mainland search engine in 2010, citing censorship and 
alleging Chinese government-sponsored hacking.  
Chinese Internet companies have flourished in a protected, as well 
as politically sensitive and highly censored environment. Although they 
may be popular with foreign investors, Chinese companies have had little 
success with ordinary Internet and mobile phone users outside of China. 
While Baidu can claim some significant inroads into the South Korean 
market, and WeChat is growing in Africa and the Middle East, it is rare to 
find anyone in the Anglophone world who uses a Chinese Internet service 
or even recognises brands like WeChat and Baidu.
Sovereignty and Cyberspace 
In a report published on 27 Feb-
ruary 2014, after having assumed 
leadership of the newly formed 
Small Group on Internet security, 
Xinhua News Agency quotes Xi as 
saying that China should ‘strive to 
become a cyber power’. But the 
article also reported the govern-
ment’s worries about Internet- 
related threats to national security 
and the control of information on 
the Internet generally:
Liu Yunshan, a member of a newly 
formed Small Group on Internet 
security
Source: news.sohu.com
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Xi called for innovative methods to spread mainstream values and 
stimulate positive energy while maintaining proper guidance of on-
line opinions in terms of timing, intensity and impact.
‘Cyberspace should be made clean and chipper,’ Xi said.
‘No Internet safety means no national security. No informatisation 
means no modernisation,’ Xi said, noting that cyber information flows 
across countries and steers technology, funding and talents … .
… The meeting was also told that there must be legislative efforts to 
draft laws and regulations on managing information online, protec-
tion of key infrastructure facilities, and cleaning up cyberspace. 
Chinese government statements on Internet controls have long cit-
ed the two concerns of national security and ‘cleaning up’ criminal, 
pornographic, or socially dangerous content. ‘Positive energy’ 正能量, 
meanwhile, is one of Xi’s favourite terms, and it refers to a concept of civ-
ic participation and constructive attitudes (see the China Story Yearbook 
2013: Civilising China, pp.172–173). In previous years, officials discussed 
censorship and other controls over the Chinese Internet defensively, im-
plying it was something that all countries did. For example, after Google 
announced in January 2010 that it was shutting down its servers in China, 
Xinhua published an article (since deleted but still available on Google’s 
own cache) that quoted Foreign 
Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu 
姜瑜 as telling journalists: ‘The In-
ternet is open in China, where the 
government always encourages 
its development and has created 
a favorable environment for its 
healthy development.’ The deleted 
article also reported Jiang saying 
The ‘Godfather of the Great Firewall’, Fang Binxing
Source: zt.dahe.cn
that China, like other countries, regulated the Internet industry in line 
with its laws. 
During Xi Jinping’s early tenure, party rhetoric has shifted in favour 
of the more aggressive promotion of the idea of ‘Internet sovereignty’, 
which emphasises the authority of a nation-state to regulate cyberspace 
in its own unique way. The Xi administration did not coin the term. It first 
appeared in a government-published White Paper from 2010, which de-
clared: ‘Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of 
Chinese sovereignty. The Internet sovereignty of China should be respect-
ed and protected.’
Major Global Websites Blocked in China, by Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
The Great Firewall, planned and developed in the first few years after the Chinese 
public began to access the Web in 1995, is a cordon sanitaire that prevents unhealthy 
foreign influences from corrupting the minds of China’s Internet users. From the start, it 
blocked websites run by banned religions and cults, those advocating Tibetan and Taiwan 
independence and the sites of some Western news organisations. The New York Times site, 
walled out in the 1990s, was back in by 2001, reportedly on the orders of then president 
Jiang Zemin. In the run up to the 2008 Olympics, the government unblocked a number of 
sites, some only temporarily. 
In 2009, as the role social media played in the Arab Spring led to talk of Facebook and 
Twitter-led ‘revolutions’, and riots broke out in Xinjiang (where some advocates of Uyghur 
independence communicated via Facebook), the Great Firewall blocked Facebook, Youtube 
and Twitter. Since Google shut down its Chinese search server in 2010, many Google sites 
and services have been inaccessible. The firewall had previously barred Wikipedia but 
restored access in 2014 while denying access to dozens of individual articles on topics 
concerning recent Chinese history. 
Investigations into the wealth of the families of party leaders by Bloomberg and The 
New York Times in 2012 resulted in the banning of their websites, while The Guardian, The 
Wall Street Journal and Reuters have all seen their websites blocked intermittently over the 
course of 2013 and 2014. The authorities also deny access to Taiwan- and Hong Kong-based 
news sites including the Apple Daily, United Daily News, Economic Daily News, Kinmen Daily 
News, The Sun, Oriental Daily News, Sing Tao Daily and Ming Pao.
Although it is relatively easy to ‘jump over the Great Firewall’ 翻墙 by using such technol-
ogies as a virtual private network, the vast majority of China’s hyperactive Internet users 
do not use them. 
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On 23 June 2014, the People’s Daily de-
voted a full-page spread to coverage of a 
forum titled ‘Internet Sovereignty: A topic 
that cannot be avoided’ 网络主权：一个
不容回避的议题. The forum involved five 
scholars articulating and justifying the idea 
that all countries have the right to decide 
what information may spread on their own 
Internets. They complained that the US 
continued to exercise an unfair amount of 
power over the functioning of the Internet 
globally. Among the participants was Fang Binxing 方滨兴, the former 
president of Beijing Post and Telecommunications University and the ‘God-
father of the Great Firewall’ (see the China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising 
China, Information Window ‘Fang Binxing and the Great Firewall’, p.326).
That same day in London, Lu Wei 鲁炜, the director of the State In-
ternet Information Office (SIIO) and also a member of the Central Inter-
net Security and Informatisation Leading Small Group made a ten-min-
ute speech at the fiftieth public meeting of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the body that controls Internet 
domain names, root name servers and protocols that allow computers to 
‘talk’ to one another, enabling the Internet to work. A non-profit organisa-
tion founded in the US, until now ICANN has operated under contract to 
the United States Department of Commerce, as well as under the principle 
that the global Internet should operate free of government control. 
On 14 March 2014, the American government announced that it 
would relinquish its position in ICANN. It asked the ‘multi-stakeholder’ 
group composed of non-profit organisations, pro-free speech groups and 
websites as well as governments, to come up with a new system for gov-
erning the Internet in a way that would keep it free and open. The 23 June 
meeting in London was the first ICANN had held since the announcement; 
Lu Wei, the Director of the State Inter-
net Information Office
Source: news.ifeng.com
Lu was there to ensure China would not miss out on any future opportuni-
ties to shape its new regime. Lu, who reportedly oversaw the crackdown 
on critical discussion of social and political issues on Weibo 微博 that be-
gan in 2013 and the subsequent tightening of controls on WeChat (see In-
formation Window ‘Major Global Websites Blocked in China’, p.117), had 
a sunny, anodyne message for the group: ‘The Internet should be for the 
benefit of all mankind, to improve the wellbeing for people around the 
world’. Lu also said ‘China has opened its doors to build a shared Internet 
era with countries around the world.’ He used the phrase ‘shared Internet’ 
no fewer than five times.
By August, Iran and other stakeholders (whose identities have not 
been made public) proposed new bylaws that would give government 
members of ICANN the defining say in its policies. As The Wall Street 
Journal pointed out in an editorial in September, what this means is that: 
‘Authoritarian governments could for the first time censor the Web glob-
ally, not just in their own countries. Russia could get ICANN to withdraw 
Ukrainian sites. China could engineer the world-wide removal of sites 
supporting freedom for Hong Kong or Tibet.’ While the US Department 
of Commerce has downplayed concern that the system could be changed 
to such an extent, The Wall Street Journal argued that Obama had ‘un-
derestimated the importance of Washington’s control in maintaining an 
open Internet — and the desire among other governments to close the 
Internet’.
Although Lu did not mention ‘Internet sovereignty’ in his published 
speech, he responded to journalists asking about who should control coun-
try-level domain names (.cn or .au for example) by saying: ‘We should re-
spect every country’s Internet sovereignty.’ In July, Xi Jinping took up the 
theme on his visit to Brazil to attend a meeting of the BRICS group — the 
same visit where he helped launch Baidu’s Brazilian search engine. At the 
BRICS meeting on 17 July, Xi talked about the need for developing coun-
tries to tell their stories better in the media. Later, he made a speech to the 
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National Congress of Brazil calling for ‘respect of all countries’ cyberspace 
sovereignty’ (China Daily translation). Chinese state media reported the 
remarks on digital sovereignty in the context of the Edward Snowden rev-
elations about National Security Agency surveillance — an issue on which 
Beijing, Brasilia and many other governments have aligned, suspicious of 
global surveillance by the American government and wary of the systems 
Silicon Valley has created that enable intrusive snooping. 
Xi’s mention of Internet sovereignty at an international forum and its 
enthusiastic reporting back home entrenches the phrase as a tifa 提法 (for 
more on this term, see Chapter 4 ‘Destiny’s Mixed Metaphors’, p.150) that 
the Chinese government will continue to use in the coming years.  
A Destiny Unshared 
Internet sovereignty gives the Chinese state the legal language with which 
to justify any of its digital policies, including censorship of its domestic 
Internet. If China is free to set its own cyber laws and policies, others have 
no right to criticise it for censoring websites, journalists or bloggers. The 
government, which has steadily tightened restrictions on digital expres-
sion over the last two years, can claim it is legally justified in doing so.
 Internet sovereignty also justifies the blocking of international sites. 
In fact, much of the discussion of Internet sovereignty in the People’s Daily 
focuses on international, cross-border flows of information, the gist being 
that every country should be able to control these flows like they do for 
other goods and services (see Information Window ‘Major Global Web-
sites Blocked in China’, p.117).
Foreign firms are already prohibited from operating Software as a 
Service, whereby a company rents software stored on a remote server, in 
the cloud, to clients rather than selling a software package that is installed 
on the customers’ own computers. Although it is not stated explicitly, In-
ternet sovereignty also excuses increased hostility towards and other lim-
Pressed and Ironed, by Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
China-based correspondents for international news media need to hold a Press Card  
常驻记者证 and a ‘J1’ long-term journalist visa, both of which are issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Since the 1990s, it has been relatively straightforward for established for-
eign news organisations to obtain these documents, and the ranks of Beijing- and Shanghai- 
based correspondents have swelled. 
Between 1992 and 2011, the Chinese government expelled only three foreign journal-
ists: Henrik Bork of the German daily Frankfurter Rundschau in 1995, accusing Bork of 
‘aggressive, biased’ reporting and, in 1998, Juergen Kremb of Germany’s Der Spiegel and 
Yukihisa Nakatsu of Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, alleging that they had illegally obtained state 
secrets. 
Then, in 2012, the ministry denied a visa extension to Melissa Chan of Al Jazeera’s Eng-
lish TV channel. Although officials did not explain why, other journalists believed it had to 
do with a documentary aired by Al Jazeera on slave labour in Chinese jails.
 On 29 June 2012, the financial news service Bloomberg published a story titled ‘Xi Jin-
ping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes of Elite’ on their website; it was blocked within 
hours of publication. Since then, Bloomberg has been unable to obtain journalist visas for 
new correspondents despite (according to The New York Times) self-censoring further such 
investigative reports into the financial holdings of Chinese officials and their families. The 
Times itself published a story titled ‘Family of Wen Jiabao Holds a Hidden Fortune in China’ 
on 25 October 2012. The Chinese government immediately blocked the paper’s website. 
Correspondents already working for both Bloomberg and The New York Times have been 
able to renew their documents with the exception of the celebrated Chris Buckley, but 
the ministry has not approved any new ones. In November 2013, Paul Mooney, a veteran 
China reporter known for his coverage of human rights issues, was denied a visa to work 
at Reuters’ Beijing bureau. 
In May 2014, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China, which operates in China without 
official recognition, issued a report on working conditions for foreign journalists. Their 
survey of 162 foreign correspondents revealed that eighteen percent had experienced 
difficulties renewing their press cards or visas, twice as many as in their previous survey 
at the end of 2011. The report also quotes journalists who describe rough manhandling 
by plainclothes police, forced meetings with police who threaten not to renew journalists’ 
visas and warn against covering news such as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1989 
Protest Movement, the detention and telephone harassment of news assistants (who are 
Chinese nationals) and hacking of journalists’ email accounts.   
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itations on foreign Internet technology firms operating in China. Citing 
the Snowden leaks and alleged monopolistic practices, various state media 
and regulators have over the past year accused IBM, Qualcomm, Apple, 
Symantec, Kapersky Labs, Microsoft and Cisco of violations of Chinese law 
or threats to China’s national security. At a press conference in Beijing on 
30 October, the SIIO chief denied knowing if Facebook was blocked in Chi-
na, but made the policy very clear with a statement reported by Xinhua: 
‘China has always been hospitable to the outside world, but I can choose 
who will be a guest in my home’.
One Internet or Many Internets?
On 19 May, US Attorney-General Eric H Holder Jr announced the indict-
ment of five PLA members on charges of hacking to benefit Chinese in-
dustry. The Chinese government issued vigorous denials. But with the 
prominence given to the Snowden revelations in state media and party 
pronouncements, Internet sovereignty remains a useful concept that has 
been used to defend Chinese military exploitation of the Internet for both 
defensive and offensive purposes.
Finally, the concept of Internet sovereignty is a rhetorical tool to 
build a China-friendly consensus on Internet management at forums such 
as ICANN, as well as in BRICS, where China has significant influence. Lu 
Wei and Xi Jinping’s itineraries and activities this year suggest that this is 
on the agenda. Despite Lu Wei’s remarks at ICANN about ‘one shared In-
ternet’, it is possible that the Internet may splinter in order for some gov-
ernments, including China’s, to exert top-down controls over expression 
and commerce. These trends would not surprise our Mr Jin who woke up 
in 2014: in this respect, the party-state’s approach to regulating media, 
telecommunications and business has barely changed since he fell asleep 
in 1994.
The question remains of how the vision of Jack Ma, China’s richest 
man, of a Chinese company changing the online world can coexist with 
the dreams of Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful man, whose Internet con-
cerns seem focused on the grim, brute work of security and stability main-
tenance. For how much longer will we be able to talk about the Internet in 
the singular, without having to specify a national identity? 
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FORUM
FORUM
BEGGING TO DIFFER
The United Front in an Age of Shared Destiny 
·  GERRY GROOT
Occupy Taiwan 
· MARK HARRISON
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T H E  U N I T E D  F R O N T  I N  A N 
AG E  O F  S H A R E D  D E S T I N Y
Gerry Groot
Back in the Spotlight
Ling Jihua 令计划 had been an aspirant 
to the Party’s top leadership before his 
son Ling Gu 令谷 crashed a Ferrari in 
Beijing in March 2012, killing himself 
and one of the two young women with 
him (see the China Story Yearbook 2013: 
Civilising China, Information Window 
‘Black Ferrari, Red Ferrari’, p.166). In 
the wake of the tragedy, which raised 
a number of questions (including how 
Ling’s son had been able to afford the 
car), Ling Jihua was removed from his 
post as the chief of the General Office 
of the Communist Party’s Central Com-
mittee and appointed head of the Unit-
ed Front Work Department 统一战线 
工作部 instead. 
The United Front Work Depart-
ment (UFWD) is the organisation 
through which the Party reaches out 
to many key non-party groups within 
and outside China in order to achieve 
important political goals. It also mon-
itors sensitive constituencies and se-
lects representatives from them who 
they can then incorporate into the po-
litical system. The last time the UFWD 
garnered any significant attention 
from foreign media was during the tu-
multuous events surrounding the 1989 
student democracy movement centred 
on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Yan 
Mingfu 阎明复, then head of the UFWD, 
played a key role in liaising with the 
students, meeting with students at 
UFWD Headquarters and famously of-
fering himself up as a hostage. 
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The Ling Gu Ferrari incident and 
its aftermath had been one of the few 
times in recent years that the depart-
ment has made international news 
until 6 June 2014, when Xi Jinping 
brought United Front work back into 
prominence in remarks he made at a 
Conference of Overseas Chinese Asso-
ciations in Beijing. ‘As long as the over-
seas Chinese are united,’ declared Xi, 
‘they can play an irreplaceable role in 
realising the Chinese Dream of Nation-
al Rejuvenation as they are patriotic 
and rich in capital, talent, resources 
and business connections.’ He was 
implicitly appealing to the Chinese in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, where 
just two days earlier there had been 
significant, large-scale commemora-
tions of the deaths that resulted from 
the government’s military crackdown 
on the protests in Beijing twenty-five 
years earlier. 
What is United Front Work?
United Front work has been a key 
strategy of the Communist Party since 
the early 1920s, when some of its 
members joined the Nationalist Party 
or Kuomintang (KMT) 国民党 (see Fo-
rum ‘Occupy Taiwan’, p.136), ostensi-
bly to build up the KMT but in reality 
to take it over. When the Nationalists 
turned on the Communists in 1927, vi-
olently purging its ranks of them and 
attacking suspected sympathisers, the 
Communists suffered heavy losses. It 
nonetheless emerged bigger than be-
fore and with broader support, despite 
being confined to the remote country-
side and under constant Nationalist 
military pressure. 
From 1936, in the wake of in-
creasing Japanese aggression, the 
Communist Party worked assiduously 
to convince urban Chinese in particu-
lar that the country’s survival as a 
nation depended on the Nationalists 
joining it in an anti-Japanese ‘United 
Front’ and that it was unpatriotic for 
the Nationalists to prosecute its exter-
mination campaign against the Com-
munists when it ought to be confront-
ing the threat of national extinction 
from Japan. From 1936 to 1945, when 
the Japanese surrendered, and from 
1946 to 1949, when full-scale civil war 
between the Communists and the Na-
tionalists broke out, the Communists 
also put great effort into building a 
United Front with ‘fellow travellers’. 
These included famous intellectuals, 
writers, teachers, students, publishers 
and business people who were not 
necessarily themselves Communists. 
Many of them belonged to or were in-
fluenced by the so-called democratic 
parties 民主党派. This ‘New Democrat-
ic, Anti-Imperialist Anti-Feudal Unit-
ed Front’ became a key to the Party’s 
success in undermining, isolating and 
de-legitimising the Nationalists. The 
common goals of national triumph 
over Japan and a better future had 
powerful appeal. No wonder then, that 
after achieving victory in 1949, Mao 
Zedong declared United Front work 
one of the Party’s three great secret 
weapons, alongside party-building 
and its armed forces. 
After 1949, United Front work 
continued to be aimed at enlisting the 
co-operation of many of the groups 
outside of the Party’s ideologically 
determined constituency of peasants, 
workers and soldiers. The United 
Front called on ‘capitalists’, intellectu-
als, prominent individuals and others 
to help rebuild the nation. When such 
allies expressed support for the Party 
or its policies, they influenced wider 
society and bolstered the Party’s le-
gitimacy and democratic credentials. 
Such behaviour by influential figures 
profoundly influenced many of the 
groups targeted.
‘Long Live the Unity of all the People of the Nation’: ethnic minorities pictured in Tiananmen Square. Yang 
Junsheng,1957
Source: ycwb.com
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After 1949, the United Front’s 
representation of these groups and 
individuals became a key part of the 
symbolism of communist socialist de-
mocracy. It is institutionalised in the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC 中国人民政治协
商会议), a high-level public advisory 
body that meets at the same time as 
the National People’s Congress. Unlike 
the Communist-dominated Congress, 
two thirds of the UFWD-vetted CPPCC 
membership are non-communists. 
(However, neither the Party nor the 
government are obliged to act on any 
CPPCC resolutions.)
Mao himself lost interest in Unit-
ed Front work after 1956, favouring 
confrontation and ‘class struggle’ over 
conciliation. It was nevertheless re-
vived each time the Party had to re-
cover from a Mao-induced crisis. At 
such times the Party recognised the 
value of the talents, voices and influ-
ence of non-party-affiliated intellectu-
als and others. For example, after the 
disastrous Great Leap Forward and 
three years of famine (1958–1961), the 
Party effected a temporary reconcilia-
tion with surviving United Front allies 
whom it had denounced during the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957; this 
temporary reconciliation was known 
as the Second Hundred Flowers Move-
ment of 1961–1963. 
After Mao’s death and the end of 
the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the 
Party revived the United Front Work 
Department and instructed it to re-
build links with overseas Chinese busi-
ness leaders to attract much-needed 
foreign investment. The UFWD also 
tapped available surviving talent at 
home to help China establish its first 
post-1949 stock market in the 1980s. 
The idea for the Special Economic 
Zones, which played a huge role in 
starting China’s economic reforms, 
for example, was first raised publicly 
by the Guangdong Provincial CPPCC 
around 1977. 
During the society-wide protests 
of April–June 1989, many of the dem-
ocratic parties and other United Front 
allies supported the students and even 
marched in demonstrations. After 4 
June and the Beijing Massacre, they 
were quickly exonerated while other 
participants were punished. The new 
Party general secretary Jiang Zemin 
even implied that the Party would re-
lax the strict controls on them and give 
more freedom to the CPPCC. His prom-
ises echoed key elements of democ-
ratisation proposed earlier by the de-
posed party leader Zhao Ziyang, which 
entailed an expansion of the United 
Front system and greater prominence 
and responsibility for the CPPCC. The 
Communist Party was worried about 
its loss of legitimacy after 1989. It 
needed help to cope with the disrup-
tion to the economy and the damage 
to China’s national image caused by 
the flight of most foreigners and the 
near drying-up of foreign investment. 
It also needed to reassure China’s own 
new capitalists who might have been 
spooked by the dramatic change in po-
litical climate. But the foreigners and 
their money soon returned, the status 
quo prevailed, and the Party didn’t 
need to make any political compromis-
es in service of the United Front. The 
UFWD began to slip out of sight.
United Front Work Today
Since then, twenty-five years of ra- 
pid economic development have made 
China an increasingly complex society 
with many new interest groups and 
classes, as well as new social fissures. 
United Front work today aims to pre-
vent the emergence of resentful inter-
est groups such as a disaffected capital-
ist class. The official list of United Front 
targets includes those from before the 
reform period: the members of the 
eight ‘democratic parties’; prominent 
non-party figures; intellectuals who 
do not belong to the Party; represent-
atives of ethnic and religious groups; 
the original (pre-1949) capitalist class; 
former Nationalist military personnel; 
people from Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan; Taiwanese who remained in 
China after 1949 and Overseas Chinese 
including those who have moved (or 
returned) to China. The new groups in-
clude independent professionals such 
as lawyers, managers and influential 
figures in private- and foreign-owned 
businesses, Chinese who have studied 
or returned from abroad and Chinese 
immigrants in foreign countries. The 
UFWD attempts to harness them to the 
aims of the Party and prevent them 
from becoming a problem in the first 
place. The Department’s work abroad 
extends beyond reaching out to for-
eign citizens of Chinese ethnic origin 
and recent emigrants, to trying to in-
fluence foreign nationals to accept the 
Communist Party’s point of view on a 
plethora of topics. 
The recent dramatic incidents 
of unrest, violence and terrorism in 
Xinjiang and Yunnan, the continu-
ing self-immolations in Tibet and the 
demolition of churches in Zhejiang all 
point to significant failures of the Unit-
ed Front. Many religious people and 
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many Uyghurs and Tibetans do not 
believe the rhetoric found in recurrent 
United Front slogans that they are ‘in 
the same boat’ 风雨同舟 with the rest 
of the nation, or indeed, that the rest 
of the nation is committed to ‘sharing 
weal and woe’同甘共苦 with them.
The protests in Hong Kong, Ma-
cau and Taiwan (see Forum ‘Occupy 
Taiwan’, p.136) have targeted, explic-
itly or otherwise, government officials, 
political parties, big business and oth-
ers believed to be too cosy with the 
Communist Party — with United Front 
work a key reason for these close re-
lationships. These allies (including, 
according to some reports, the Triads 
— the ‘Chinese Mafia’) have been culti-
vated by the UFWD largely because of 
their assumed influence on the wider 
population. Such allies may in turn 
benefit from their links to the Commu-
nist Party, and believe it will protect 
their interests.  But the growing num-
ber of protests show that the United 
Front message is failing to resonate 
with many ordinary people in these 
places and elsewhere across China, 
undermining Xi Jinping’s vision of a 
Shared Destiny. The lessons of twen-
ty-five years ago though, warn us that 
that the Party has other ways of real-
ising such ideals as ‘China and Hong 
Kong are One Family’ 中港一家亲.
Pro-Beijing protests in Hong Kong: the red banner on the tank reads ‘China and Hong Kong 
are One Family’ 
Source: blog.sina.com.cn
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O CC U P Y  TA I WA N
Mark Harrison
Heads Up
For twenty-four days in March and 
April 2014, student activists occupied 
Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative 
Yuan 立法院. The Sunflower Student 
Movement 太陽花學運, which success-
fully combined traditional forms of 
protest like the sit-in with viral cam-
paigns on social media, captured the 
world’s attention. Using technology 
such as the smartphone, the students 
created a politically savvy ‘multi-plat-
form’ protest movement that has had a 
profound effect on Taiwan politics. 
In recent years, the Taiwan-
ese have coined the phrase ditouzu 
低頭族, ‘the tribe of the bowed heads’, 
to describe young people bent over 
their smartphones — texting, play-
ing games, updating their Facebook 
accounts, oblivious to what is going 
around them. The phrase ditouzu ex-
presses unease about how technology 
can disconnect people from society 
and an anxiety about whether public 
or civic life is even possible in a place 
like Taiwan today. As it turned out, 
smartphones (7.55 million were pur-
chased in Taiwan in 2013 alone) helped 
to enable the political movements that 
transformed Taiwan politics and pub-
lic life in 2014. 
The Sunflower Student Move-
ment’s origins date back to 2010, when 
students from a number of universi-
ties began campaigning for students’ 
rights on campus. Many university 
rules and ordinances had remained 
unchanged since the martial law era 
(1949–1987): universities retained the 
authority to exclude students from 
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courses and restrict their rights to as-
sembly on the basis of their political 
beliefs. Two students in particular 
came to prominence: Lin Fei-fan 林飛
帆 and Chen Wei-ting 陳為廷. 
In 2012, these student activists 
extended the range of their activities 
beyond the campus to deal with larg-
er issues in Taiwan’s democratic sys-
tem. In an alliance with journalists 
and other civic groups, they began a 
campaign against the concentration 
of media ownership in Taiwan. The 
specific target of their protests was the 
Want Want China Times Group 旺旺中
時媒體集團. Want Want China Times 
旺e報 is a Taiwan media conglomerate 
whose editorial position, if not explic-
itly supportive of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Chinese Communist 
Party, considers Taiwan and mainland 
China as a single commercial market, 
one whose growth is in the common 
interests of people on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.
In the first years of this decade, 
the Want Want China Times Group 
made a number of corporate acquisi-
tions. From control of the China Times 
Group of newspapers, the company 
took over the major free-to-air televi-
sion provider CTV and then the cable 
provider CTi TV. In 2012, the company 
made a bid for another cable television 
provider, CNS. The growing concentra-
tion of media ownership by a company 
with such a specific editorial agenda 
led to the creation of the Anti-Media 
Monopoly Movement 反媒體壟斷運
動. It targeted Want Want China Times 
as well as the media regulator, the Na-
tional Communications Commission, 
and demanded legislative changes 
to support media diversity. Activ-
ists within the Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement argued that the media had 
a vital mission to sustain democracy 
through a diversity of opinions and 
editorial stances. The activists carried 
out their campaign for diversity and 
better regulation of the mainstream 
media across a range of social media 
platforms such as Facebook, creating 
a kind of alternative commons that ac-
corded with the democratic ideals they 
believed in. 
The subtext of the movement, 
sometimes explicit, at other times 
implicit, was the threat to Taiwan’s 
democracy presented by the People’s 
Republic of China. Student activists re-
gard this threat as both political, from 
China’s authoritarian Communist gov-
ernment, and corporate, as Taiwan-
ese commercial interests willingly set 
aside democratic values to observe the 
People’s Republic’s ideological edicts 
in the pursuit of profit. 
By mid-2013, in response to the 
campaign, the National Communica-
tions Commission ruled on the Want 
Want China Times acquisition of CNS, 
and required the company to divest 
itself of the news programming of its 
other cable provider, CTi. Another 
deal, by which a consortium with links 
to Want Want China sought to acquire 
the Taiwan interests of the Hong Kong-
based Next Media group, collapsed 
when the bidders walked away from 
the deal. 
The student activists quickly 
moved on to different issues. In 2013, 
they campaigned against urban and 
rural development projects that would 
have displaced long-established com-
munities. These included those in rural 
Miaoli 苗栗 as well as the old district of 
Huaguang 華光 in Taipei, where KMT 
veterans had lived for decades since 
fleeing the Communists’ victory on the 
Mainland in 1949.
By late 2013, student and com-
munity activism in Taiwan had de-
veloped a distinctive style and set of 
practices: the ‘multi-platform’ activism 
mentioned above. On the one hand, 
students used traditional direct action, 
such as sit-ins, to forestall the demo-
lition of Huaguang, resulting in their 
forcible removal by police in a violent 
confrontation. On the other, they also 
used social media and mobile com-
munication, including the techniques 
of viral marketing, to circulate infor-
mation and political ideas both online 
and on the streets. The protests have 
moved from issue to issue, but in each 
Yang Yi 杨毅, spokesman for the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, which is responsible for setting and 
implementing guidelines and policies related to Taiwan
Source: chinataiwan.org
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instance, detailed online exposition, 
debate, and rich image-making sup-
ported the banners and slogans of di-
rect action.
The result has been the creation 
of a vigorous and dynamically engaged 
community. Their online debates and 
real-world actions show that the con-
test over Taiwan’s political future runs 
much deeper than the mainstream do-
mestic Taiwan or international media 
coverage would indicate.  
The Sunflower Student Movement
The Sunflower Student Movement was 
sparked in mid-2013 when the govern-
ments of Taiwan and mainland Chi-
na approved the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement (CSSTA).
As disquiet grew within the Leg-
islative Yuan, the Black Island Nation 
Youth Alliance began to mobilise on 
campuses. The activists were troubled 
by the prospect that, without appro-
priate safeguards, access to education 
markets, financial services and the 
media would potentially give China 
leverage over Taiwan’s social and 
cultural life. This concern expressed 
a deep-seated anxiety in Taiwan, a 
legacy of the martial law era, about 
the power of an unscrupulous state to 
manipulate social identity, and a pro-
found suspicion of the current motives 
of the KMT government in improving 
relations with China. 
On 17 March 2014, after months 
of delay, and disregarding a previous 
agreement to conduct a clause-by-
clause review of the CSSTA with the 
opposition Democratic Progressive 
Party, the KMT-led legislative commit-
tee charged with managing the debate 
unilaterally decided to send the agree-
ment to the floor of the KMT-majority 
chamber, where it would be sure to 
pass. The following day, protesters, 
including student, civic groups and 
concerned citizens, began gathering 
outside the legislature. On the evening 
of 18 March, they entered the building 
and occupied the chamber. Nothing 
like this had happened before in the 
island’s history.
Police tried to expel the students 
on the first night but failed. The stu-
dents quickly mobilised support sys-
tems that they had developed during 
previous protest actions. Supporters 
supplied food, water, computers and 
mobile phones with Internet access, 
both to those inside the chamber and 
other groups gathering in the streets 
outside. The local media reported the 
occupation through their typically 
partisan lenses, giving airtime to opin-
ion-makers on one side of Taiwan’s 
party political divide or the other to 
support or condemn the student activ-
ists. International media reports em-
phasised the anti-free trade element of 
the activists’ concerns. 
The mood among the protesters 
in the first week was tense, fuelled by 
rumours, information circulating on 
social media, and media speculation 
that there could be a strong police 
response. What is more, once they oc-
cupied the legislature, they were not 
quite sure what to do next. On the first 
weekend, a breakaway group of stu-
dents stormed the nearby Executive 
Yuan, which houses the offices of the 
cabinet, and were violently ejected 
by riot police. Many were seriously 
injured, including one who was left 
in a coma for several days. The gov-
ernment predictably condemned the 
student occupiers for breaching dem-
ocratic process; the students accused 
the government of the same.
By the second week, however, the 
occupation became institutionalised. 
The student occupiers developed a 
clear and focused message about the 
reasons for their actions and commu-
nicated it effectively through social 
media. Student supervisors regulated 
movement in and out of the chamber. 
Their behaviour inside the chamber 
was always disciplined and controlled. 
During the first week, a local flo-
rist brought a bunch of sunflowers to 
the legislative assembly building. The 
sunflowers, he said, symbolised the ac-
tivists’ campaign to shed light into the 
‘black box’ of government dealing with 
mainland China. The movement began 
calling itself The Sunflower Student 
Movement. Yellow was added to the 
black of the Black Island Nation Youth 
Alliance, and black and yellow became 
the movement’s colours.
Over the course of the occupa-
tion, the legislative building became 
the centre of a whole new array of im-
provised institutions, the hub of new 
paths of communication across Taipei 
and the island, and the focus of activi-
ties that brought together people from 
different walks of life. Part of the ex-
citement around the occupation was 
the way it revealed an alternative set 
of political possibilities for Taiwan and 
transformed the relationship between 
the electorate and legislature. 
 On 30 March, hundreds of thou-
sands of people rallied in support of 
the students, jamming the streets for 
blocks around the city centre. The 
massive show of public support, which 
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FROM THE MANUAL OF DISOBEDIENCE USED BY THE HONG KONG PROTESTORS
(1) Philosophy
1. Civil disobedience refers to acts of opposing injustice through refusing to comply with 
a law, decree or order. The participants will not resort to violence. Rather, they will pro- 
actively accept the due legal consequences. The acts have to display not only civility but 
also a disobedient attitude in refusing to co-operate with the unjust authorities, and to 
strive for societal changes through continuous protest. Genuine pacifism does not mean 
not to resist against evils, but to fight against evils squarely with non-violent means.
2. Using violence against violence will only intensify bias and fear, provide the government 
the excuse for suppression, and further empower the suppressors. Civil disobedience is 
to win over hatred with love. The participants should face sufferings with dignified atti-
tude, so as to summon the conscience of the suppressors and to minimize the hatred un-
derlying the acts of suppression. More importantly, non-violence will win over the empa-
thy of bystanders, and expose the complete lack of legitimacy of the institutional violence 
applied to us by the suppressor. The self-sacrifice can arouse the awakening of the public.
3. The ultimate aim of the campaign is to establish a society embracing equality, tolerance, 
love and care. We fight against the unjust system, not individuals. We are not to destroy 
or humiliate the law enforcers, rather we are to win over their understanding and re-
spect. Not only do we need to avoid physical confrontation, but also to avoid developing 
hatred in heart.
4. Occupy Central participants must strictly follow the principle of non-violence if we are to 
gain the understanding and support of the public. Protesters must not engage in physical 
or verbal conflicts with law enforcers, nor damage any public properties. When facing 
brutal force, you can act to protect your body but not fighting back. When facing arrest, 
protesters can form a human chain and lie down so as to make the arrest more difficult 
but not to struggle hard. Protestors should display a peaceful and rational attitude with 
dignity. They should keep reminding themselves to demonstrate virtues of higher stand-
ard than those of the suppressors, so as to gain the support of the society.
Occupy Central with Love 
and Peace is a civil disobedi-
ence movement that began 
in Hong Kong in September 
2014. It called on protesters 
to block roads and paralyse 
Hong Kong’s financial district 
if the Beijing and Hong Kong 
governments did not agree 
to implement universal suf-
frage for the chief executive 
election in 2017 and the 
Legislative Council elections 
in 2020
Photo: boxun.com 
(2) Rules for Non-Violent Protest
1. Insist on the use of non-violence means. In the face of law enforcers and anti-Occupy 
Central demonstrators, never hurt anyone physically or mentally, or damage any pro- 
perties.
2. Be brave in facing the authorities and accept the responsibilities of civil disobedience. 
Do not use any masks to cover faces.
3. Do not bring any weapons or anything that can be used as weapons.
4. When facing arrest, form a human chain and lie down to show our non-co-operation.  
Do not struggle hard so as to avoid injury.
5. Be bold in the face of violence. Do not try to hit back. Move to a safe place and ask for 
the help from the picket or medical team.
6. For the sake of consistent crowd control information, no one except designated person-
nel should use any loudspeakers. Do not put up any long flags or large posters that will 
block the views.
7. Leaders of the operation could be arrested anytime. Be prepared for changes in leader-
ship and try to maintain good order all along. 
8. Respect the decisions of OCLP. Any disagreements should only be reviewed after the 
operation. Avoid any action that may disrupt the operation.
Occupy Central with Love and 
Peace advocacy group compiled 
a set of rules and guidelines for 
use during the protests
Source: oclphkenglish.wordpress.
com
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accorded legitimacy to the student ac-
tivists, proved a turning point with the 
government. 
 The ruling KMT seemed divided 
on how to respond to the protest, and 
at the end of the first week President 
Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 gave a weak press 
conference in which he evaded hard 
questions about the occupation and 
the future of the trade agreement. The 
speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang 
Jin-pyng 王金平, a key rival to Ma in 
the KMT, opened negotiations with 
the student leadership himself. By this 
time, Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting 
had become more than just student 
leaders. As the faces of the occupa-
tion, they were celebrities, profiled in 
newspapers and on TV. Although the 
protesters were not unanimously in 
favour, the leaders agreed that they 
would leave the legislative assembly 
on 10 April. In return, the government 
promised a proper legislative review 
of the CSSTA and to set up institutional 
public oversight mechanisms for man-
aging cross-Strait relations.
Despite the significant disruption 
caused by the protests, in the end, the 
parties came to a relatively peaceful 
resolution. Student movements in Tai-
wan since 2012 have generally sought 
to avoid confrontation with the police, 
preferring rational debate and discus-
sion in service of social justice and pro-
gress. They considered the process of 
negotiated settlement an expression of 
their democratic ideals. 
Shared Destiny and the ‘Taiwan 
Question’
The movement showed up the weak-
ness and isolation of the president in 
Taiwan. President Ma’s level of per-
sonal public approval hovers around 
the ten percent mark. At the same 
time, the authority of the office of the 
president in Taiwan is greatly limited 
by Taiwan’s geo-political relationships 
with China and the US. Since the first 
truly democratic presidential election 
on the island in 1996, the electoral pro-
cess has been one of the pillars upon 
which Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty 
rests, and which in turn legitimises the 
office of the president. Yet the People’s 
Republic of China, both Taiwan’s chief 
trading partner and main security 
threat, considers the incorporation of 
the island into its territory a predes-
tined national mission. From Beijing, 
Taiwan’s island story, the creation of a 
sovereign people through democratic 
principles and process, skewers Chi-
na’s manifest destiny. 
In his two terms in office, Ma 
Ying-jeou has attempted to obfuscate 
this problem by calling for practical, 
economic engagement, while avoiding 
the constant crises of his predecessors. 
A raft of new cross-Strait agreements 
allows tourists, students and govern-
ment officials to move freely across 
the strait and reduce barriers to trade. 
Ma began with the support of Chinese 
president Hu Jintao; Xi Jinping seems 
content to continue the process of in-
stitutionalising cross-Strait relations as 
a means for realising a unified China. 
The Sunflower Student Move-
ment, which built on citizen activism 
and opposition to this institutional-
isation, makes the governments on 
both sides nervous. The Chinese gov-
ernment reacted to the crisis mostly 
by ignoring it or offering platitudes 
about the continuing development of 
cross-Strait ties. When the official me-
dia in China mentions the movement 
explicitly it has only been to condemn 
it and associate it with Taiwan’s inde-
pendence-leaning opposition Demo-
cratic Progressive Party. The student 
activists, meanwhile, mostly ignored 
China, focusing on democratic legisla-
tive process and the ruling KMT. Two 
leaders of the 1989 Beijing student 
movement, Wu’erkaixi 吾爾開希 and 
Wang Dan 王丹, both of whom live in 
Taiwan, joined the student occupiers, 
entering the legislative chamber in the 
first week. The students were by turns 
welcoming and dismissive of them, 
their reaction a reflection of the com-
plex nature of the movement’s politics. 
International opinion may see the 
Taiwan problem as heading towards 
a ‘natural’ resolution of the incorpo-
ration of Taiwan into the People’s Re-
public of China through the building 
of cross-Strait ties. Yet the emergence 
of a new, politically savvy, wired and 
connected generation of leaders and 
opinion-makers in Taiwan, who are 
anything but ditouzu, suggests that the 
‘Taiwan question’ will test regional 
politics and security for years to come. 
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DESTINY’S MIXED METAPHORS
Gloria Davies
IN APRIL 2014, an article titled ‘The Chi-
na Dream and the New Horizon of Sinicised 
Marxism’ appeared on the Qiushi 求是 web-
site run by the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Central Committee. Qiushi describes itself as 
the Party’s ‘most influential and most author-
itative magazine devoted to policy-making 
and theoretical studies’ and aims to promote 
the Party’s ‘governing philosophy’. The article 
defined the China Dream as the ‘means for 
bringing together the state, the nation and 
individuals as an organic whole’. It can do 
this, the article said, because it ‘accentuates 
the intimate bond between the future and 
destiny of each and every person with that of 
the state and nation’.
Image: The National Centre for the Performing Arts (‘The Egg’), Beijing
Source: Gustavo Madico/Flickr
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In 2013, other articles in the state media tied the notion of the China Dream 
to the catchphrase of Shared Destiny, describing the China Dream itself as 
a Community of Shared Destiny (distinguishing itself from the American 
Dream of individual freedom). According to an earlier article published by 
the state news agency Xinhua, this is a community ‘in which the interests 
of nation and state and the interests of each and every person become 
intricately linked, such that when people are encouraged to establish their 
own ideals, they also create the conditions for everyone else to realise 
their ideals’.
 These long-winded formulations are a product of what China’s party 
leaders, and the party theorists who help write their speeches, call tifa 提
法: ‘formulations’, or correct formulas for the expression of key political 
or ideological concepts. Intentionally vague and circular statements, these 
formulations are an essential part of China’s official language because 
they can be made to fit a wide variety of situations. Phrases like ‘to link 
one’s personal future and destiny with the nation and state’s future and 
destiny’ are word-strings, designed for repetition, like a pledge or a man-
tra of intellectual fealty. 
Formulations/Tifa
The Party’s leaders and theorists are the keepers of a language that is de-
signed to guide people’s actions and thoughts while reinforcing the notion 
of one-party rule as China’s historical destiny. Many of these didactic for-
mulations have the authority of scripture. But while the party’s rhetori-
cians must employ standard, revered and authoritative formulations in 
the Party’s lexicon, they cannot rely on repetition alone as the old formula-
tions do not always stretch to cover new circumstances, answer fresh chal-
lenges or express refinements of ideology. In order to establish themselves 
as unique contributors to China’s advancement, and secure their place in 
history, the leaders and theorists thus seek to develop new tifa within the 
constraints set by the diction and vocabulary of their predecessors. The 
way they refine the concept of Shared Destiny, for example, will determine 
their future place in history as well as their careers and livelihood in the 
present day. 
In 2013–2014, as Xi Jinping’s new administration sought to rein in cor-
ruption and pollution, redress inequalities and reform the law, it cautious-
ly updated the official language. It employed words like ‘destiny’, ‘history’ 
and ‘mission’ to lend Xi’s leadership an image of strength and boost the 
legitimacy of one-party rule. 
As noted in the China Story Yearbook 2013, China’s former president 
and party general secretary Hu Jintao was prone to overuse impersonal 
tifa in his speech, for which he was widely parodied in Weibo posts that 
told him to ‘speak like a human being’. Xi Jinping, by contrast, initially 
attracted praise for being plain-spoken, part of his carefully cultivated im-
age as a ‘man of the people’. 
Rumours and Big Vs
By August 2013, when Xi showed himself to be even less tolerant of dis-
sent than his predecessor, the praise gave way to pensive silence. That 
month, his administration launched a fresh, strict crackdown on online 
‘rumours’ with the arrests of Charles Xue 薛必群 and Wang Gongquan 王
功权, wealthy venture capitalists and microbloggers who had carved out 
a big presence on the Internet with their liberal views and enthusiastic 
support for a range of social causes. Xue and Wang were ‘Big Vs’ — a term 
used to describe popular microbloggers with verified (V) real-name Weibo 
accounts and whose followers numbered in the millions. 
Hu Jintao began the campaign against ‘rumours’ in 2012 under the 
pretext of protecting the public from fake news, but Xi has pursued it vig-
orously. The detention of Xue, Wang and others, and their abject televised 
confessions (see Forum ‘Orange as the New Black’, p.316) showed Xi’s de-
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termination to guide and contain public discourse. Although the detain-
ees received plenty of messages of support from outside China, the Party 
effectively demonstrated that even ‘Big Vs’ posed no threat to its power. 
Xue had more than twelve million Weibo followers before his account was 
shut down and Wang 1.5 million. Their public humiliation cowed many 
other ‘Big Vs’ as well as less prominent and well-financed netizens into 
self-censorship and silence.     
Ideology Recalibrated
For all their ‘anti-rumour mongering’ rhetoric, China’s Party leaders are 
experts at using innuendo to keep people guessing and uncertain. A case 
in point is the address that Xi gave on 19 August 2013 to propaganda of-
ficials at the National Ideological Work Conference in Beijing (noted in 
our 2013 Yearbook), which state media reports promptly trumpeted as his 
‘important speech of 19 August’ without revealing its detailed contents. 
In the weeks that followed, numerous editorials and commentaries about 
Xi’s ‘important speech’ appeared in key party newspapers and websites 
but only broadly hinting at its content: articles in the People’s Liberation 
Army Daily and China Youth Daily on 21 August and 26 August, for exam-
ple, mentioned ‘positive propaganda’ and ‘the struggle for public opinion’. 
In November, an unverified document purporting to be a leaked tran-
script of the speech began circulating on the Internet. Independent com-
mentators posting on websites hosted outside China were confident that 
the document was genuine because its content reflected what had been 
said about the speech in party publications that had appeared in the inter-
vening months. 
 To date, the full official text of Xi’s speech has not been made public 
and the authorities have neither confirmed nor denied the leaked doc-
ument’s authenticity. Instead, the state media has mainly quoted others 
talking about it:  provincial propaganda chiefs, senior editors at leading 
state media organisations and senior Party officials such as Cai Mingzhao 
蔡名照 (director of China’s State Council Information Office) and Liu Yun-
shan (who as leader of the Party’s Central Secretariat, head of the Central 
Party School and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee is one of 
China’s top seven leaders). 
On 24 September 2013, Qian Gang 钱钢, Director of the China Media 
Project at the University of Hong Kong, published his 
analysis of the reporting of Xi’s ‘important speech’. 
Qian identified the term ‘the struggle for public opin-
ion’ 舆论斗争 as the key to understanding the priority 
Xi placed on suppressing dissent. Qian noted that the 
term was a throwback to the early post-Mao period: 
it first appeared in a People’s Daily editorial of 1980, 
four years after Mao’s death and the end of the Cul-
tural Revolution, when there was still raw and fierce 
debate over the legacies of both. Qian argued that whereas Xi’s adminis-
tration has previously used ‘the struggle for public opinion’ to justify tight-
er censorship to protect mainland public culture from Western ‘spiritual 
pollution’, it was now also targeting critical debate within China itself.   
Qian noted that the initial Xinhua report of 20 August 2013, which he 
said bore the marks of a ‘rigid process of examination and authorisation’, 
made no mention of the ‘struggle for public opinion’. The term was also 
missing from eight subsequent People’s Daily commentaries about Xi’s 
speech that appeared from 21 August onwards. Yet on 24 August, the Glob-
al Times, the jingoistic subsidiary of People’s Daily published an editorial 
titled ‘The Struggle for Public Opinion’, which it described as ‘an unavoid-
able challenge to be faced head on’ 舆论斗争，不能回避只能迎接的挑战.
After ten days of not mentioning the ‘struggle’, on 30 August 2013, the 
People’s Daily published a lengthy editorial that cited Xi as explicitly call-
ing for ‘the struggle for public opinion’ so as to ‘effectively channel public 
opinion’. More lengthy articles followed in September promoting the idea. 
Qian viewed this carefully orchestrated revival of the term, occurring in 
Qian Gang
Source: jmsc.hku.hk
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tandem with the crackdown on ‘online rumours’, as a further indication 
that political reform was not on Xi’s agenda. 
At the time of Xi’s speech, one target of ‘the struggle for public opin-
ion’ was Bo Xilai, the ousted Party secretary of Chongqing whose trial, held 
from 22 to 26 August, had engrossed the nation (see the China Story Year-
book 2013: Civilising China). Xi Jinping had previously supported Bo’s ‘Red’ 
revival (see the China Story Yearbook 2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse) and 
had praised his ‘strike black’ anti-crime campaign. By late August 2013, 
Bo had to be denounced as a corrupt official who deserved life imprison-
ment. No mention was to be made of his once-enormous popularity or Xi’s 
former support. 
From September through October, ‘the struggle for public opinion’ ac-
quired a distinctive diction. The revived Mao-era term Mass Line 群众路
线 was now often married to the moral posture ‘with righteous confidence’ 
理直气壮地 to form sentences such as: ‘To proceed with righteous confi-
dence and properly carry out the Mass Line Education and Practice Cam-
paign’ 理直气壮地做好群众路线教育实践活动. Launched in June 2013, 
this campaign grew more intense two months later with the media offen-
sive around Xi’s 19 August speech (see the China Story Yearbook 2012: Red 
Rising, Red Eclipse, Chapter 3 ‘The Ideology of Law and Order’, p.60).
Unsheathing the Sword
Of all the slogans associated with ‘the struggle for public opinion’, the most 
striking is ‘Dare to grasp, control and unsheathe the sword’ 敢抓敢管敢于
亮剑 (see Chapter 6 ‘The Sword of Discipline and the Dagger of Justice’, 
p.260). This phrase first appeared, without attribution, in two commentar-
ies published on 2 September 2013 in both the People’s Daily and Beijing 
Daily respectively. In an article published on 30 September on Deutsche 
Welle’s Chinese-language website, the Beijing-based democracy activ-
ist Chen Ziming 陈子明 likened ‘the struggle for public opinion’ and ‘un-
sheathe the sword’ to Chairman Mao’s strategic pairing of ‘class struggle’ 
and ‘don’t fear poison-
ous weeds’ at the Party’s 
National Thought Work 
Conference in 1957 that 
signalled the start of the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign: 
‘precious words dictat-
ed from on high, with 
a unique and mutually 
sustaining significance’. 
Yet in 1957, ‘class 
struggle’ was a political 
theory elevated to a doc-
trine of mass mobilisa-
tion. ‘Poisonous weeds’ 
was Mao’s metaphor for 
dissent in the garden of 
true Communism. In 2013, ‘the struggle for public opinion’ was a more 
nebulous idea and ‘unsheathe the sword’ 亮剑 came from a hit TV series 
of the same name. 
The Shanghai-based entertainment company Hairun Pictures co-pro-
duced the TV series Unsheathe the Sword with a unit of the PLA. Set in 
the wartime China of the 1930s and 1940s, it was based on the novel by 
Du Liang, a former PLA soldier. China’s most-viewed TV series in 2005, 
it has enjoyed frequent reruns. The title comes from a line spoken by the 
show’s protagonist, Li Yunlong, a PLA general: ‘When you’re faced with a 
mighty foe and you know you’re not his match, you must be resolute and 
unsheathe your sword. If you’re cut down, become a mountain, a great 
mountain ridge!’ 
Fans of Unsheathe the Sword praised its unvarnished portrayal of hu-
man foibles in the time of war. As Geng Song 宋耕 and Derek Hird have 
written, Li, ‘depicted as a crude man with a bad temper and a foul mouth’ 
China’s most-viewed TV series in 2005, Unsheathe the Sword 亮剑
Source: youku.com
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was a startling departure from the revolutionary screen heroes of the 
Maoist period. Cunning, rebellious and fond of drink, he more closely 
resembled ‘the knight-errant’, an outlaw archetype of popular Chinese 
culture (epitomised in the Ming-dynasty novel Outlaws of the Marsh). ‘Un-
sheathe the sword’ became urban slang in 2005, signifying manly daring 
in the pursuit of one’s goals. 
Unsheathe the Sword was such a success that, on 16 November 2005, 
the state’s China Television Art Committee and the PLA’s publicity de-
partment ran a symposium on the show in the hope of finding a winning 
formula for future party- and nation-building ventures in popular enter-
tainment. While the unverified transcript of Xi’s speech contained the ex-
pression ‘dare to grasp, to control and to unsheathe the sword’, by link-
ing it to the ‘stability maintenance’ campaigns against crime, corruption, 
dissent and terrorism he distorted its meaning. Still, those keen to show 
there is no need to struggle for their opinion readily adopt the Party’s us-
age, describing Xi as having ‘unsheathed his sword’ when he met with US 
Vice-President Joe Biden to discuss China’s Air Defence Identification Zone 
in December 2013, for example, or when he launched the probe into the 
corrupt affairs of China’s former propaganda chief Zhou Yongkang 周永康 
(see Information Window ‘Big Game: Five “Tigers” ’, p.266).
Back to Nature
The unverified transcript of the 19 August speech also shows Xi calling for 
renewed attention to the ‘relationship between the nature of the Party and 
the nature of the people’. The ‘nature of the Party’ is described as ‘whole-
hearted service to the people’ in the form of ‘a Marxist political organisa-
tion that is of and for the people’.  The transcript highlights the importance 
of Party officials not alienating the people. Understanding the ‘nature of 
the people’ means heeding the different ‘ideological and cultural needs’ 
of different groups: ‘workers, peasants, PLA soldiers, cadres, intellectuals, 
the elderly, the young, children’ as well as new group identities such as 
‘the ant-tribe’ 蚁族 (college-educated, low-income workers living in city 
slums); ‘northward drifters’ 北漂 (job-seeking college graduates from the 
south living in Beijing); ‘returned students’ 海归 (the term is a homophone 
for ‘sea turtles’, referring to people with overseas qualifications); ‘un-
employed returned students’ 海待 (the term sounds like ‘seaweed’); and 
‘small investors’ 散户 (literally, ‘scattered households’).     
As illustrated by the use of such terms, ideological work under Xi 
includes incorporating urban slang into the Party’s vocabulary as a con-
crete demonstration of the Party’s closeness to and understanding of the 
‘nature of the people’. But it also requires the study of texts that include 
the speeches of former party leaders and new works produced by party 
propagandists such as Five Hundred Years of World Socialism (discussed 
below).  This is ideological recalibration, as opposed to new thinking, 
backed up by policing ‘the struggle for public opinion’ by cracking down 
on ‘rumours’, for example.
 We can only guess at the extent to which the crackdown on ‘rumours’ 
contributed to the nine percent drop in Weibo users by the end of 2013 (a 
loss of 27.83 million users, according to official figures). Many Weibo users 
migrated to Weixin (WeChat), a mobile text and voice messaging service 
that itself fell under close scrutiny in 2014. Although it lacks Weibo’s broad 
reach, Weixin nonetheless enables independent discussion of social prob-
lems by groups around the country (and abroad). 
Scripting Destiny 
Inequality has always dogged China’s one-party system, as unaccounta-
ble political power under Mao in the form of a revolutionary virtuocracy 
(to borrow Chinese politics expert Susan Shirk’s insightful phrase), then 
as unaccountable wealth under Deng Xiaoping and his successors in the 
form of a kleptocracy (to use The New Yorker’s former Beijing correspond-
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ent Evan Osnos’s description). The gap between its ideology and practice 
poses a challenge to the party-state. But a greater challenge comes from 
the fact that Chinese citizens are, in ever increasing numbers, culturally, 
politically, academically and socially engaged with the world beyond the 
control of China’s rulers. Moreover, the world — including global virtual 
communities of shared interests, the international media, environmental 
and rights activists and organisations — is engaging right back.  
 In June 2014, both the neo-Maoist Utopia website and Qiushi re-post-
ed a Weibo post by the self-styled Maoist Yin Guoming 尹国明 in which he 
likened public intellectuals 公知 and the democracy movement 民运 to an 
‘evil cult’. In China, the term ‘public intellectuals’ often signifies writers, 
academics and others who engage in public discourse that has not been 
sanctioned by the Party.  Yin claimed that some who identified as such, or 
as democracy activists, had links to terrorist groups or banned religious 
organisations (‘evil cults’ in the official vocabulary) such as the controver-
sial Church of Almighty God 全能神教会 (see Forum ‘Almighty God: Mur-
der in a McDonald’s’, p.304). Qiushi included a disclaimer saying that the 
views expressed were those of the author and that Qiushi had not verified 
these claims.
That Qiushi was prepared to publish a text it acknowledged as poten-
tially unreliable left readers in no doubt that the Party’s campaign against 
rumour-mongering exempted rumours that served its own purposes. Par-
ty rhetoric has become notably hostile towards ‘intellectuals’ 知识分子, 
defined as people with university qualifications in general and academics 
and writers in particular, from 2013. In his day, Mao had been suspicious 
of intellectuals, and made them a target of both the 1957 Anti-Rightist 
campaign and the Cultural Revolution. One of the greatest political and 
cultural shifts of the early post-Mao era was the ‘rehabilitation’ of China’s 
intellectuals and the affirmation of their importance to a modernising and 
economically reforming China. In his 19 August speech, Xi said that ‘to do 
ideological work well, the highest degree of attention must be given to the 
work of intellectuals’. How they fare, however, depends on how closely 
they identify with Xi’s Com-
munity of Shared Destiny. 
As noted in the China 
Story Yearbook 2013, in the 
first half of 2013, the state 
banned discussions of con-
stitutionalism and enumer-
ated ‘Seven Things That 
Should Not Be Discussed’ 
in university courses (uni-
versal values, freedom of 
the press, civil society, civil 
rights, historical mistakes 
by the Party, Party-elite 
capitalism and judicial in-
dependence). In October 
2013, Peking University ter-
minated the appointment of 
Xia Yeliang 夏业良, an asso-
ciate professor of economics, on the grounds of ‘poor teaching’, though 
online many commentators alleged that he was sacked for advocating 
constitutionalism. Then, in December, Shanghai’s East China University of 
Political Science and Law fired Zhang Xuezhong 张雪忠, a lecturer in the 
university’s law school, for breaching university regulations by using the 
university’s email system to notify colleagues of his new e-book, New Com-
mon Sense: The Nature and Consequences of One-Party Dictatorship. He too 
had defied the ban on discussing constitutionalism in class. The university 
accused him of ‘forcibly disseminating his political views among the fac-
ulty and using his status as a teacher to spread his political views among 
students’. Later that month, Chen Hongguo 谌洪果 of Xi’an’s Northwest 
University of Politics and Law stated on Weibo that the new restrictions 
made academic life untenable for him; he was resigning.
Top Ten Academic Research Topics in 2013
1. Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and the 
China Dream
2. Marxism and Distributive Justice
3. Deepening Reform Strategy
4. Big Data National Strategy
5. The Information Age and Virtual Communities
6. The Construction of New Cities and Towns 
under the Scientific Development Concept
7.  Judicial Reform and the Establishment of Rule 
of Law
8. The Implications of ‘New Relations between Big 
Powers’
9. Overseas Transmission of Chinese Contempo-
rary Literature and Translation Research
10. Discovery and Interpretation of Historical 
Documents related to the Diaoyu Islands
Source: news.xinhuanet.com
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Many academics outside China praised these three outspoken indi-
viduals for standing up for academic freedom. They expressed concern 
about the limitations and long-term ramifications of collaborating with 
Chinese universities on research and teaching. In China, however, some 
colleagues cast aspersions on the academic credibility of the trio. Yao Yang 
姚洋, an eminent economist based at Peking University, for example, told 
the online Inside Higher Education that Xia Yeliang’s publications did not 
meet the university’s research standards and that Xia was ‘trying to use 
external forces to try to force the university to keep him’. Yao commented, 
‘I think that’s a really bad strategy’.
By contrast, the state has awarded generous research grants to aca-
demics whose work shows the party-state’s ideas, policies and slogans in a 
positive light. In November 2013, the Berkeley-based website China Digital 
Times (blocked in China) alerted readers to a list, announced five months 
LEARNING FROM XI JINPING, by Joel Martinsen
President Xi Jinping’s surname occurs as the second character in 
the ordinary Chinese word for study, xuexi 学习. That term can 
also be read ‘learn from Xi’. State media have run columns un-
der punning headlines: ‘Learn from Xi through Pictures’ 学习图
解, ‘Big Data for Learning from Xi’ 学习大数据, ‘Notes on Learning 
from Xi’ 学习笔记, and ‘Learning from Xi from the Heart’ 学习心
得, all of which appear on the website of the People’s Daily under 
the heading ‘The Proper Way to Learn from Xi’ 学习有方. Here are 
some examples:
Yang Zhenwu on Xi Jinping
In the 28 May 2014 edition of the People’s Daily, editor Yang Zhenwu 杨振武 explicated a 
range of Xi Jinping’s speeches regarding the media’s responsibility to guide public opinion. 
Yang’s explanations, recapped on the paper’s website the following day in a handy text- 
commentary form for easy reading, covered subjects ranging from confidence in China’s 
unique path of development, to materialism and dialectics and the appropriate methods 
for disseminating propaganda. Yang interpreted Xi’s remark that ‘Ideas and beliefs are the 
bones of the spirit of Party members’, as a call for propaganda workers to remain steadfast 
in their beliefs, and discussed the importance of the ‘main melody’ 主旋律 and ‘positive 
energy’ 正能量 as values.
Hands: Invisible and Visible 看不见的手/看得见的手
At a Politburo meeting on 26 May concerning the government’s role in market resource 
allocation, Xi Jinping stressed the need to use both the ‘invisible’ hand of the market and the 
‘visible’ hand of the government. In its discussion of ‘deepening reforms’ at the time of the 
Third Plenum in October 2013, the People’s Daily had called for a more effective use of ‘vis-
ible hands’, since ‘the market only has vitality through cautious action by the government’ 
政府慎作为，市场才有活力. Presaging the theme of the Fourth Plenum in October 2014, the 
article refers to ‘letting the “visible hands” wear the “gloves” of the rule of law’.
Zero Tolerance 零容忍
Xi Jinping has called for ‘zero tolerance’ in a number of areas, including threats to state 
security (in particular, the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism, and extremism), cor-
ruption, violations of party discipline, work safety infractions and repugnant behaviour by 
law enforcement and justice officials.
Kin in Grass Sandals 草鞋亲戚
This refers to the officials who inform the central government leadership about local con-
ditions. Yang Yizhou 杨奕周, an official in Xiadang county, Fujian province, is the leading 
exemplar. In 1989, he met Xi Jinping, then party secretary of Ningde, Fujian, and became one 
of his closest ‘kin in grass sandals’.
earlier, of the top fifty-five major grants awarded under China’s Nation-
al Social Science Fund. The fund is the nation’s most prestigious grant 
scheme, and is supervised by the Party’s Central Propaganda Department. 
The first three titles on the list were: ‘Research into reinforcing confidence 
in the path, theory and system of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ 
坚定中国特色社会主义道路自信、理论自信、制度自信研究; ‘Research on 
the internal logic and historical development of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics as a body of theory’ 中国特色社会主义理论体系的内在逻
辑与历史发展研究; and ‘Research into the basic requirements for seizing 
new victories for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ 夺取中国特色社
会主义新胜利的基本要求研究. 
In February 2014, the media widely celebrated the publication of Five 
Hundred Years of World Socialism 世界社会主义五百年, an account by 
party theorists of Chinese socialism within the international context. The 
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book, published by the Central Propaganda Department’s Study Publish-
ing House on 1 January 2014, is now required reading for all Party cadres 
and members. In the ‘struggle for public opinion’ in academic circles at 
least, the party-state is winning.
Mixed Metaphors
Xi Jinping has used a Community of Shared Destiny in two ways. Initially, 
he evoked the image of a strong and prosperous nation living happily un-
der party rule — the ‘China Dream’. Later, he extended it to describe Chi-
na’s foreign policy. In his speech of 25 October 2013 in Beijing at the Work-
shop on Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries, Xi highlighted the 
importance of reassuring the world that ‘the China Dream will combine 
with the aspirations of the peoples of neighbouring countries for a good 
life and the hopes of all for regional prosperity so that the idea of a Com-
munity of Shared Destiny can take root among our neighbours. Implicit 
in Xi’s statement is the assumption that others must adapt their national 
stories and dreams to those of China. 
On 24 October 2013, Xu Danei 徐达内, the Shanghai-based column-
ist for London’s Financial Times, posted an article titled ‘A Community of 
Shared Destiny’ in his online column ‘Media 
Notes’. By sheer coincidence, on the eve of 
Xi’s foreign policy speech, Xu used the phrase 
to describe a camaraderie born of hardship 
among Chinese journalists. He highlighted 
the plight of Chen Yongzhou 陈永州, a novice 
reporter arrested on defamation and slander 
charges for investigative articles he had writ-
ten about the Changsha construction compa-
ny Zoomlion. Chen’s employer, the Guang-
zhou-based New Express 新快报, had stood 
Xu Danei
Source: yo2.cn
by him. The paper ran a 
front-page banner headline 
on 23 October with the call 
‘Release Him’ 请放人 under 
which appeared a front-
page editorial defending 
Chen’s integrity and criti-
cising the arbitrary use of 
police power in Changsha 
to arrest him. This unusu-
ally bold step taken by the newspaper’s senior executives had been Xu’s 
inspiration. 
Two days later, however, on 26 October, China Central Television 
news aired a public confession by Chen, prompting the New Express to 
publish a retraction the following day, in which the editors apologised for 
questioning the police investigation and ‘damaging the credibility of the 
press’. With Guangzhou’s third largest media organisation thus brought 
into line, the government continued to widen its crackdown on ‘rumours’ 
in the early months of 2014 (see Chapter 3 ‘The Chinese Internet: Unshared 
Destiny’, p.106). 
The key to understanding the ‘struggle for public opinion’ is that there 
is no struggle. The term warns people that they disagree with the state 
at their peril. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping famously used the expression ‘the 
Hall of the Monologue’ 一言堂 to criticise Mao for monopolising party dis-
course. The term is a direct critique of the Cultural Revolution concept of 
‘monolithic leadership’ 一元化领导, which in 1969 was formally defined as 
‘putting Mao Zedong Thought in command of everything’. 
In the 1980s, Deng sought to strengthen collective leadership by ap-
pointing his protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to key positions while 
remaining all-powerful even in ‘retirement’. The reiteration of Xi’s ‘im-
portant speech of 19 August’ (and many of his other speeches since then) 
in commentaries, editorials and reports produced by others similarly pro-
Chen Yongzhou 
Source: caixin.com
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
D
es
tin
y’s
 M
ix
ed
 M
et
ap
ho
rs
 
G
lo
ria
 D
av
ie
s
164
165
NEW INTERNET SLANG AND MEMES
Over the past five years, many Chinese websites and newspapers, including official publica-
tions such as the People’s Daily, have issued year-end lists of new Internet buzzwords and 
memes. For some reason, there were very few of these lists at the end of 2013, although the 
Party has created a few memes of its own and ensured their popularity through constant 
repetition in both news media and on digital platforms such as WeChat and Weibo. ‘Big Dad-
dy Xi’ 习大大 (p.168), the China Dream 中国梦 (pp.xviii–xx) and Tigers 老虎 (pp.xxviii–xxxi) 
are probably the most widely used party-generated memes.
The memes below are drawn from a variety of online sources that listed phrases that 
became popular in 2013 and 2014. 
Vulgar Tycoon or Nouveau Riche 土豪
The term tuhao, originally meaning ‘local strongman’, was first used online to describe 
Internet gamers who spent large amounts of money on in-game items to impress other 
players. Since late 2013, the term has described people of tremendous wealth but uncouth 
ways and poor taste. It has also become a teasing term of endearment among friends used 
when one splurges on some indulgence. 
You Understand … 你懂的
Originating in a song by the singer and comedic actor Xiao Shenyang 小沈阳, the phrase 
ni dongde soon took a life of its own as a verbal wink between two people in the know as 
a placeholder to disguise political or social commentary or explain its absence. Even gov-
ernment officials have taken it up: asked at a press conference on 2 March 2014 for details 
about the corruption investigation into former Politburo member Zhou Yongkang, which 
had not yet been formally announced, Lü Xinhua 吕新华, a spokesperson for the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference blathered for a few minutes and then simply 
said, ‘ni dongde’.
Cherish What You Have 且行且珍惜
After a Weibo user exposed an extra-marital affair by actor Wen Zhang 文章, his wife Ma 
Yili 马伊琍 posted this response: ‘Although love is easy, marriage is difficult — cherish what 
you have’. The last five characters 且行且珍惜 (pronounced qie xing qie zhenxi) became an 
Internet meme, spawning a slew of similar terms using the formula qie X qie XX, for example 
‘Eating is easy, losing weight is not, cherish what you eat 吃饭虽易，减肥不易，且吃且珍惜 .
No Zuo No Die or No 作 No Die (sometimes rendered as 不作死就不会死)
This Chinglish phrase sometimes written as no zuo no die; sometimes as no 作 no die, 
began as slang from the Chinese north-east. Internet users use it to mean that if you don’t 
do something stupid in the first place, you don’t have to worry about it coming back later 
to haunt you. 
jects a picture of consensus and commitment to policies that are guided in 
fact by one powerful person. In this sense, Xi’s emphasis on ‘the struggle 
for public opinion’ attempts to recover the prestige the Party enjoyed dur-
ing the halcyon early years of ‘reform and opening up’ before corruption 
set in, and public discontent led to the massive protest movement of 1989 
(see Chapter 6 ‘The Sword of Discipline and the Dagger of Justice’, p.260, 
and Forum ‘Xu Zhiyong and the New Citizens’ Movement’, p.292). 
The party-state led by Xi seeks to repair the Party’s relations with the 
people using a rhetoric that combines intimidation and cultural appeal 
 — but not just pop cultural appeal. Xi is fond of quoting from the Chinese 
classics and the state media enjoys presenting him as a man of erudition 
(see Forum ‘Classic Xi Jinping: On Acquiring Moral Character’, p.4). On 8 
May 2014, the overseas edition of the People’s Daily published a full-page 
article, widely reproduced since, on thirteen literary allusions that Xi has 
used in his speeches since becoming president and party general secre-
tary: ‘Self-Cultivation through Learning: Famous Classical Quotations by 
Xi Jinping’ 习得修身: 习近平引用的古典名句.  Xi’s surname 习 means to 
study or practise; the headline puns on this to equate Xi with learning 
itself.
However, puns and even the most agile rhetoric cannot solve many of 
the key challenges facing the party-state. In an article published on 27 March 
2014 on the bilingual website China Dialogue, Beijing-based environmental 
and legal consultant Steven Andrews wrote that the Chinese government’s 
Air Quality Index, which is less stringent than international standards, 
caused China’s pollution to be reported ‘in a misleading way, blocking 
public understanding and enabling official inaction’. Another example is 
the enforcement of the ideal of ‘maintaining a unified approach’ 统一口径 in 
news coverage, when it has often been independent investigative journalists 
who have exposed many serious problems, especially those related to 
corruption in local areas. The second half of the phrase in Chinese, 口径 
(pronounced koujing) signifies the calibre or bore of a gun, which lends the 
phrase the sense of a line of matched guns all firing in unison. 
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The Spring and Autumn Style 春秋笔法, by Geremie R Barmé
One of the main features of New China Newspeak 新华文体 is its ‘moral-evaluative’ dimen-
sion. In this it builds on patterns of moral judgment used by writers in pre-modern times, be 
they historical, cultural or artistic judgments. For those who would use the past as a mirror 
to guide present actions, evaluations and moral judgments were crucial.
It is the concern of many students of things Chinese (be they in or outside China) 
that the yawning gap between reality and rhetoric should, in the long run, make things 
untenable, or lead to some massive revision or collapse of the vestigial ideological power 
of the party-state. Taking a sideways glance at the parallels between Soviet and Chinese 
socialism, however, and if we remain mindful of the lessons that have been learnt from the 
Soviet collapse, one could say that party-state rule in China has created a range of appealing 
and abiding ideological simulacra. To date these have incorporated cultural alternatives 
and opponents in a ‘postmodern pastiche’ of the kind originally described in the Russian 
philosopher Mikhail Epstein’s work on the former Soviet ideological landscape. This kind 
of pastiche has also been commented on (and denounced) by China’s own New Left and 
retro-Maoists.
In his work on relativistic patterns in totalitarian thinking, Mikhail Epstein analysed to-
talitarianism as ‘a specific postmodern model that came to replace the modernist ideologi-
cal stance elaborated in earlier Marxism’. He argued that the use of what he called ‘descrip-
tive-evaluative’ words, that is terms that combine both descriptive and evaluative meanings 
or connotations — ‘ideologemes’ employed universally in Soviet speech — communicate 
not only information but also a specific ideological message, or concealed judgments that 
take the form of words. Epstein’s view of how ideologemes 
functioned in Soviet public discourse finds striking parallels 
in reformist-era China (1978–). In short, Epstein noted that 
a key to the function of ideologemes is that they can encom-
pass both leftist and rightist concepts, embracing the spec-
trum of utilitarian shifts made within a totalitarian or rather 
a totalising system, that is a system that can incorporate and 
reconcile logical inconsistencies and opposing ideas.
A simple example of this can be found in the expression 
‘socialist market economy’. It is a term created to convey the 
extreme contradictions within contemporary economic real-
ities; it is an expression that allows for an ideological under-
pinning to what, superficially at least, appears to have been 
an example of the party’s retreat from its avowed state-cen-
tred Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary ideals. According 
Mikhail Epstein 
Source: dur.ac.uk
to Epstein, this kind of linguistic formulation is not the re-
sult of a desperate pragmatism; rather it is the reflection of 
the core philosophy of a politics which ‘uses leftist slogans 
to defeat the right, rightist slogans to defeat the left’, a pol-
itics that strives throughout to maintain its own primacy. 
This is a primacy that is not merely about temporal power, 
but one that is also about dominion in the realms of ideas 
and emotions.
Totalitarian speech is marked by its ability to employ 
ideologically laden words to weaken opposing sides while 
taking advantage of the resulting confusion. I would note 
that the Chinese language — and what is under discussion 
here, New China Newspeak — has a rich and venerable lex-
icon of words that have been converted under party-state rule to act as ‘ideologemes’. It is a 
lexicon that, according to tradition, was first formulated by Confucius when he purportedly 
edited the history of the State of Lu 鲁国, the Spring and Autumn Annals 春秋, judiciously 
selecting expressions to depict political actions in moral terms. Classical scholars claimed 
that the Sage thereby created a ‘Spring-and-Autumn writing style’ 春秋笔法 which relied on 
a vocabulary of baobian ci 褒贬词, or judgmental words, to praise bao 褒 or censure bian 贬 
every political act and event recorded in the annals of Lu.
In modern usage, all activities beneficial to the party-state are represented by words 
with positive connotations 褒义词, while those that are deleterious in nature are con-
demned with negative verbs, nouns and adjectives 贬义词. The growth or maturation of 
socialist society has led to a linguistic accretion, one that incorporates Maoist doublethink 
of the first three decades of the People’s Republic with the patriotic parole of Reform. The 
general party line exists in a state of constant tension with both right and left deviations, 
maintaining a rhetorical and practical balance between the two. This was notably evident in 
the populist, and popular, ‘Sing Red Crush Black’ 唱红打黑 campaign launched in Chongqing 
as part of an effort to clamp down on local mafias (as well as business and bureaucratic 
enemies) while extolling a nationalistic-Maoism through mass choral performances. One 
could postulate, as Epstein does for Soviet Marxism, that ‘Socialism with Chinese Charac-
teristics’— the theoretical formula that underwrites contemporary China — is an enigmatic 
and hybrid phenomenon that, ‘like postmodern pastiche… combines within itself very dif-
ferent ideological doctrines’.
The Spring and Autumn Annals 
Source: no-1chineselearning.com
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Say ‘Uncle’
Yet while Xi’s vision of Shared Destiny involves a tightening of central 
control, his administration also demonstrates a savvy approach to image 
management. Since the latter half of 2013, large numbers of non-official 
pro-Party online comments have appeared referring with casual (but re-
spectful) familiarity to Xi Jinping as Xi zong 习总 (‘Gen Sec Xi’), Xi laoda 习
老大 (‘Eldest Brother Xi’) and even Xi dada 习大大 (‘Uncle Xi’). Whether or 
not Party propagandists came up with these forms of address, the censors 
appear happy to allow — if not encourage — them to circulate. 
A widely relayed Southern Weekly article of 24 April 2014 on 
‘appropriate uses of honorifics in officialdom’ notes that standard 
honorifics are frequently complicated by local variations. ‘Eldest brother’ 
老大, historically signifying the head of a martial arts clan or band 
of knights-errant, implies a leader among men, one who commands 
personal loyalty — the cardinal virtue in martial arts folklore. The friendly 
abbreviation of the top Party position to zong (more commonly used as 
an abbreviation for ‘manager’ in businesses and organisations) is used 
far more frequently of Xi than his predecessors. Dada, meaning paternal 
uncle, bespeaks familial affection.
These informal honorifics that elevate Xi to a folkloric hero, national 
manager and beloved patriarch are a new development in the sphere of 
ideological work. By ‘unsheathing the sword’, the party-state under Xi has 
cut through an official language hidebound by precedents to establish a 
Community of Shared Destiny. Yet the Chinese word for destiny, mingyun 
命运, can also mean ‘fate’ (see Information Window ‘Mingyun 命运, the 
“Destiny” in “Shared Destiny” ’, p.xii).
Whereas destiny foretells a happy end, fate can progress to gloom 
and doom. The official interpretation of mingyun, however, in this case, 
excludes ‘fate’ — in the rhetoric of the party-state, destiny can only be 
positive.
 
Big Daddy Xi — ‘Photoshopped’ images of 
President Xi holding a yellow umbrella were 
used at various pro-democracy protests in 
Hong Kong. The political meme went viral 
on social media
Source: hkfuture2047.wordpress.com
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FORUM
FORUM
XI WHO MUST BE OBEYED
Big Daddy Xi on the Arts 
·  LINDA JAIVIN
Springtime for the Arts 
·  LINDA JAIVIN
China, Hollywood and Split Screens 
·  QIAN YING 钱颖
Looking Backward: Chinese Art in 2014 
· CHEN SHUXIA 陈淑霞
A Storm in a Chicken Cup: A Burgeoning Market 
·  OLIVIER KRISCHER
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B IG  D A D DY  X I  O N  T H E  A RTS
Linda Jaivin
•  Vulgar is not the same as popular, 
desire doesn’t represent hope and 
purely sensual entertainment is not 
equal to spiritual happiness.
•  Art must not be a slave to the mar-
ket; it mustn’t stink of money.
•  Art is the clarion call to an age to 
advance; it is the most representa-
tive face of an age, and is most able 
to guide the manners of an age.
•  Art must not lose its way amongst 
the tides of the market economy, 
or its perspective on account of 
personal concerns and biases, or it 
will have no vitality.
On 19 October 2014, the People’s Daily published an article titled ‘Ten Insightful 
One-Liners by Big Daddy Xi on the Arts’ 习大大的10句文艺妙语, a guide to the 
great leader’s thinking on culture. They are translated below:
•   If literature and art workers wish to 
succeed, they must seek to breathe 
as one with the People, sharing 
their destiny, heart-to-heart, made 
happy by the People’s joys and trou-
bled by their concerns, becoming 
like an ox that can be led by a child. 
This latter phrase is taken from a poem 
by the famous writer Lu Xun 鲁迅. It 
was further immortalised by Chair-
man Mao when he made reference to 
it in the concluding section of his 1942 
speech ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art’. 
Facing page: Ten Insightful One-Liners by Big Daddy Xi on the Arts
Source: blog.sina.com.cn
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•  The People are the wellspring of 
artistic creativity. If art separates 
itself from the People, it becomes a 
rootless, whining, soulless shell.
•  There are hundreds of ways to do 
art, even thousands, but the most 
essential, the most key, the most 
reliable method is that which is 
rooted in the People and life.
•  Art is the engineering that con-
structs the human soul; literature 
and art workers are the engineers 
of the human soul. Good art should 
be like sunshine in a blue sky or 
a clear breeze in springtime, able 
to inspire thought, calm the mind, 
bring contentment and eliminate 
degeneracy and dejection.
•  We should respect the creative 
character and creative labour of 
workers in literature and art, strong 
political faith, enthusiastic support 
for creativity and the establishment 
of an environment in which the 
creative arts can thrive.
•  Our writers and artists should be 
the first to understand the nature 
of the age, they should be pioneers 
and advocates, producing works 
of ever greater strength, morality 
and passion that record the worthy 
practices of the People, the pro-
gressive demands of the age and 
highlight the beauty of faith and 
nobility.

C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
Sp
rin
gt
im
e 
fo
r t
he
 A
rt
s 
Li
nd
a 
Ja
iv
in
178
179
S P R I N G T I M E  F O R  T H E  A RTS 
Linda Jaivin
‘I AM SO EXCITED THAT I can’t sleep … . The spring for art and literature 
has truly come!’ Zhao Benshan 赵本山 
is a much-loved Chinese actor famous 
for his comedy. But when the Global 
Times quoted his ecstatic response to 
Xi Jinping’s 15 October 2014 speech on 
the arts, there was no sign that he was 
joking. Who would dare? Xi’s speech 
has been promoted and likened to Mao 
Zedong’s ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art’ of 1942, in which 
Mao demanded that art serve the Party, 
serve the People and vanquish the ene-
my. Xi has done the same, extolling the 
Stalinist idea that writers are engineers 
of human souls, while also addressing 
contemporary phenomena such as 
market influences and popular culture 
(see Forum ‘Big Daddy Xi on the Arts’, 
p.174). He has called for Chinese artists 
to create ‘socialist culture and art’ that 
is ‘artistically outstanding and morally 
inspiring’. Art must, he stressed, serve 
‘correct’ viewpoints with regard to his-
tory, nationality and culture. It must 
feature, he said, ‘positive energy’.
At the forum, Xi praised two 
young bloggers for their ‘positive ener-
gy’: Zhou Xiaoping 周小平 (over elev-
en million views) and Hua Qianfang 
花千芳 (over 87,000 fans on Weibo). 
Among Zhou’s writings is a blog post 
from June 2013 called ‘Please Don’t Be 
Unworthy of This Age’ 请不要辜负这个
时代. A paragraph towards the end of 
the piece may give some idea of what 
‘positive energy’ means:
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I, Zhou Xiaoping, do not deny that China has corrupt officials, prison guards, 
bad people, bullies and crazy people. In the same way I wouldn’t deny that 
a beautiful woman has thickened skin on the soles of her feet, snot, bowel 
movements, bacteria or germs, inflammation of the mouth, swollen lymph 
glands, or pancreatic juices (what’s more, these things make up no small 
proportion). But when I see a beautiful woman I still feel delight in my heart 
and eyes, and I still hope that I can hold her in my arms. If at the moment, 
you are standing to one side nattering on, saying: ‘You’ve been brainwashed, 
this beautiful woman is made of the skin on her feet, snot, bowel move-
ments, germs and viruses, inflammation of the mouth, pancreatic juices, 
intestines, organs and lymph, it’s extremely disgusting, hurry and wake up.’ 
I honestly don’t know whether I’m blind or you’re mad. If you don’t do any- 
thing but natter, at most I’ll just smile. But if one day, someone makes a 
move to eliminate this ‘harmful beauty’, I will certainly not stand idly by. 
The reason is very simple: if I failed to act, would I be a man? A man’s great-
est virtue is that of guarding and protecting.
Zhao Benshan was only one of a number of major, state-supported artists 
including the veteran painter Fan Zeng 范曾, who lavished praise on Xi’s speech, 
much as state-supported artists have done since 1942, whether out of genuine 
enthusiasm or simply mindful of the price of dissent. (The writer Wang Shiwei 
王实味 was the first to pay the ultimate price for dissidence, expelled from the 
Party in 1942 and beheaded in 1947.)
Zhou Xiaoping, a thirty-three-year-old blogger 
praised by Xi Jinping for his ‘positive energy’
Source: 1937cn.net
 Xi has expressed specific as well 
as general views on the arts — for ex-
ample, he revealed that he hates the 
kind of ‘weird architecture’ that has 
come to define China’s modernising 
cities. ‘Weird architecture’ presuma-
bly includes the work of international 
and Chinese architectural leaders such 
as Zaha Hadid and Ma Yansong 马岩松 
(of MAD Architects) as well as numer-
ous high-concept, low-value knockoffs 
and buildings designed to look like lo-
tuses, teapots, coins and even a piano 
and violin. ‘No more,’ said Xi. It’s un-
certain what this diktat will mean in 
practice for projects already contract-
ed or underway — or what the speech 
as a whole will mean for art, literature 
and film that is already out there but 
does not sing along with what the 
Chinese media and propaganda arms 
have long promoted as ‘main melody’ 
主旋律 (politically on-message) art.
China is home, after all, to a flour-
ishing counterculture that since the 
1980s and the introduction of the mar-
ket economy, includes independent 
visual artists, film makers and others 
who support themselves outside the 
state system or have used it cannily to 
pursue their careers. There are also 
many other artists working within the 
system (in the sense that all officially 
distributed films must pass the censors 
and published works need to do the 
same) who have nonetheless managed 
to make boundary-pushing works. For 
example, the directorial debut of the 
rock star Cui Jian 崔健 (whose songs 
have been banned and unbanned over 
nearly thirty years) Blue Sky Bones 
蓝色骨头, which deals with the Cul-
tural Revolution, sexuality (including 
homosexuality) and a corrupt media, 
screened in theatres nationally from 
October 2014. 
To cite another example, Chen 
Qiufan’s 陈楸帆 first novel The Waste 
Tide 荒潮, which describes a dystopian 
near-future where, on an island built 
from e-waste off the Chinese coast, mi-
grant workers battle capitalist elites 
and powerful local forces for control, 
won Best Novel in China’s Nebula 
Awards 星云奖 in October 2013 and 
Huadi 花地 Best Work of Science Fic-
tion Award in March 2014, sponsored 
by Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening 
News 羊城晚报. The Women of China 
website noted that: ‘The novel paints 
Galaxy Soho is a new office and retail and enter-
tainment complex on the East Second Ring Road 
in Beijing. It was designed by Zaha Hadid and Ma 
Yansong of MAD Architects. Xi Jinping has publicly 
revealed that he does not like the ‘weird architec-
ture’ of China’s modernising cities 
Photo: Iwan Baan
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China as a conflicted nation, powerful 
enough to convince other countries 
to accept its ideologies, but not strong 
enough to pull its population out of 
poverty’. 
Chen Qiufan, who was born in 
1981, obliquely addressed the ques-
tion of Shared Destiny when he wrote 
that his generation encompasses work-
ers in Foxconn’s factories, princelings 
‘who treat luxury as their birth right’, 
entrepreneurs pursuing dreams of 
wealth and college graduates who 
must ‘compete ruthlessly for a single 
clerical position’. Yet, Chen observes, 
the Party persists in speaking as 
though the ‘People’ all share a mon-
olithic Chinese Dream: ‘Between the 
feeling of individual failure and the 
conspicuous display of national pros-
perity,’ Chen writes, ‘lies an unbridge-
able chasm.’
How the party-state will address 
political heresy in the domestic cul-
tural sphere — including how they 
will deal with ‘globalised’ artists and 
writers and the import of foreign pop-
ular culture — will become clear in 
the coming year. In the Mao years and 
through much of the Deng era as well, 
the authorities accused creative artists 
whose work offended them of ideo-
logical crimes such as ‘counter-rev-
olution’ 反革命, ‘spiritual pollution’ 
精神污染 and ‘bourgeois liberalism’ 
资产阶级自由化. In more recent times, 
the party-state has preferred criminal 
to political charges. These have the po-
tential to smear an artist’s reputation, 
especially within China itself, punish 
them financially through fines and tie 
them up in legal cases they can’t win. 
An example is how the authorities 
detained the artist-activist Ai Weiwei 
艾未未 from 2011, charged him with 
tax evasion and put him under contin-
uing surveillance. After the Australi-
an-Chinese artist Guo Jian 郭健 cre-
ated a diorama of Tiananmen Square 
smothered in rotting meat to com-
memorate the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the violent suppression of the 
1989 Protest Movement, the authori-
ties detained him and then deported 
him on charges of visa fraud. 
Australian-Chinese artist Guo Jian 
Source: cribeyondbeijing.com
The consequences are generally 
more severe for artists with less inter-
national clout: in November 2014, for 
example, the independent film-maker 
Shen Yongping 沈勇平, who had pro-
duced an eight-episode Internet docu-
mentary on China’s constitutional gov-
ernance (posted in April or May 2014 
through Weibo) faced trial. Police had 
warned him during the filming that if 
he went ahead with it he was going to 
prison. What they have charged him 
with, however, is engaging in ‘illegal 
business activity’. (This came during 
the last week of October, when state 
media was singing the praises of the 
Fourth Plenum under Xi Jinping with 
its stated focus on rule of law and con-
stitutionalism.)
There is also a third way: in Oc-
tober, police detained thirteen artists 
in the Beijing ‘artists’ village’ of Song-
zhuang on charges of ‘creating trou-
ble’: all had indicated support for the 
pro-democracy protesters in Hong 
Kong on social media or were planning 
to attend a poetry reading in solidar-
ity with the protests. (Human rights 
monitors have reported the arrests of 
dozens of mainland citizens who have 
indicated support for the Hong Kong 
protesters.) Reports in the foreign 
press at the end of October indicated 
that police were swarming through 
Guo Jian created a diorama of Tiananmen Square smothered in rotting meat to commemorate the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the 1989 Protest Movement in Beijing. The artwork was not well received by the authorities
Photo: Guo Jian
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Translation: Magic, Realism
The death of the writer and Nobel Literary Laureate Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez at the age of eighty-seven on 17 April 2014 
triggered an emotional outpouring of tributes in China. The 
topic even trended at second place for a while on Weibo. One 
of the first contemporary writers to have his books published 
in China in translation during the early years of the Reform era, 
Marquez influenced generations of readers and writers. When 
Mo Yan 莫言 became the first Chinese writer living in China to 
receive the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012 (the exiled Gao 
Xingjian 高行健 won it in 2000), he acknowledged the Colombi-
an writer’s profound influence on his own work.  
Chinese readers typically have access to about 14,000 new 
foreign titles a year. Yet the number of Chinese titles on the 
lists of foreign publishers is minute: in 2012, American pub-
lishers published sixteen — out of a total of 453 in translation 
from all non-English languages and 200,000 titles in all. Not 
surprisingly, it is hard to imagine a Chinese writer having anything comparable to the 
influence overseas that Marquez has had in China.
International awards and exposure for Chinese writers whose books have been 
translated into English and other languages, however, including Mo Yan, Yan Lianke 阎
连科 and others, have helped to raise the profile of Chinese literary fiction in the non-
Chinese-reading world. Chinese writers of genre and other commercial fiction are also 
beginning to make their mark: translated by Olivia Milburn, the thriller Decoded by the 
best-selling author Mai Jia 麦家, a former intelligence officer in the PLA, received positive 
reviews in the UK on publication there in April 2014. Ken Liu is currently translating Chen 
Qiufan’s The Waste Tide. Global warming, Wikileaks and other issues may well cause 
readers around the world to recognise in fictional dystopias and intelligence thrillers a 
genuine sense of Shared Destiny. 
Mo Yan was the first 
Chinese writer resident 
in China to win the Nobel 
Prize in Literature in 2012
Source: wb.yunnan.cn
the once-relaxed village and that many 
artists had closed their studios to out-
siders.
The artists, for their part, can 
accept the Party’s leadership and 
Xi’s guidance in the kind of art they 
produce, or make the sort of art they 
consider meaningful and important 
and risk the consequences, or attempt 
hitting what’s called ‘graze-edge balls’ 
擦边球, named for a play in ping-pong 
in which the ball grazes the edge of 
the table — technically still ‘in’ or legal 
and yet almost impossible to counter. 
Or, if they have the means, they can 
send their art overseas. 
Chen Qiufan published the essay 
from which the earlier quotation was 
taken, translated by his fellow science 
fiction writer Ken Liu, on the inter-
national science fiction and fantasy 
website Tor.com in May 2014. Writers 
Murong Xuecun 慕容雪村, Yu Hua 余华 
and Yan Lianke 阎连科 (a finalist in the 
2013 Man Booker International Prize 
who became the first Chinese writer 
to win the Franz Kafka Prize in 2014) 
are among those who have increas-
ingly turned to international websites, 
newspapers and journals including 
The New York Times, to publish essays 
that cannot appear at home. 
Working remotely, Ai Weiwei cre-
ated a giant, site-specific installation 
for the infamous former island peni-
tentiary of Alcatraz, in San Francisco 
Bay. It includes a colourful dragon 
with Twitter-bird eyes, 175 Lego rep-
resentations of prisoners of conscience 
from around the world and a dozen 
gleaming steel stools individually in-
stalled in one of the cells in Cell Block 
A, into which songs and speeches of 
protest are played (including Martin 
Luther King’s 1967 anti-Vietnam War 
speech and music by the imprisoned 
Tibetan singer Lolo and Hopi chants 
representing the Native Americans 
incarcerated there in the nineteenth 
century for resisting assimilation). 
Guo Jian, meanwhile, went to New 
York in the second half of 2014 to col-
laborate with the American artist and 
Iraq War veteran Markus Erikson on 
an anti-war multimedia installation 
called Surrender. They asked people 
all over the world, especially soldiers 
in uniform, to send photographs of 
themselves with their hands up in sur-
render — like Ai Weiwei’s Alcatraz, a 
rather different vision of Shared Desti-
ny to that of Big Daddy Xi. 
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THE FILM MARKET in China is flourishing. Whereas in 2002, 
Chinese cinemas sold US$133 million 
worth of tickets, total box office reve-
nues in 2013 amounted to US$3.6 bil-
lion. In 2014, China’s box office had 
reached US$1.6 billion by 21 May, just 
141 days into the year. Both imported 
and Chinese films were doing well. 
Among the twenty-four films that had 
made over US$16 million, half were 
categorised as ‘domestic’ films, gener-
ating a total revenue of US$670 million. 
The other half were foreign, mainly 
Hollywood films, earning US$630 mil-
lion. Protectionist policies might have 
contributed to the box office success of 
domestic films: the government only 
allows thirty-four foreign films to be 
imported annually, and the authori-
ties have reportedly pulled successful 
imported films from cinemas from 
time to time to create breathing space 
for new domestic features. In June 
2014, Transformers opening date was 
pushed to exactly one day after that of 
the Chinese-produced romantic com-
edy Break-up Guru 分手大师, and the 
head of the State Film Bureau, Zhang 
Hongsen 张宏森, ordered cinema own-
ers not to pull domestic features in 
favour of the more lucrative imported 
blockbusters. Despite such policies, 
China has already surpassed Japan to 
become Hollywood’s largest interna-
tional market.
There are hopes for further 
growth: among the Hollywood stars 
who made publicity trips to China in 
2014 were Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie and 
Johnny Depp. Increasingly, Hollywood 
films feature China-friendly plots and 
C H I N A ,  H O L LY WO O D  A N D  
S P L I T  S C R E E N S
Qian Ying 钱颖
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Chinese characters as a strategy for 
snaring one of the thirty-four annual 
licences. Meanwhile, co-productions 
have become a strategy to bypass the 
import quota: co-produced films ful-
filling certain requirements can count 
as ‘domestic’. 
The schlocky 2012 Australian 3D 
film Bait, in which a tsunami traps 
shoppers and killer sharks in a mall on 
the Gold Coast, featured both Chinese 
investment and heroics by Chinese ac-
tors — and took AU$20 million at the 
Chinese box office, more than any pre-
vious Australian film and more than 
three times as much as Happy Feet 2. 
That same year, DreamWorks Anima-
tion opened Oriental DreamWorks in 
Shanghai, a joint venture with three 
Chinese companies, to create animat-
ed and other films for China and inter-
national markets. Disney quickly fol-
lowed suit, forging a partnership with 
the Chinese Ministry of Culture itself.
Film industries in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have also benefitted from the 
strong mainland market. A substantial 
number of domestic films are co-pro-
ductions with Hong Kong, including 
The Monkey King 大闹天宫, a fantasy 
film adaptation of the classic novel 
Journey to the West 西游记 that sat at 
the top of the box office in June 2014. 
Since 2012, import quotas for films 
from Taiwan have been lifted; sixteen 
Taiwan films made it to mainland cin-
emas in 2013, well up from four films 
in 2009. Although the media conglom-
erate Wanda produced The Great Hyp-
notist 催眠大师, which made RMB 250 
million in box office revenue in its first 
twenty-one days in Chinese cinemas, 
both the director and the producer 
were from Taiwan. 
Then there is non-commercial 
cinema. In China, non-commercial cin-
ema may represent either the artistic 
Chinese-produced The Break-up Guru’s premiere 
took precedence over the opening date of Trans-
formers, which was pushed back by one day 
Source: Enlight Pictures Beijing
vision and socio-political agendas of an 
individual film-maker (‘indie’ film), or 
the state (‘main melody’ 主旋律 films 
promoting party ideals and history). 
Cinema’s ability to witness, ana-
lyse and mobilise society has long been 
central to China’s cinematic tradition. 
Chinese film-making entered its first 
golden age in the 1930s, in a rapidly 
industrialising Shanghai divided and 
occupied by foreign powers, as a polit-
ically unstable nation faced the threat 
of Japanese invasion. In such an envi-
ronment, although audiences craved 
diversion, or what one critic called 
‘ice-cream for the eyes’, socially pro-
gressive writers, directors and actors 
considered the notion of cinema as en-
tertainment to be frivolous and waste-
ful, and produced films that reflected 
the national crisis and promoted social 
and political change. With some ex-
ceptions (such as the masterful 1948 
Springtime in a Small Town 小城之春 
directed by Fei Mu 费穆) China’s film 
culture during the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937–1945) and the Civil War (1946–
1950) strongly favoured social realism 
and political engagement. 
In the Mao era, heeding Lenin’s 
dictum that cinema is the most im-
portant art, the state closely super-
vised and invested heavily in both 
film-making and distribution, so that 
film-as-propaganda could reach every 
corner of the countryside and the fron-
tier regions. 
When the first post-Mao genera-
tion of Chinese film directors (the Fifth 
Generation) began making films, they 
worked within the state studio system; 
there were no other options. Their first 
works, including Chen Kaige’s Yellow 
Earth 黄土地 (1984), Huang Jianxin’s 
Black Cannon Incident 黑炮事件 (1985) 
and Zhang Yimou’s Red Sorghum 
红高粱 (1989), were made with low 
budgets and little pressure to turn a 
profit. With their unconventional cine-
matic language and bold inquiries into 
social and political taboos, they rede-
fined Chinese cinema, not always with 
the approval of the authorities — or 
the movie-going masses. 
In March 2014, Chinese film- 
makers and audiences mourned the 
passing of Wu Tianming 吴天明, the 
popular Fourth Generation director 
and former head of the Xi’an Film Stu-
dio who had mentored and produced 
so many seminal works of the Fifth 
Generation. Wu’s own films Life 人生 
(1984) and Old Well 老井 (1987) por-
trayed human suffering and dignity 
against a backdrop of rural–urban in-
equality and extreme poverty. 
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Given this long history rich in 
artistic, social and political aspirations, 
it is no wonder that many of China’s 
best film-makers are neither motivated 
nor impressed by box office success. In 
April 2014, the Chinese Film Directors’ 
Guild (CFDG) created a public stir by 
withholding prizes for the best film 
and the best director in its prestigious 
annual award ceremony (‘China’s 
Oscars’), claiming that none of the 
films in competition — including huge 
box office hits — were good enough.  
In a speech announcing the de-
cision, Feng Xiaogang 冯小刚, a veter-
an film-maker and head of the CFDG 
jury, explained that the jury made the 
decision collectively ‘out of artistic 
conscience and respect for cinema’. 
If, more than a decade ago, Chinese 
film-makers put aside their artistic ide-
als and made commercial films out of 
financial necessity, he said, it was now 
time to ‘revive our ideals, rebuild our 
spirit and return to the artistic mean-
ing of film’.
Given China’s rigid system of 
censorship, making films according 
to one’s ideals is far from straightfor-
ward. Sensitive topics, including the 
representation of homosexuality and 
inter-ethnic conflicts, are off limits. A 
Touch of Sin 天注定 by China’s leading 
Sixth Generation film-maker Jia Zhang-
ke 贾樟柯 is a study of corruption, des-
peration and violence based on four 
real-life events. Despite winning the 
Best Screenplay Prize at Cannes in 
2013, and being critically acclaimed 
abroad (including in Hong Kong), the 
authorities indefinitely postponed its 
release date on the Mainland. With-
out a screening at home, it was not 
eligible for the CFDG annual awards. 
Some Chinese netizens speculated that 
CFDG’s surprise announcement was 
an implicit protest on behalf of Jia’s 
film.   
A small number of independent 
films have emerged in China in the 
past two decades, screening in ‘under-
ground’ indie film festivals and gal-
leries, or on DVDs passed from hand 
Li Xiantang is a renowned independent art critic 
and curator
Source: Baidu
to hand. Some have achieved inter-
national exposure and distribution. 
But the government has intensified 
its crackdown on this sector in recent 
years. In August 2014, the police raided 
the office and archive of the Beijing In-
dependent Film Festival and detained 
its organisers, including the promi-
nent art curator and critic Li Xianting 
栗宪廷, who was forced to sign, as a 
condition for his release, a document 
promising not to organise any film fes-
tivals in the future.
Non-Chinese film-makers hoping 
to exhibit in the Chinese film market 
must also deal with censorship. The 
debate over the extent to which for-
eign film-makers should comply with 
Chinese censorship has been going on 
for some time, especially as they are 
sometimes asked not only to change 
scenes, but the plot as well. The mak-
ers of Skyfall, the latest Bond movie, 
had to cut a scene where 007, played 
by Daniel Craig, kills a Chinese secu-
rity guard, and alter a plot line where 
the villain Javier Bardem explains that 
being in Chinese custody had turned 
him into a villain. The censors also 
clipped thirty-eight minutes, mostly 
love scenes, out of Cloud Atlas, a film 
based on a David Mitchell novel that 
was very popular in China. 
At the National People’s Politi-
cal Consultative Conference in March 
2014, Feng Xiaogang and Jackie Chan 
陈龙 called on the government to re-
lax its regime of film censorship. Ex-
pounding on the damage censorship 
does to the quality of cinema, Feng 
complained that film-makers’ most 
creative ideas are often rejected by 
clueless censors. ‘We often say, film is 
a glass of wine, it shouldn’t be water or 
juice… . But [the censor] just wants a 
glass of orange juice,’ Feng said. Jackie 
Chan spoke about the adverse effect 
censorship had on the box office. 
In April, Oliver Stone upset his 
hosts at the Beijing International Film 
Festival by asking when China would 
start making films critical of Mao Ze-
dong and the Cultural Revolution, 
stating that only when these taboos 
are lifted could true creativity emerge, 
which would be a basis for genuine 
co-production. In fact, there have 
been films in China critiquing the Cul-
tural Revolution and, implicitly, Mao 
Zedong, such as Troubled Laughter 
苦恼人的笑 (1979), Black Cannon In-
cident (1985) and Xie Jin’s adaptation 
of Hibiscus Town 芙蓉镇 (1986). As 
noted above, Cui Jian, the musician 
who pioneered Chinese rock music 
in the 1980s, debuted as a director in 
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2014 with the film Blue Sky Bones, a 
tale of two generations of family se-
crets, sexual longings and the pursuit 
of rock music, set both in the Cultural 
Revolution and the present day. With 
hard-to-miss references to some of the 
Cultural Revolution’s most prominent 
perpetrators and victims, the film ex-
perienced delays in release but eventu-
ally premiered nationwide in October. 
Yet Stone still had a point — there are 
not many cinematic treatments of the 
Cultural Revolution and, of those, few 
have challenged the official historiog-
raphy. (Tian Zhuangzhuang’s 田壮壮 
1993 Blue Kite 蓝风筝 was too challeng-
ing for the authorities: they banned it 
and told the director he would never 
make a film again. He has.)
With censorship rules unlikely to 
change in the short term, film-makers 
continue to seek acceptable ways to 
express the unacceptable. After going 
on to win the Golden Bear for Best 
Film in Berlin in 2014, Diao Yinan’s 
刁亦男 Black Coal, Thin Ice 白日焰火 
will screen in China without major 
changes. The film’s depiction of 
working-class desperation is framed by 
a detective crime story told in the style 
of film noir, a genre to which American 
film-makers have turned in their explo- 
rations of the darker sides of modernity 
— another aspect of Shared Destiny. 
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LO O K I N G  B A C K WA R D :  
C H I N E S E  A R T  I N  2 0 1 4
Chen Shuxia 陈淑霞
THE EXHIBITION ‘Ink Art: Past as Present in Contemporary China’, 
which opened in December 2013 at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art (The Met) 
in New York, reflected a basic theme 
of the contemporary Chinese art scene 
in 2014: nostalgia and continuity with 
the past. By juxtaposing contemporary 
ink works in various media (including 
painting, photography, sculpture, in-
stallation and video) with fifth-century 
Buddhist sculptures from its perma-
nent collection as well as Han-dynasty 
ceramics and Ming furniture, The Met 
attempted to place Chinese art today 
within its historical context. 
In 2014, exhibition titles in China 
itself frequently featured terms such as 
‘ancient’, ‘history’, ‘past’, ‘new youth’, 
‘childhood’, ‘anniversary’ and ‘gener-
ation’. Moreover, curators routinely 
referred to classic texts and philoso-
phy, including works by the military 
strategist Sunzi 孙子 and the Daoist 
philosopher Zhuangzi 庄子. Whether, 
as some claimed, this represented a 
literati or dilettantish escapism or a 
vision of a brighter future, art exhi-
bitions in 2014 sought to re-treat, re-
view, re-visit, re-evaluate, re-examine, 
re-contextualise, re-frame, re-invent, 
re-interpret and re-think the Chinese 
past as a strategy for making sense of 
an increasingly complex present.
The independent curator and art 
historian Martina Köppel-Yang claims 
that this strategy looks forward rather 
than backward. In her curatorial essay 
for the exhibition ‘Advance Through 
Retreat’ 以退为进 at the Rockbund 
Art Museum in Shanghai, she refers 
to The Met’s ‘Ink Art’ as well as other 
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recent exhibitions such as Pi Daojian’s 
皮道監 The Origin of Dao 原道 at the 
Hong Kong Museum of Art (2013). She 
notes ‘a tendency that is gaining ever 
greater importance, a tendency which 
shows the apparent need to rediscov-
er and revaluate Chinese traditional 
media as a lingua franca’. She also 
notes that in the ‘creation of a cultural 
identity of a new, self-confident, post-
WTO-entry China’, political and eco-
nomic as well as artistic and cultural 
motivations are at play. Yang drew the 
title of her exhibition from a famous 
stratagem in Sun Tzu’s sixth-century 
BCE text The Art of War 孙子兵法. Os-
tensibly a retreat to traditional meth-
ods and local aesthetics, the exhibition 
included works that resist the offi-
cial project of reaffirming a national 
cultural identity — 
by the ‘outsider’ cal-
ligraphy of the late 
Hong Kong street art-
ist Tsang Tsou Choi 曾
灶財, scrawled over 
distribution boxes 
and electricity poles 
around the streets 
of Kowloon, and the 
Cantonese collective 
the Yangjiang Group, 
which refuses to 
follow established artistic rules in its 
practice, for example.
Beijing’s newly opened private-
ly-owned Redbrick Art Museum also 
reflected this broad trend in its inaugu-
ral exhibition ‘Extensive Records of the 
Taiping Era’ 太平广记, the title directly 
referring to a tenth-century collection 
of folk stories. The curatorial team, 
led by Gao Shiming 高士明, stressed 
the power of ‘folk’ or ‘non-official’ 
在野 culture, and how such non-of-
ficial knowledge, created by artists 
turned augurs, astrologers and narra-
tors, evokes perceptions of fate, reali-
ty and uncertainty in contemporary 
China. The night before the exhibition, 
Hong Kong artist Pak Sheung Chuen 白
雙全 gathered together a group of Dao-
ist priests and held religious rituals to 
The late Hong Kong street artist Tsang Tsou Choi
Source: leapleapleap.com
attract stray ghosts. Grains of rice and 
joss stick ashes from their necroman-
tic rituals were later unintentionally 
carried by the soles of visitors’ shoes — 
or perhaps the invisible ghosts — into 
the space of other works in the show. 
A number of new private muse-
ums opened across China in 2014, in-
cluding Shanghai’s Long Museum and 
Yuz Museum, both located on the West 
Bund and showcasing their respec-
tive owners’ private art collections. In 
their inaugural exhibitions too, histo-
ry reigned: the Long Museum opened 
with ‘Re-View’ 开今 • 借古, literally 
‘borrowing from the past, opening 
up to the present’, while the title of 
the Yuz Museum’s ‘Myth/History’ 天
人之际, literally ‘between heaven and 
human’, quotes from a letter written 
by the classical historian Sima Qian 
司马迁 to his friend Ren An 任安 in 93 
BCE. Here Chinese history and philos-
ophy provide a context for the discus-
sion of current issues and the future 
development of Chinese art. 
Three researchers from the 
Shanghai Museum disputed the au-
thenticity of an eleventh-century cal-
ligraphy work on display in the Long 
Museum, Gongfu Tie 功甫贴 by Su Shi 
苏轼, which the collector and muse-
um-owner, Liu Yiqian 刘益谦 bought 
at Sotheby’s in New York last year. 
This month-long dispute exemplifies 
mounting tensions between state-
owned museums and the emerging 
private sector, in which anyone with 
the money and interest can open their 
own museum. Those within the state 
sector and the academy have raised 
serious questions about the quality of 
institutional research in the private 
sector as well as issues including au-
thenticity, management and curatorial 
strategies; there is also no doubt that 
there is tension between the worlds 
of officially sanctioned culture and 
private cultural entrepreneurship on 
principle and ideology.  
To demonstrate its own intellectu-
al strength and the potential for inno-
vation within the state sector, the Na-
tional Art Museum of China launched 
its third International Triennial of 
New Media Art, titled ‘Thingworld’ 齐
物等观, in June 2014. Curator Zhang Ga 
张尕 explained: ‘In Chinese language, 
the word for “thing” is a compound of 
the characters East and West, a geo- 
graphic stretch across the infinite 
space of two imaginary ends in the 
ancient mind. Thing is everything.’ 
The exhibition showcased fifty-eight 
works by sixty-eight artists and artist 
collectives from twenty-two countries 
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and regions (for instance, Taiwan). 
The work included machines, robots, 
installations using garbage, furniture, 
rocks and flowers as well as new me-
dia. 
Zhang Ga’s curatorial essay for 
‘Thingworld’ drew on Zhuangzi’s con-
cept of the ‘equality of all things’ 齐
物论, another example of ‘the use of 
the old to serve the new’ in contem-
porary Chinese curatorial practice. At 
the same time, he scored some subtle 
ideological points by slamming the 
‘frivolity’ of contemporary cultural de-
bates over representation and identity, 
humanism and so forth in the face of 
man-made climate change and ecolog-
ical disaster.  
Anxiety about the worsening en-
vironment is reflected in the recent 
work of a number of Chinese artists 
as well as exhibitions. The Central 
Academy of Art in Beijing and Nanjing 
University consecutively hosted ‘Un-
fold’, a travelling exhibition of climate 
change-inspired art curated in Great 
Britain. The relationship between peo-
ple 人 and nature-heaven 天 was also 
a theme in the exhibition ‘Landscape: 
the Virtual, the Actual, the Possible?’ 
风景：实像，幻像或心像? at the pri-
vate, Rem Koolhaus-designed Times 
Museum in Guangzhou. Implicit in 
this sort of work is a sense of a better, 
cleaner, simpler past. 
Looking backward need not be a 
negation of the present, of course. Like 
‘Ink Art’, Shenzhen OCT Contemporary 
Art Terminal’s exhibition ‘From the 
Issue of Art to the Issue of Position: 
Echoes of Socialist Realism’ 从艺术
的问题到立场的问题：社会主义现实
主义的回响, positioned contemporary 
Chinese art in a historical continuity. 
Carol Yinghua Lu 卢迎华, who curated 
the exhibition in collaboration with 
her husband, artist Liu Ding 刘鼎, ar-
gued that Socialist Realism, both as an 
artistic language and an ideology, ex-
erts lasting influence on contemporary 
art practice. This curatorial position 
challenges the conventional percept- 
ion that contemporary Chinese art is 
rebellious towards officialdom. While 
this argument is not entirely new, it 
was ground-breaking to realise it in the 
form of a museum-scale exhibition. 
Whether revisiting the traditional 
medium of ink and referencing ancient 
philosophy, reflecting on a rapidly 
changing environment or re-examin-
ing the not-so-distant Socialist Realist 
past, recent exhibitions of Chinese art 
have looked at the past to ask impor-
tant questions about ownership over 
the future.
The Metropolitan Museum of Art’s exhibition ‘Ink Art’ positioned contemporary Chinese art 
in a historical continuity 
Source: metmuseum.org
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A  S TO R M  I N  A  C H IC K E N  C U P : 
A  B U R G E O N I N G  M A R K E T
Olivier Krischer
SOTHEBY’S HAS A US$1.6 million dollar limit per credit card trans-
action. So it took the Shanghainese bil-
lionaire Liu Yiqian 刘益谦 twenty-four 
swipes of his Amex card to purchase 
one of the most sought-after pieces 
of Chinese porcelain in the world: a 
Ming-dynasty teacup decorated with 
a delicate painting of chickens. While 
the payment was going through at the 
auction house in Hong Kong in late July 
2014, Liu picked up the US$36 million 
cup, poured some tea into it and took 
a sip. The photo of him drinking from 
the cup ignited a storm of criticism in 
China, where he was accused of vanity, 
vulgarity, risking damage to the cup 
and ostentation. ‘Emperor Qianlong 
has used it,’ he said. ‘Now I’ve used it. I 
just wanted to see how it felt.’
Billionaire Liu Yiqian bought a Ming-dynasty 
teacup with twenty-four swipes of his Amex card 
in 2014
Source: bendijin.net
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Liu’s ‘chicken cup’ 鸡缸杯 is des-
tined for display in his new private 
museum, the Long Museum in Shang-
hai (see Forum ‘Looking Backward: 
Chinese Art in 2014’, p.194). One of 
only nineteen such cups still in ex-
istence, this is considered the most 
flawless specimen. Only a few remain 
in private hands, and this is the only 
genuine, authenticated example in a 
Chinese collection.
It was also the most expensive 
piece of Chinese art sold at auction in 
2014, still well above the loftiest figures 
in contemporary art, including Zeng 
Fanzhi 曾梵志, who became the most 
expensive living Asian artist when his 
painting The Last Supper (2001) sold at 
auction for US$23.3 million in October 
2013. 
According to Artprice.com, a 
comprehensive global database of art 
sales, China — with combined sales 
topping US$4.1 billion — remains the 
largest market for art, edging ahead 
of the US for the fourth year in a 
row. Artprice will soon produce its 
market reports in Chinese as well as 
in English. Despite ongoing issues of 
non-payment, price manipulation and 
authenticity, the world’s largest auc-
tion houses have set up shop in situ 
— Sotheby’s in Beijing, in partnership 
with the state-owned Beijing GeHua 
Art Company, and Christie’s, working 
solo in Shanghai.
The mainland Chinese auction 
houses China Guardian and Poly Auc-
tion, meanwhile, have become forces 
on the international scene. If still trail-
ing well behind Sotheby’s and Chris-
tie’s, they rank third and fourth largest 
in the world in terms of total sales: Chi-
na Guardian passing US$582 million 
under the hammer in 2013, and Poly 
US$580 million. The domestic art mar-
ket in China has a long and prestigious 
history, despite a three-decade hiatus 
during the Mao era, when many fine 
pieces still managed to land in the pri-
vate collections of connoisseurs such 
as Kang Sheng 康生, Mao’s long-serv-
ing security and intelligence chief 
who was posthumously denounced as 
an ‘extreme leftist’ in league with the 
Gang of Four. 
While Chinese contemporary art 
is losing some of its circa 2005–2011 
global lustre, late-coming mainland 
collectors and patriotic overseas Chi-
nese continue to buoy up their compa-
triots’ prices. Prestige and investment 
motivate Chinese buyers as much 
as personal taste. Imperial antiques 
aside, there is a voracious interest in 
the country’s modern masters, late 
nineteenth- and mid-twentieth-cen-
tury names like Chang Dai-Ch’ien 张
大千, Qi Baishi 齐白石, Li Keran 李可
染 and Xu Beihong 徐悲鸿, as well as 
Paris-based emigrés Zao Wou-Ki 赵无
极 and Sanyu 常玉. In 2013, three Chi-
nese artists ranked among the world’s 
top ten for combined sales, with the 
leader, Chang Dai-Ch’ien, coming in 
third overall, with US$291.6 million 
of ink paintings sold — overshadow-
ing the likes of Gerhard Richter (No.7, 
US$165.8 million) and Claude Monet 
(No.10, US$137.6 million). There is also 
growing interest in prestige non-Chi-
nese works, with collectors finding 
ready sellers in cash-strapped Europe 
and elsewhere. In November 2013, 
China’s richest man, Wang Jianlin 
王健林 (Wahaha), purchased a Picasso 
(Claude et Paloma, 1950) for just over 
US$28 million. In China, investing in 
art that is high in cultural prestige, but 
low in political risk, has become a big 
business with global implications. 
China’s richest man in 2013 Wang 
Jianlin purchased a Picasso for  
US$28 million
Source: wanda-group.com
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URBAN, MOBILE AND GLOBAL
Carolyn Cartier
PEOPLE IN URBAN China travel, move house 
and commute longer distances than ever before. 
They also enjoy greater opportunities to change 
their lifestyles or move up the social ladder. The 
gradual removal of historical bans imposed by the 
Communist Party on unauthorised movement be-
tween cities (or from the countryside to the city) 
as well as owning property and travelling abroad 
make the ease of movement — mobility — novel 
and exciting.   
Over the past year and a half, the anti-
corruption campaign has identified ‘excessive 
mobility’, as defined by all forms of ‘extravagance’ 
铺张 or 奢靡 on the part of party and government 
officials, as being a danger to the wellbeing of 
the party-state. New prohibitions and regulations 
have put pressure on party and government 
officials to change their habits, alter their lifestyles 
and abandon any plans to establish a residential 
base overseas — in effect, to retreat from the 
Zeitgeist of mobility. This chapter considers the 
implications for the Shared Destiny of the Chinese 
in the context of movement between China and 
the world, particularly in relation to the Party’s 
seemingly stringent anti-waste regulations.
Image: Chinese tourists at Uluru, Central Australia
Source: Northern Territory Tourism
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A New Austerity
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eighteenth Party Central Committee approved 
what are formally known as ‘Party and Govern-
ment Regulations for Strict Economic Practices to 
Combat Waste’ 党政机关厉行节约反对浪费条例. The 
regulations, divided into twelve chapters and cov-
ering sixty-five items, outlined in great detail the 
management of government funds for everything 
from official travel, receptions and meetings to the 
use of vehicles and the renovation or construction 
of public buildings. This was the fourth tranche of 
bans and regulations issued since 2012 aimed at 
reforming and remoulding official conduct. They 
complemented and extended the ‘Twenty-six Item Directive’ or ‘Rules on 
Party and Government Domestic Official Business Reception Management’ 
党政机关国内公务接待管理规定 of December 2013; the January 2013 stip-
ulations known as the ‘Cage of Regulations’ 制度的笼子; and, the Decem-
ber 2012 ‘Eight Rules on Official Behaviour’ 八项规定 that were a feature 
of China Story Yearbook 2013.
The new raft of regulations prescribed correct practices in mind- 
numbing detail and highlighted existing problems of official conduct. 
They targeted lavish dining out, banquets and receptions, gift-giving, pub-
lically funded travel and the perks that go with it. The prescriptions (and 
proscriptions) in each and every category will slow down growth in the 
urban economy, especially the service industries, such as restaurants and 
hotels, as well as the urban environment and the experience of living in 
Chinese cities more generally. 
Among other things, the regulations specifically prohibited: bribery in 
all forms, including accepting expensive gifts; hiding illegally obtained in-
come; misusing government funds; charging non-official fees and tourism 
in the guise of official travel. They ban local initiatives including celebra-
Rules on Party and 
Government Domestic 
Official Business Reception 
Management
Photo: xinxi1.yymcc.com
tions of local culture and the manufacture of products that have not been 
approved by higher authorities. They also proscribe non-approved chang-
es to the administrative divisions, that is, the subnational boundaries, of 
governing districts. They demand that officials vacate non-standard office 
spaces, including long-term leases in hotels, and ban the construction of 
large and lavish new offices. Moreover, local governments must not, as 
they have taken to doing on a grand scale, build flash new urban land-
marks 城市地标 or large-scale plazas.
The regulations promote budget restraint, rigorous audit practices, 
market price-based expenditure, the market reform of official vehicle pro-
curement, and a two-tier, central and provincial-level approval process 
for related decisions that had previously only needed to be approved lo-
cally. They encourage the conservation of energy and resources, including 
of equipment and furnishings — no need to update computer laptops to 
the latest model or redecorate for no good reason. Government bureaus 
should adopt the ‘paperless office’ and co-ordinate to prevent duplication 
of functions. Propaganda or party PR departments must ‘promote the con-
The newly approved ‘Party and Government Regulations for Strict Economic Practices to Combat Waste’ forbade 
lavish dining out, banquets and receptions, gift-giving, publically funded travel and the perks that go with it
Photo: Frank Müller/Flickr
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cept of green, low-carbon consumption and a healthy and civilised life-
style’ 倡导绿色低碳消费理念和健康文明生活方式. The Party will conduct 
on-site disciplinary inspections — including unannounced or spontaneous 
inspections — and investigate tips received from the public regarding offi-
cial breaches of these published rules and regulations.
Yet contradictions abound. On the one hand, the anti-corruption 
campaign purports to promote market competition, which means that 
the state should not control production and that entrepreneurs should 
be free to establish businesses small or large. On the other hand, it 
demands the standardisation of consumption practices at all levels of 
society. It strengthens the visible hand of the Party while simultaneously 
encouraging and frustrating the less visible hand of the market. 
The anti-waste campaign seeks to curb dining out on the public 
purse. Article Twelve of the ‘Twenty-six Item Directive’ prohibits the 
consumption of shark fins, birds’ nests and endangered animals, as well as 
spending government funds on cigarettes and liquor. The campaign also 
targets consumption that is beyond the public gaze, banning officials from 
frequenting or belonging to private 
clubs (see the China Story Yearbook 
2013: Civilising China, Information 
Window ‘Bathtime: Clamping Down 
on Corruption’, p.104). Inspectors 
have identified upscale private clubs 
and restaurants in public parks 
and heritage sites for closure and 
corrective action. In January 2014, 
the Beijing Municipal Government 
listed twenty-four such clubs and 
restaurants operating in public 
parks, some in dynastic-era heritage 
buildings, including in Beihai Park 
In December 2013, Xi Jinping took his austerity 
program into the streets, eating at the Qingfeng 
Steamed Bun Outlet in Beijing’s Chaoyang dis-
trict, one in a chain of such restaurants 
Photo: Weibo
in central Beijing. It ordered 
them to suspend business and 
‘adjust their way of thinking’ 
调整思路. The Hangzhou West 
Lake government also ordered 
luxury restaurants to close or 
develop new business models 
with moderately priced menus.
In December 2013, Xi Jin-
ping took his austerity pro-
gram into the streets, eating 
at the Qingfeng Steamed Bun 
Outlet 庆丰包子铺  in Beijing’s 
Chaoyang district. He appeared 
to have arrived alone, ordered 
at the counter, paid twenty-one 
yuan (US$3.50) for the meal and carried his tray to a table. Following his 
visit, to which the official media gave much publicity, customers flocked 
to the restaurant to order the ‘Chairman’s Combo’ 主席套餐, a value meal 
of six steamed buns, a cold green vegetable and a soup of pig’s liver and 
intestines. The owner, concerned with crushing competition for ‘Xi’s Seat’, 
removed the table at which he sat as if it were an iconic object. 
Yet if the image of Xi eating at the Qingfeng Steamed Bun Outlet seems 
to support small-scale entrepreneurs in the market economy, the reality 
is somewhat different. The Qingfeng chain is a subsidiary of the Huatian 
Group, a state-owned conglomerate that was co-founded by Beijing’s 
Xicheng District Government and the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. The complex relationship 
between the state and the market results in many such examples in 
which private enterprise and state ownership coexist. For example, 
when corporations, not official bodies, sponsor banquets, the anti-waste 
Xi Jinping eating a value meal subsequently dubbed the 
‘Chairman’s Combo’
Photo: Weibo
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regulations don’t apply — yet the corporation itself may well be wholly or 
jointly state-owned.
Curbing Excess at Home but Not Abroad? 
While aimed at bolstering the Party’s legitimacy with the people and 
targeting official waste and corruption, the austerity campaign has also 
affected the relationships between political and economic elites, who 
together set trends in the urban consumer economy through their social 
relations and exchanges of favours. 
Just two years ago many foreign luxury firms had planned to expand 
their businesses widely in China. But sales for international brands began 
A French luxury goods conglomerate that owns Möet & Chandon and Louis Vuitton reported that sales 
growth in China had dropped from ten to twenty percent to just five percent in 2013
Photo: us.moet.com
to decrease in 2013 and by 2014 some luxury malls and international 
brand shops in Shanghai and Beijing had become consumer deserts. 
Although luxury brands continue to boost their profiles with bullish 
retail promotions and press releases, there is no doubt that conspicuous 
consumption has decreased as a result of the austerity campaign.
Yet by the first quarter of 2014, as global firms tracking luxury brands 
reported decreased sales in China, they noted that consumption of luxury 
goods by Chinese tourists overseas actually increased. In 2014, France, 
the home of many luxury brands, became the most favoured destination 
for middle-class Chinese tourists. It had already been high on the list of 
China’s wealthy, measured as the top wealthiest twenty-five percent of 
the country’s outbound tourists by income, who prefer it second only to 
Bling Loses its Sparkle, by Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
In 2012, China spent its way past the USA to become the biggest luxury goods market in the 
world, according to the Business of Fashion website. However, the same article notes that 
the growth of China’s luxury market dropped to seven percent in 2012, down from more 
than thirty in previous years.
LVMH, a French luxury goods conglomerate that owns Möet & Chandon and Louis 
Vuitton, reported that sales growth in China has 
dropped from ten to twenty percent to just five 
percent in 2013. In the same period, Salvatore 
Ferragamo’s revenue growth in Asia halved to 
ten percent. When the price of shoemaker Tod’s 
shares fell seven percent, the company blamed 
declining demand in Asia. 
While industry says the anti-corruption cam-
paign is responsible for declining sales, changing 
tastes are also partly responsible: the ostenta-
tious embrace of luxury brands by déclassé nou-
veau riche has also taken some shine off the bling 
for the truly well-heeled. 
A lucky licence plate in China has become al- 
most as much a status symbol as a car. Super- 
stitious rich people spend a small fortune to 
purchase an auspicious plate. The luckiest 
number, and therefore most expensive, 
is eight, or ba, which rhymes with fa, the 
Chinese character for wealth
Photo: Patrick Streule/Flickr
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Australia, where the clean environment is 
the main draw.  
Having seen Paris, some wealthy 
Chinese tourists took to pursuing the 
red wines of Bordeaux and Burgundy to 
the source, visiting the great chateaux 
and buying wine, or even whole cellars. 
Other travellers, led predominantly by 
women, would head south to seek out the 
fabled colours of Provence. These regional 
landscapes — from the Route des Grands 
Cru, Dijon to Santenay, to the lavender 
fields of Aix-en-Provence — have become 
widely known and even reproduced in 
China. 
After the fashion model Zhang Xinyu 
张馨予 posted a photo of herself with a 
lavender-stuffed, lavender-coloured plush bear from a lavender estate in 
Nabowla, Tasmania (the south-eastern island state of Australia), Chinese 
tourists descended on the town en masse to snap up the same bear — orig-
inally created as a way to deal with excess lavender. The demand grew so 
intense that the lavender estate limited sales to one per person. Even a 
Chinese quarantine services ban on the bear failed to have any immediate 
effect on sales. 
Chinese citizens first gained the opportunity to travel outside the 
Mainland in the 1980s. In 1983, Hong Kong and Macao became the first 
places opened to Chinese tourists, but they could only travel as part of an 
organised tour. In 2003, in response to the SARS (Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome, or ‘avian flu’) crisis, which caused a meltdown in Hong 
Kong’s tourism industry and put many businesses in peril, Hong Kong im-
plemented an ‘individual visitor scheme’ to boost mainland tourism. Chi-
na’s middle class shoppers, discouraged from buying quality goods and 
Zhang Xinyu posted a photo of herself 
with a lavender-coloured plush bear 
from a lavender estate in Tasmania. 
Chinese tourists descended on the 
town en masse to snap up the same 
bear
Photo: Zhang Xinyu/Weibo
luxury brand products in China because import duties and consumption 
taxes had made them far too expensive, found the same goods in Hong 
Kong’s shopping malls — tax free. If the individual visitor scheme intro-
duced new possibilities for travel and consumption, it was a privilege that 
was unevenly distributed. Just as the first economic experiments of Deng 
Xiaoping’s program of Reform and Opening Up were first trialled in the 
Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen in the south before being extended 
to coastal cities and finally interior provinces, from south to north and 
east to west, the individual visitor scheme initially allowed independent 
travel only to residents of certain places in Guangdong. Later, this was 
extended to Beijing and Shanghai. Shenzhen, on the Hong Kong border, 
was able uniquely to offer multiple-entry visas for Hong Kong beginning 
in 2009. 
WHERE THE ECONOMIC ELITE 
WENT IN 2013*
1.   Australia
2.  France
3.  Dubai
4.  Switzerland
5.  Maldives
6.  United States
7.   Japan
8.  Germany
9.   Singapore
10.  New Zealand
*Defined as the top twenty-
six percent by income of 
‘outbound tourists’.
Australia was mainland China’s most popular 
travel destination in 2013
Photo: Northern Territory Tourism
Data source: 2013 survey by FT (Financial Times) China Confidential survey 
of 1,227 middle income consumers in ten first- and second-tier cities. 
http://www.ftchinaconfidential.com/outbound2013
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During this time, the government gradually relaxed restrictions on 
travel by Chinese nationals to other countries. Through the 1990s, ‘ap-
proved destinations’ were confined to the Asia and Pacific region, with 
Australia and New Zealand being added to the list in 1999. Most European 
countries became approved destinations in 2004–2005, the United States in 
2008 (by which time there were ninety-five countries on the list) and Can-
ada in 2010. In 2013, Rwanda became the 116th country to make the list.
Exceptional Zones: Hong Kong and Macao
While mainland Chinese tourists boost the economies of their destina-
tions, their arrival has not always been greeted with joy. In January 2014, 
the Hong Kong Secretary for Commerce and Development Gregory So 
Kam-leung 蘇錦樑 sparked public consternation when he claimed that 
Hong Kong, an urban area with a population of 7.2 million, could receive 
as many as seventy million tourists annually within three years, and up 
to one hundred million by 2023. In 2013, 40.8 million of the year’s annual 
54.3 million visitors arriving in Hong Kong came from mainland China.
‘Mr. 689’ is the nickname Hong Kongers have given CY Leung, installed as Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2012 with 
689 votes by China’s elite electoral committee. It became the unoffical symbol of the Hong Kong protests in 2014
Photo: hk.apple.nextmedia.com
 There had already been both media criticism of and protests against 
Mainlanders (‘locusts’) for the bad manners that some displayed and the 
negative impact of mainland tourism in general (see the China Story Year-
book 2013: Civilising China, Forum ‘Civilised Tourism’, p.14). In March 
2014, a particularly theatrical protest saw about one hundred people 
wearing Cultural Revolution-style costumes, waving red flags and holding 
posters with the Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung’s 梁振英 face ‘photo-
shopped’ onto Mao Zedong’s body as they shouted slogans like ‘Love your 
country — buy Chinese products’ 愛國愛國貨. In response to this popular 
backlash, in May 2014, the New China News Agency published a list of 
‘do’s and don’ts’ for Mainlanders planning a visit to Hong Kong. The intro-
duction to these guidelines reminded travellers that, ‘when you go some-
where, follow local custom’ 入乡随俗, elaborating on differences in daily 
life between the Mainland and Hong Kong.
Another concern is economic. In March 2014, The Economist 
named Hong Kong number one on its new ‘crony-capitalism index’, by 
a wide margin. The index tracks economic activity susceptible to ‘rent-
seeking’, which it defines as ‘grabbing a bigger slice of the pie rather than 
WHERE MIDDLE-CLASS TOURISTS 
WANTED TO GO IN 2014
1.  France
2.  United Kingdom
3.  Italy
4.  Germany
5.  Hong Kong
Data source: Hurun Report 2014, People’s 
Daily Online, retrieved 26 January 2014
6.  Japan
7.  United States
8.  Singapore
9.  South Korea
10.  Switzerland
Chinese tourists are buying up infant milk powder 
everywhere they can get it. In Hong Kong the 
phenomenon has resulted in widespread shortages. 
Hong Kong authorities have imposed a two-tin export 
restriction on mainland Chinese tourists
Photo: voanews.com
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making the pie bigger’, and which often 
involves businesses gaining advantages 
over competitors as a result of political 
connections. It cites both Hong Kong and 
Singapore for their ‘role as entrepôt for 
shiftier neighbours’.
Local authorities are also concerned 
about mainland visitors engaging in prac-
tices aimed at circumventing Chinese law, 
including the anti-waste regulations and 
the anti-corruption campaign. Some visi-
tors make fraudulent use of UnionPay cards 
to circumvent Chinese laws restricting the 
amount of foreign currency a citizen can 
legally take out of the country. UnionPay is 
China’s only domestic bankcard. It is used 
by all banks in China and operates with the 
approval of the People’s Bank of China. It 
is widely accepted by ATMs in Hong Kong 
and Macao. 
In 2006, Macao beat Las Vegas to take the 
title of biggest gambling centre in the world. 
By 2013, official figures for gaming revenue 
in Macao reached an unprecedented US$45 
billion. But an estimated further US$90 
billion in unreported income, twice the 
official total, came from the illegal use of 
UnionPay cards. The most common ruse is 
to pay for jewellery or other luxuries via UnionPay and then return the 
items for cash. The second type of fraud involves the use of handheld 
UnionPay terminals registered on the Mainland and smuggled into Macao 
in order to record transactions as domestic. 
WHAT’S IN AND WHAT’S OUT
IN      
Eating in       
Simple dishes
Spending time with family
Cars bought retail 
Budget determines spending  
Visits to the grassroots  
Limited retinue
Short meetings
Plain wrapping
‘Ordinary’ facilities 
Thrifty leadership 
Recycle-reuse
OUT
Eating out
Exotic meats
Expending time in clubs  
State-subsidised vehicles
Spending determines budget
Travel outside one’s jurisdiction 
Large entourages    
Long conferences
Gaudy packaging
‘Image’ projects
Flashy conduct
Latest model
In May 2014, the unprecedented growth of UnionPay card use in Ma-
cao raised concerns in Beijing that, as reported by the Macau Business 
Daily, ‘tens of billions of yuan in illicit funds are being funnelled out of 
the Mainland and into casinos in direct contravention of national curren-
cy controls’. UnionPay quickly announced measures to ‘combat overseas 
money laundering [and] capital flight’. The Macao Monetary Authority 
ordered casinos and shopping malls to search out and remove all unreg-
istered UnionPay card machines. Subsequent media reports indicate that 
mainland visitors still commonly use UnionPay in Macao, but casinos and 
shops have not been able to add new payment terminals and there is on-
going official scrutiny. 
Globalisation of Capital and Residency Schemes
Ever since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, well-heeled Chinese 
have invested in the housing market in many of the world’s most desirable 
cities. Wealthy investors ‘rationally overpay’ to park capital in real estate 
that then routinely lies vacant. The decision to invest in property overseas 
is not surprising. In China, property reverts to the state after seventy years; 
there is no such thing as ownership in perpetuity. According to the global 
real estate services firm Jones Lang La-
Salle, Chinese investment in real estate 
abroad increased by twenty-five percent 
in the first quarter of 2014 over the pre-
vious year to a total of US$2.1 billion. 
Among the most popular cities 
with cashed-up Chinese investors 
are those where housing is the least 
affordable: Hong Kong, Vancouver, 
Sydney, San Francisco, San Jose (Silicon 
Valley), Melbourne, New York, London, 
‘Naked officials’: Party and government offi-
cials who send their families and suspicious 
fortunes to Hong Kong or Western countries, 
including tax havens with no extradition 
treaty with China, without a legitimate 
work-related reason
Photo: Weibo
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Los Angeles and Auckland. As a result, in many of these cities there is 
concern that Chinese investment is pushing housing prices out of the 
reach of local residents. In February 2014, Canada cancelled its Immigrant 
Investment Program, which had some 65,000 pending applications, seventy 
percent of which were from China, claiming that the scheme had under- 
valued Canadian permanent residency. 
In Australia, there have been conflicting reports on the impact of 
foreign investment, of which Chinese investment is a significant part, on 
the real estate market. The law holds that non-residents are allowed to 
purchase only new-build housing (thus stimulating construction), while 
some figures suggest that non-resident purchases also factors in the 15.4 
percent rise in housing prices in Sydney and 9.2 percent rise in Melbourne 
over the twelve months to June 2014. A parliamentary inquiry into the 
effect of foreign buyers on Australian real estate prices has suggested 
new rules and stricter enforcement of existing rules, while reported 
reactions among ‘cashed-up foreign real estate investors view the existing 
$85,000 fine for buying existing dwellings just a cost of doing business’.
  A financial industry survey found that forty-seven percent of ‘high 
net worth’ individuals planned to move overseas. From the standpoint of 
those running the anti-corruption campaign, the problem is that Chinese 
investing overseas includes government officials whose incomes should 
not allow it. A survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences revealed 
that half of the party and government officials at provincial and county 
levels were considering how to acquire foreign nationality or residency 
for their children. Bureaucrats whose spouses, children — and assets — 
have been moved abroad are called ‘naked officials’ 裸体官员, known 
colloquially as luoguan 裸官 (see Forum ‘Chinese Families Going Global?’, 
p.230). According to the Global Financial Integrity Group, which monitors 
illegal money flows, no less than US$3 trillion had been illicitly spirited out 
of China in the six years to 2011. 
In a 2013 speech on the drive for clean government (‘honest and clean 
party and government rule’ 党风廉政), Wang Qishan, head of the Cen-
tral Commission for Discipline Inspection, previewed measures to bring 
China’s 1.18 million ‘naked officials’ into line. Wang identified how the 
problem of nepotism, like all forms of corruption, interferes with the de-
velopment and operation of the market. But his observation exposes the 
contradiction between party-state expectations for political elites and the 
rational choices individuals make in the global market.
The Hong Kong Capital Investment Entrance Scheme bars applicants 
from China but makes an exception for Chinese nationals who have per-
manent residence in another country. For a fee of HK$200,000 (US$25,800) 
Hong Kong immigration agents help mainland citizens obtain residency 
permits in other countries with lax requirements for residency so that 
they can take advantage of this loophole. Of more than 17,000 mainland 
WHEN IN HONG KONG: RULES FOR MAINLAND TOURISTS
DO
Keep clear of roads and avoid blocking paths
Speak softly
Refrain from bumping or pushing people
Avoid greeting people loudly from  
a distance
Treat service staff politely
Avoid excessive bargaining
DON’T
Drink or eat on the MTR 
Smoke in a non-smoking area
Litter or spit on the ground
Cross the road against a red light
Forget to wear your seatbelt in a taxi
Ride in the first-class train carriage  
without paying 
Source: Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2014 
Mainland Chinese tourists are the subject of global 
criticism. The Chinese government has issued guide-
lines on how to travel abroad 
Source: Xinhuanet.com
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
U
rb
an
, M
ob
ile
 a
nd
 G
lo
ba
l 
Ca
ro
ly
n 
Ca
rt
ie
r
222
223
WHERE CHINESE TRAVELLERS GO
Approved Destination Status agreements with China, by year. 
Year   Destination
1983 Hong Kong, Macao
1988   Thailand  
1990   Malaysia, Singapore
1992   Philippines
1998   South Korea
1999   Australia, New Zealand
2000   Brunei, Cambodia, Japan, Myanmar, Vietnam 
2002   Egypt, Indonesia, Malta, Nepal, Turkey
2003   Croatia, Cuba, Germany, Hungary, India, Maldives, Pakistan, South Africa,  
Sri Lanka
2004   Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Seychelles, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
2005   Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Jamaica, Lao PDR, Mexico,   
Northern Mariana Islands, Peru, Russia, United Kingdom, Vanuatu
2006   Bahamas, Grenada, Mongolia, Tonga
2007   Andorra, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Uganda, Morocco, Monaco, Namibia, 
Venezuela, Oman, Syria
2008   French Polynesia, Israel, Taiwan, United States
2009   Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Montenegro, 
Papua New Guinea, United Arab Emirates
2010   Canada, Lebanon, Federated States of Micronesia, North Korea, Uzbekistan, Serbia
2011   Iran
2012   Madagascar, Cameroon, Colombia, Samoa
2013   Rwanda
Source: Chinese National Tourism Association (www.cnta.gov.cn)
Chinese investors in the Hong Kong scheme, a group that constitutes 
eighty-seven percent of the total, 13,300 have residency papers from Gam-
bia and Guinea-Bissau. In the third quarter of 2013, applicants for Hong 
Kong’s program more than doubled from the previous year to 3,380, a 
record high. Officials from the People’s Republic may apply with civilian 
mainland identity cards while maintaining household registration status 
and businesses in China. 
Applications from mainland students to Hong Kong universities have 
also increased significantly, including applications from mature-age stu-
dents. In the 2010s, the proportion of postgraduate students from main-
land China studying at Hong Kong universities increased to more than 
half. In the academic year 2011–2012, out of fewer than 7,000 postgraduate 
students at Hong Kong universities, 4,298 were from China. By 2012–2013, 
the number increased to 4,586. Most pursue master’s programs in busi-
ness, finance, accountancy and other professional degrees. The postgradu-
ate visa is a more economical way to obtain Hong Kong residency than the 
capital investment scheme. It allows graduates one year to find a job and, 
after another six years, the opportunity to apply for permanent residency. 
After Canada cancelled its popular (and relatively low-cost) Immi-
grant Investment Program, similar schemes in Australia, Europe and the 
US became even more popular. In November 2012, Australia introduced 
the Significant Investor Visa, which mandated an investment of AU$5 mil-
lion in a local business or approved managed funds for those who would 
want to obtain permanent residency. Within a year, eighty-five percent of 
the applications came from mainland Chinese. In October 2014, the Aus-
tralian government went even further, announcing a new ‘premium’ in-
vestor visa for applicants investing AU$15 million or more in the country, 
who can then get permanent residence in one year.
 In Europe, the direct purchase of real estate entitles the buyer to res-
ident status in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Cyprus. In 2012, Portugal intro-
duced a ‘318 Golden Visa’; this allows the granting of permanent residency 
after five years and EU residency after an additional one year for buyers of 
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real estate with a value greater than €500,000. In the first year, 248 of 400 
successful applicants came from China. 
In August 2014, the US State Department announced that the annual 
quota of investment visas for permanent residency in the United States 
had filled early, with Chinese investors making up eighty percent of the 
year’s allocation. Demand from China for the US scheme exceeds that from 
any other county, and it increased after Canada shut down its program.
Conclusion
When the Party launches a political campaign, superficial or at least sta-
tistically evident results can be quick. But such campaigns have histori-
cally played out only in China itself. The current austerity campaign has 
implications for the behaviour of Chinese elites and officials in a global 
context. In October 2014, the Australian Federal Police revealed they were 
working with their Chinese counterparts to seize the assets of corrupt of-
ficials who had brought hundreds of millions of dollars of illicit earnings 
into Australia.
How will political and economic elites react to the new pressures for 
clean government in relation to the way they take up global opportuni-
ties? How will regulations set by the Party work in an era of international 
capital mobility? What are their implications for national loyalties, food 
security and environmental quality at home and abroad?
As noted elsewhere in this volume, the anti-corruption campaign os-
tensibly sought to clear the way for the implementation of a new wave of 
economic reforms. Its anti-waste directives expose and address popular 
outrage at official corruption and excess consumption. But it also reveals 
fundamental contradictions in a political-economic system in which the 
state embraces market discourses and desires rather than focusing on the 
establishment and long-term maintenance of viable market institutions. 
The political campaign is unlikely to be able to rein in the new urban mo-
bility. 
Domestic and international mobility in China has increased 
dramatically over the past thirty years. The impending loosening and 
reform of the once-strict household registration system will grant legal 
residency status to millions of urban migrants; it will address the problems 
of the urban underclass and increase their potential for social mobility 
in China’s burgeoning cities. At the same time, urban professionals are 
growing anxious about the future in which they share social welfare 
with millions of new urban citizens. New constellations of mobility make 
the cities of the outside world, by comparison, desirable and realistic 
destinations and sites of comparative possibility. The Shared Destiny 
of groups and classes in China extends their desire to embrace a global 
destiny — the ramifications of which are hard to predict. 
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CH I N E S E  FA M I L I E S  G OI N G 
G LO B A L ?
Luigi Tomba
EARLY JUNE EACH year in China is gaokao 高考 season, when mil-
lions of hopeful pupils enrol in the 
university entrance examinations. In 
2014, 9.4 million students competed 
for almost seven million places, a high 
number indeed, although not all plac-
es are equal. China’s leading univer-
sities only admit the highest scoring 
candidates. Lower marks leave many 
with the choice between a mediocre 
higher education in China and, if they 
can afford it, an expensive degree in 
an overseas university. 
With the family’s fortunes at 
stake, parents of students crowd the 
temples dedicated to Confucius at this 
time of the year. China’s new mid-
dle-class families spare no effort to 
ingratiate their children with China’s 
ultimate sage. According to the South 
China Morning Post, some even hedge 
their bets by praying to Mao Zedong as 
well. At the time of the examinations 
themselves in 2014, the topic ‘gaokao 
blessing’ 高考祝福 topped the Weibo 
ranking with fifty-seven million posts. 
The infamous pressure gaokao 
places on students, and the unavoida-
ble disappointment some of them suf-
fer, results increasingly in their seek-
ing places in universities elsewhere. 
Over the last decade, many North 
American, British and Australian uni-
versities have become increasingly 
dependent on full fee-paying Chinese 
students (see Information Window 
‘Chinese Students Abroad’, p.235). The 
movement of students into universities 
abroad is also part of the larger trend 
of the internationalisation of China’s 
middle class, who desire greater ac-
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cess not only to education and infor-
mation but also to international name 
brands, holidays and property (see 
Chapter 5 ‘Urban, Mobile and Global’, 
p.204). In 2012, The Economist started 
a ‘Sinodependency Index’, to map the 
growing global importance of Chinese 
consumption to the world economy. 
Foreign analysts have long sug-
gested that the globalisation of China’s 
middle class will also lead them to 
become more aware of and thus con-
cerned about political restrictions such 
as those on free expression; that it will 
make them more interested in democ-
racy. Yet families investing in education 
or other assets abroad appear more 
interested in consolidating their priv-
ileges and overcoming their anxieties 
about China’s political and economic 
future than in precipi-
tating political change 
by challenging the re-
gime. They may well 
change the world before 
they change China.
It is not just about 
travel and education. 
Chinese are also becom-
ing more aware of the 
opportunities offered 
by a globalised market: 
a group of over 7000 
mainland direct-mar-
keting professionals 
recently became the 
largest travel party ever 
to enter the US. The 
latest annual Hurun 
胡润 report on China’s 
wealth, published in 
early 2014, estimates 
that Chinese with as-
The Times cover on 5 March 2013: The internationalisation of China’s 
middle class, who desire greater access not only to education and infor-
mation but also to international brand-names, holidays and property
Source: offbeatchina.com
sets of more than US$1 million trans-
ferred a total of US$465 billion out 
of the country in 2011 alone. Sixty- 
four percent of Chinese millionaires 
polled for the same report have either 
taken residence in a second country or 
are planning to do so. 
The movement of private capi-
tal (and entrepreneurship) to foreign 
countries causes the domestic lead-
ership anxiety. This can be seen in a 
number of measures taken by the gov-
ernment over the last twelve months 
to keep China’s hard-won prosperity 
from bleeding over its borders. Bei-
jing’s concerns are not so much with 
individual consumers or China Inc.’s 
productive, strategic and lucrative in-
vestments. It is with the steady and 
seemingly uncontrollable drift of pri-
vate savings to consumer-friendlier 
economies and the flight of capital, 
especially that acquired illegally by of-
ficials and the wealthiest families (see 
Information Window ‘Naked Officials’, 
p.236).
Corruption is only part of the sto-
ry. The wealth of China’s middle class 
and the rich is also heading overseas 
because it is becoming more difficult 
to create and accumulate wealth at 
home. For over two decades beginning 
in the 1990s, local and central govern-
ments openly engineered the growth 
of the middle class through subsidis-
ing home ownership on a broad scale, 
especially among employees of the 
public sector (some of whom would 
later move into the private sector). 
Low entry prices and cheap credit ena-
bled this first-generation middle-class, 
known as the ‘home-owning class’ 
房产阶级, to enjoy an unprecedented 
capacity for discretionary spending. 
Later, inflation in housing prices made 
it far harder for the next generation to 
purchase their own home. 
The importance of home own-
ership for Chinese families goes well 
beyond the financial value of the prop-
erty. A recent article in the Guangzhou 
Daily 广州日报 placed the home at the 
centre of a family’s ‘chart of social rela-
tionships’ 社会关系图. Reflecting deep-
ly held popular beliefs, the newspaper 
In April 2014, a Hong Kong man was caught trying to 
cross the border into Shenzhen with US$580,000 taped 
to his body. In general, travellers are only allowed 
to carry up to US$5,000 when entering the mainland 
without submitting a declaration form
Photo: China Daily
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suggested that the location and value 
of a property determine the oppor-
tunities families have. These include 
the quality of elementary schooling to 
which their children have access; the 
type of friends children and adults 
will make and how well-connected 
their social networks will be; access to 
health services and, most importantly 
according to the chart, the marriage-
ability of the families’ sons. However 
retrograde these motivations might 
appear, they undeniably help to shape 
the strategies of middle-class Chinese 
families when it comes to buying a 
home. And satisfying these desires in 
China itself is becoming increasingly 
difficult.
Individuals and young families 
in particular often struggle to gain ac-
cess to the property market. The recent 
combination of inflated prices and re-
strictions on credit to rein in the hous-
ing bubble has forced many to aban-
don their dreams of owning property. 
By 2011, three first-tier Chinese cities 
(Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen) had 
already topped the IMF world rank-
ing for the least affordable housing. 
Beijing’s housing prices were already 
more than twenty-two times higher 
than the average yearly household in-
comes. The same indicator was 6.2 in 
New York and 9.2 in Sydney, two cities 
where housing is considered notori-
ously expensive by local standards. 
Urgent attempts by governments 
to stimulate the construction of mod-
erately priced housing (local govern-
ments allocated US$19 billion in 2014 
for this purpose) are, for the moment, 
failing to make a dent. The low af-
fordability of housing risks hurting 
the bottom line of local governments 
as well. In the first months of 2014, 
numerous municipalities experienced 
a dramatic downturn in sales of land-
use rights to construction companies, 
one of their most important sources 
of public revenue. Some fast growing 
cities like Hangzhou, for example, re-
corded no sale of land rights at all in 
the usually peak month of May.
Low housing affordability en-
courages savings over consumption. 
This damages the prospect that the pri-
vate reserves of Chinese families will 
help stimulate and rebalance the coun-
try’s economy. Chinese families hold 
on to more than fifty percent of their 
income, against a world average of less 
than twenty percent. The contribution 
of consumption to the Chinese GDP is 
still only about thirty-seven percent, 
much lower than the world average 
and a sign that China’s growth is still 
Chinese Students Abroad, by Jeremy Goldkorn
China is the world’s biggest exporter of students. More than three million Chinese travelled 
overseas for educational purposes between 1978 and 2013. In 2013, there were 413,900. 
While this represented a 3.58 percent rise over the previous year, the Chinese Ministry of 
Education reports that this was the first year that the growth rate declined to a single digit 
level after five continuous years of double digit growth. The Chronicle of Higher Education 
reported in August 2014: ‘American graduate schools … reported no rise in offers of admis-
sion to Chinese students, the first time in eight years with no growth’.
Yet the US remained Chinese students’ favoured destination. According to the Ministry 
of Education, in the 2012–2013 school year a total of 235,597 Chinese citizens were study-
ing there. The UK hosted a total of 56,535 Chinese students in the 2012–2013 school year 
and Australia 78,277, though this figure seems to include the 25,000 students reported by 
Chinese media to have been studying in New Zealand in 2012. Chinese media reports that 
another 25,346 Chinese students were enrolled in Canada in 2012. According to Eol.cn, an 
official education portal site, the top destinations for outward bound students are: 
• USA 30%
• UK 21%
• Australia 13%
• Canada 10%
• Hong Kong 7%
• Japan 5% 
• France 4%
• Germany 2%
• Singapore 2%
• South Korea 1%
• Others 5%
The USA is still the top choice for Chinese students seeking an education abroad
Source: usa.chinadaily.com.cn
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too dependent on investment despite 
two decades of consumption stimuli. 
According to one report, the 
‘investable assets’ held by individuals 
in 2012 was about eighty trillion 
yuan, double the amount estimated in 
2008. All indications suggest that the 
wealthiest families hold a large portion 
of these cash savings — and overseas 
investments in property are becoming 
more and more attractive to them. In 
the predictions of the McKinsey Global 
Institute, Chinese family consumption 
will increase from ten to twenty-seven 
trillion yuan annually over the next 
decade. As this fortune moves offshore, 
it also expands the ways in which the 
world depends on China’s growth. 
The amount of money flowing 
into the global property market alone 
is enough to have an effect on the re-
ceiving economies. Hong Kong was an 
early destination for luxury housing 
investments, but prices there can now 
exceed those of even New York, Sydney 
and London, especially since the Hong 
Naked Officials, by Luigi Tomba
After first appearing in a popular blog in 2008, the expression ‘naked official’ entered every-
day language. It describes party and government officials who send their families and, with 
them, large chunks of their suspicious fortunes to Hong Kong or Western countries, includ-
ing, on occasion, tax havens with no extradition treaty with China, without a legitimate 
work-related reason. They acquire residency or citizenship in these places thanks to invest-
ments in real estate or local enterprises, enrolment in educational institutions or other 
forms of contribution to the local economies. 
In January 2014, the Party named naked officials one of the major targets of its anti-cor-
ruption campaign. A central party document warned that for an official to relocate his or her 
family overseas would be enough to block their promotion, if not worse. 
Media commentaries exposed cases of naked officials and criticised them for their ‘lack 
of patriotism’ and commitment to their duties as public servants. The media also stressed 
the importance of family support for the good performance of Chinese public servants. 
But there is no question that the real worry for the government is that any public official 
on a set salary who can afford to send families and patrimonies overseas is doing so with 
ill-gotten gains. 
According to one People’s Bank of China report, 18,000 officials left the country be-
tween 1995 and 2008, taking assets (whether legally or illegally acquired) valued at 800 
billion yuan, and the trend has been on the rise. The assessment of Central Party School 
Professor Lin Zhe 林喆 as reported in Caixin revealed that, from 1995 to 2005, China had 1.8 
million naked officials. 
A prominent recent case was that of Fang Xuan 方旋, Guangzhou’s deputy party secre-
tary, who was forced to retire prematurely in May 2014, only a few weeks before his boss, 
Kong government increased stamp 
duty and introduced new restrictions 
for non-local buyers. 
Chinese investors currently pur-
chase around twelve percent of all 
new residential real estate built in 
Australia, and are expected to invest 
more than AU$44 billion in the Aus-
tralian property market over the next 
seven years. Such investments, mainly 
by private families, will have a signif-
icant impact on the affordability of 
Australian housing. Yet any drying up 
of Chinese investment would likewise 
cast a shadow on the sustainability of 
the Australian construction industry. 
London, meanwhile, has seen an 
increase of 1,500 percent in Chinese 
investments in real estate from 2010 to 
2013 (£54 million to £1 billion). And in 
2014, the Chinese surpassed the Rus-
sians to top the buyers’ list in Manhat-
tan. Out of every one hundred foreign 
home buyers in the USA in 2012, elev-
en were Chinese, up from five percent 
in 2007. 
Wan Qingliang 万庆良, was indict-
ed on much worse charges of cor-
ruption. There followed a wave of 
demotions of officials from other 
cities in Guangdong province for 
the same reason while still others 
scrambled to recall their families 
from overseas to save their ca-
reers. The Guangdong campaign has publically identified 1,000 naked officials as a model 
and a warning for the rest of the country; about 900 of these have reportedly already been 
disciplined or demoted. 
Hu Chunhua 胡春花, the recently appointed Party Secretary of Guangdong, widely seen 
as a front-runner for the top job in Beijing at the next transition, has been particularly zeal-
ous in his implementation of the central government’s anti-corruption drive. He has intro-
duced large scale ‘democratic life meetings’ 民主生活会 for officials who are party members, 
with criticism and self-criticism sessions inspired by Maoist practices to address the con-
cern, first expressed by party leaders in the 1920s and 1930s, that party officials maintain a 
lifestyle compatible with Communist ideology. 
The campaign against naked officials is ‘going global’ as well: ‘Operation Fox Hunt’ (see 
p.223) has reached Australia, where ninety percent of all applicants in Australia’s ‘Signifi- 
cant Investor Visa’ scheme are from the People’s Republic. The Australian Federal Police 
have agreed to collaborate with Chinese authorities to seize the assets of Chinese citizens 
alleged to be laundering the returns of corrupt activities into investments in Australia. 
A ‘naked official’ returns from Canada
Photo: tehparadox.com
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Slower economic growth and 
housing prices at home are also push-
ing corporate real estate capital into 
more profitable markets. In the first 
quarter of 2014, overseas real estate 
investments grew by over twenty-five 
percent. Eighty percent of that growth 
was in the residential market. Many 
Chinese corporate real estate projects 
in Australia and the US, meanwhile, 
target private Chinese investors and 
families. 
Analysts suggest that new regula-
tions that allow large Chinese wealth 
and insurance funds to invest in real 
estate overseas will lead to an even 
greater outflow of managed private 
Chinese investors are dramatically pushing up property prices in Australia. Joe Tan and Elsie Lua bought a 
three-bedroom house in the catchment area for Glen Waverley, a prestigious Secondary College in  
Melbourne, for AU$1,255,000 in December 2013 
Photo: Joe Armao/news.domain.com.au
capital into international real estate 
markets. The recent purchase by Chi-
na’s Ping An Insurance Group, the 
nation’s second-largest insurer, of the 
iconic Lloyds building in London, is 
only the latest symbol of how much 
Chinese capital is affecting the new 
structure of global real estate markets. 
Directly or indirectly, China’s 
private wealth is having a significant 
impact on world consumer markets, 
creating opportunities along with ex-
pectations and anxiety. Chinese fami-
lies often try to maximise the return on 
their investment in overseas education 
by investing in real estate at the same 
time, adding an element of wealth cre-
ation to the net cost of sending chil-
dren to study overseas. According to 
one source in the last five years, the 
percentage of lower middle-class chil-
dren sent overseas to study has moved 
from two to thirty-four percent of the 
total. Another survey suggested that 
the number of families who intend to 
send their children to study abroad 
is already more than forty percent, 
although almost half of all families 
(forty-seven percent) see the financial 
costs as prohibitive.
The overall cost of such degrees 
often greatly surpasses the benefits to 
returnees in a domestic economy in-
creasingly saturated with graduates in 
mid-level positions: it doesn’t always 
pay off in terms of better jobs or high-
er salaries. Faced with a drain on its 
talent, China struggles to lure back its 
overseas graduates. The government 
recently introduced changes to China’s 
‘green card’ system to make it easier for 
established Chinese professionals with 
an international education and foreign 
citizenship, as well as other foreign na-
tionals, to live and work in China.
There has also been a recent 
growth in what is called ‘spiritual con-
sumption’ 精神消费, a cryptic term that 
means the purchase of services (in-
cluding health services, education and 
travel) rather than goods (see Chapter 
5 ‘Urban, Mobile and Global’, p.204). 
Although within China itself, there has 
been a clampdown on the building of 
golf courses to preserve land for more 
productive uses, including agriculture, 
Chinese developers have become in-
terested in golf courses in the US and 
Europe. In those countries, golf cours-
es have seen a steady drop in prices 
and memberships since 2006. Chinese 
investors have stepped in to feed the 
increasing appetites of the new and 
globally mobile middle class for what 
under Mao was a forbidden recrea-
tional activity. 
While China’s wealthy are off 
rescuing the world’s real estate mar-
kets from the financial crisis, contrib-
uting to the funding of world-class 
educational institutions and reviving 
overseas golf courses, some less-privi-
leged Chinese families fight just to get 
their children into school. The recent 
dramatic case of Wang Guangrong 
王光荣, father of four, who committed 
suicide in Guangzhou because he could 
not afford to pay the extra school fees 
imposed on him for a violation of the 
family planning policies, is a stark re-
minder that global mobility is far from 
universal among China’s families.
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IN 2014, FOR THE first time the Chi-nese outnumbered all other foreign 
buyers of real estate in the United 
States, including Arabs and Russians. 
They tripled their investment in Eu-
ropean property, snapped up several 
billion dollar projects in the UK and 
were reported to be driving Australia’s 
overheated property market, where 
house prices grew ten percent across 
the country in the year to 30 June and 
fifteen percent in Sydney. 
According to CLSA, a Hong Kong-
based brokerage and investment ser-
vices firm, the wave of Chinese money 
flowing into the Australian property 
market is ‘phenomenal’. Claiming that 
roughly ten million Chinese families 
are interested in migrating to Austral-
ia, CLSA expects the trend to continue 
for at least three years. In March 2014, 
B U Y I N G  U P  T H E  B LO C K
Jeremy Goldkorn
Wang Jianlin is a Chinese businessman 
and philanthropist. He serves as the 
Chairman of the Dalian Wanda Group, 
China’s largest real estate developer. 
He has a net worth of US$36.6 billion
Photo: image.wanda.cn
the Bank of New Zealand reported that 
in 2013, one out of every four foreign-
ers buying property in New Zealand 
was Chinese, a higher proportion even 
than Australia’s. 
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Chinese buyers are already 
London’s top foreign buyers of luxury 
homes, accounting for six percent of 
all purchases of homes worth over 
£1 million in 2013, according to the 
estate agent Knight Frank. In the US, a 
survey by the National Association of 
Realtors estimated that Chinese buyers 
spent US$22 billion on residential 
property in the year to March 2014, up 
from US$12.8 billion the year before. 
More than half of that was spent in 
California, Washington State and New 
York. In response, the US property 
website Zillow began publishing its 
entire property database in Chinese. 
In Europe, where the focus of Chi-
nese buyers has been on commercial 
real estate, Chinese buyers tripled their 
investment to €3.05 billion in the year 
to January 2014, according to Real Cap-
ital Analytics. Much of the activity was 
in London, which saw several flagship 
deals in 2014, including the insurance 
group China Life’s purchase of a seven-
ty percent stake in one of the Canary 
Wharf towers in June. The trend is like-
ly to continue: in January, Wang Jian-
lin, the head of Dalian Wanda and in 
2014 China’s second richest man after 
Alibaba’s Jack Ma (see Chapter 3 ‘The 
Chinese Internet: Unshared Destiny’, 
p.106), pledged to invest £3 billion in 
real estate projects in the UK. On the 
other side of the Atlantic, US commer-
cial real estate investments continue 
to attract Chinese money: the Bei-
jing-based Anbang Insurance Group 
announced in early October that it had 
agreed to pay the Hilton hotel group 
US$1.95 billion for the storied Waldorf 
Astoria hotel on Park Avenue.
A postcard depicting the iconic Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City c.1850–1920, which was acquired by the 
Beijing-based Anbang Insurance Group in 2014
Source: Harper Stereograph Collection, Boston Public Library, on Flickr
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FOLLOWING THE END of the Cultur-al Revolution (1964–1978), when 
the first large groups of immigrants 
from China began to settle in the US, 
Canada, Australia and elsewhere, TV 
shows and films have documented 
and reflected on the motivations and 
challenges of emigration, a politically 
loaded subject. 
The first to make a real splash was 
the highly popular 1993 twenty-one 
part television series A Beijing Man in 
New York 北京人在纽约, which told the 
story of a Beijing musician, Wang Qi- 
ming 王起明 (played by Jiang Wen 
姜文), who moves to New York to pur-
sue his dreams of fame. In one scene, 
Wang, who has earned his fortune but 
lost his values and his family, showers 
a blonde Caucasian prostitute with 
dollar bills as he has sex with her. He 
tells her to say ‘I love you’. The scene, 
and the series as a whole, sparked 
much discussion about the superiority/
inferiority complex with which many 
Chinese people viewed the West and 
America in particular, Chinese male 
behaviour and notions of cultural pu-
rity and contamination. 
Other TV shows and movies about 
this period also describe the struggle of 
Chinese in the US to cope with — or re-
bel against — their low socioeconomic 
status there as well as cultural clashes. 
The 2001 film The Gua Sha Treatment 
刮痧 tells the story of a grandfather 
who gives his American-born grand-
son a traditional Chinese medical cure, 
gua sha, that involves scraping the skin 
with a hard object. But the marks on 
the child’s skin lead people to accuse 
his daughter of child abuse. 
C H I N E S E  FA M I L I E S  G OI N G 
G LO B A L  I N  P O P U L A R  C U LT U R E
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Reflections on the motivations and challenges of emigration: The 
highly popular 1993 twenty-one part television series A Beijing Man in 
New York 北京人在纽约, tells the story of a Beijing musician, Wang  
Qi-Ming 王起明 who moves to New York to pursue his dreams of fame 
Photo: icba.com
The twenty-five episode New 
World 新大陆, a Sino-American co- 
production first screened in 1995, 
depicted the challenges faced by the 
earliest migrants in the 1980s, includ-
ing students working in Chinese res-
taurants to survive. 
The 2001 Dangerous Journey 危
险旅程 (originally titled Tou Du Ke 偷
渡客) a twenty-six part TV series shot 
in China, the US and New Zealand tells 
the grim tale of a woman (played by 
Wang Ji 王姬)  who becomes a ‘snake-
head’ (people smuggler).
The most recent wave of mi-
grants, from 2000 to the present, has 
largely comprised China’s middle 
class, skilled workers and their fam-
ilies. Films such as Farewell, Vancou-
ver 别了, 温哥华 shot in 2003 and the 
2008 TV series Couple’s Time Lag 夫妻
时差 echo familiar themes of cultural 
maladjustment, but the characters are 
finally on an equal footing with their 
new neighbours, no longer broke or 
linguistically and culturally inept. 
In films like the hugely popular 2012 
comedy Lost in Thailand 人再囧途之
泰囧, the foreign country is an exotic 
locale for adventure while the 2013 
romantic comedy Finding Mr Right 
北京遇上西雅图 is set in Beijing and 
Seattle, to which the female protag-
onist Jiajia 佳佳 (played by Tang Wei 
汤唯) flies to give birth to the child of 
her married tycoon boyfriend back in 
China, but falls in love with a Chinese 
doctor now driving a taxi in Seattle: 
it’s complicated. 
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YAO  M I N G ,  W I L D L I F E 
P R OT E C TO R
ONE OF CHINA’S best-known celeb-rities, retired basketball superstar 
Yao Ming 姚明, has teamed up with do-
mestic animal activists, as well as with 
international organisations such as 
WildAid, African Wildlife Foundation 
and Save the Elephants to campaign 
against the illegal wildlife trade. 
Yao’s environmental activism 
began in 2006 when he joined a Wil-
dAid campaign targeting the massive 
Chinese consumption of shark fin soup 
鱼翅羹, a traditional delicacy in south-
ern Chinese cuisine but that involves 
great cruelty to sharks and endangers 
their population. Coupled with an offi-
cial State Council ban on the consump-
tion of shark fin and other expensive 
delicacies at lavish official banquets, 
the efforts of Yao, along with Jackie 
Chan and other celebrities, have re-
sulted in a fifty to seventy percent de-
crease in the prices and sales of shark 
fins in China, according to a survey re-
leased in August 2014. 
Since 2012, Yao has also used 
his considerable public influence to 
call for an end to the brutal practice 
of bear bile farming 熊胆. Bear bile, 
used in traditional Chinese medicine, 
is extracted from Asiatic black bears 
through the ‘free drip’ extraction 
method, in which farmers drill a per-
manent hole into the bear’s abdomen 
and gall bladder to allow bile to be 
tapped — a hideously painful process. 
The bears are also confined in cages. 
Yao now wants to persuade Chi-
na’s nouveau riche to give up the 
deeply rooted tradition of collecting 
and presenting as gifts lavishly carved 
elephant tusks and rhinoceros horns. 
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He launched the ‘Say No to Ivory’ and the ‘Say No to Rhino Horn’ campaigns 
with WildAid and Save the Elephants in April 2013 and, in March 2014, during a 
speech at the opening session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference, of which he is a member, Yao called for a Chinese government ban on 
ivory sales. The End of the Wild 野性的终结, a documentary that follows Yao into 
the heart of Africa’s wildlife conservation crisis, aired on state broadcaster CCTV 
in August 2014. 
Basketball superstar Yao Ming campaigns against the illegal wildlife trade. The End of the Wild is a documentary 
that follows Yao into the heart of Africa’s wildlife conservation crisis. It was first aired on CCTV in August 2014
Photo: onehourlife.com
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S H A R E D  A I R ,  S H A R E D  D E S T I N Y 
Wuqiriletu
Breathing Together, Struggling 
Together 
On 25 February 2014, the concentration 
of fine particulate matter, known as 
PM2.5, reached 400 micrograms per cu-
bic metre of air in Beijing, hazardous by 
the standards of both the American En-
vironmental Protection Agency and Chi-
na’s own air quality index system. That 
same smoggy day, President Xi Jinping 
made an unannounced visit to a lane off 
the popular tourist street of Nanluogux-
iang in the captial, talking with the peo-
ple who lived there. The news report 
on his visit was subtitled ‘breathing the 
same air and sharing the common fate’
同呼吸,共命运. 
A slightly different slogan, 
‘breathing the same air and sharing 
the common struggle’ 同呼吸,共奋斗 
was China’s theme for the 2013 World 
Environment Day. At that time, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection 
called on all citizens to do their part to 
protect the environment, and to realise 
the dream of a beautiful China with a 
blue sky, green earth and clean water. 
On 10 September 2013, the State 
Council issued its Air Pollution Preven-
25 February 2014: Xi Jinping ‘breathing the same air 
and sharing the common fate’ 
Source: talk.takungpao.com
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tion Action Plan 大气污染防治行动计划 
for implementation at the level of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. The action plan links 
air quality to the health of China’s cit-
izens, economic development, social 
stability and the Chinese Dream. At the 
same time, it emphasises that it could 
take five years to improve the air qual-
ity in the regions of Beijing, Tianjin 
and Hebei province; the Yangtze River 
Delta and the Pearl River Delta. It may 
take much longer to improve the air 
quality in the country as a whole. The 
ultimate goal for Beijing is to reduce 
the yearly average density of fine par-
ticulate matter to sixty micrograms per 
cubic metre.
In order to achieve its targets, 
the action plan lists ten policies, re-
ferred to as the National Ten 国十条. 
They cover the treatment of sewage, 
industrial restructuring along envi-
ronmental principles, technological 
innovation, energy structure, energy 
saving and environmental protection, 
environmental and economic man-
agement, legal supervision, regional 
co-operation, monitoring and early 
warning of pollution events, the estab-
lishment of clear lines of responsibility 
and the mass mobilisation of the popu-
lace. The action plan stresses the need 
for broad social participation: a shared 
struggle to improve the quality of air 
that everyone breathes. 
In January 2014, the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and the 
thirty-one provinces, autonomous re-
gions and municipalities signed ‘The 
Air Pollution control target responsi-
bility book’ 大气污染防治目标责任书, 
pledging to work towards the plan’s 
goals.
Hebei province’s Yanzhao Metrop-
olis Daily 燕赵都市报 called the book a 
good starting point — it showed good-
will and commitment. On the other 
hand, the paper warned that other ac-
tion plans, on national housing policy, 
for example, had become little more 
than slogans. It advocated strengthen-
ing the system of accountability. 
In the Same Boat 吴越同舟
Air and air pollution respect no bor-
ders. When air pollution levels rise 
in China, neighbouring countries are 
affected, particularly in the northeast. 
In fact, for some years airborne par-
ticulates traceable back to China have 
been discovered by monitoring sta-
tions as far away as California. On that 
same February day that Beijing PM2.5 
levels reached 400, the South Korean 
capital Seoul reported a concentration 
of atmospheric pollutants two to three 
times the usual level. According to Ja-
pan’s Ministry of the Environment, 
more than ten municipalities in Japan 
issued air pollution warnings on 26 
February. 
Officials from South Korea and 
Japan have expressed a willingness 
to work together with China to re-
duce PM2.5. Some Japanese media 
outlets have used the old saying ‘Wu 
and Yue — in the same boat’ 吴越同
舟 to describe how former enemies 
can put aside their points of difference 
to work for the common good. On 20 
March 2014, environmental protection 
officials and atmospheric pollution 
experts from Japan, China and South 
Korea gathered in Beijing for the first 
time to discuss co-operative meas-
ures to control air pollution. About 
a month later, on 28–29 April, Daegu 
city in South Korea hosted the six-
teenth two-day, tripartite meeting of 
environment ministers from China, 
South Korea and Japan. 
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‘Chindia’ 中印大同
China, the United States of America, the European Union and India are 
the world’s biggest contributors to global emissions, generating more than 
half of global greenhouse gases in 2013. Yet neither President Xi Jinping 
of China nor Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India were among the 120 
heads of state who attended the United Nations Climate Summit held on 
23 September 2014 in New York, where one of the main topics was reduc-
ing greenho se gas emissions. Xi did, however, send Vice-Premier Zhang 
Gaoli as his special envoy. 
On  we k before the Summit, China’s State Council approved the 
Goals Provinces, cities, districts
Average annual reduc-
tion target of PM2.5 
concentration
-25% Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei
-20% Shanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang
-15% Guangdong, Chongqing
-10% Inner Mongolia
Average annual reduc-
tion target of PM10 
concentration
-15% Henan, Shanxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang
-12% Gansu, Hubei
-10% Sichuan, Liaoning, Jilin, Hunan, Anhui, 
Ningxia
-5% Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guizhou,  
Heilongjiang
Continuous 
improvement 
Hainan, Tibet, Yunnan
GOALS OF THE ACTION PLAN by REGION
2014 Conclusion.indd   362 3/09/2015   1:08 pm
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South Korea had first proposed 
an annual meeting of environmental 
ministers, and it hosted the first one 
in 1999. The three countries take turns 
to host the summit. During the 2014 
meeting, Li Ganjie 李干杰, China’s Dep-
uty Minister of Environmental Pro-
tection met with Yoon Seon-kyu, the 
Korean Minister for the Environment 
and Ishihara Nobuteru, the Japanese 
Minister to discuss issues including 
atmospheric pollution and climate 
change. Yoon Seon-kyu said that air 
pollution problems are already affect-
ing people’s health in the three coun-
tries. 
The meeting concluded with a 
five-year agreement on priority areas 
of co-operation: air quality, biodiver-
sity, the disposal of electronic waste, 
climate change, the protection of vil-
lage environments and the protection 
of water and sea environments. The 
three countries also decided to hold 
regular meetings devoted to issues 
related to the atmosphere. (The first 
meeting had in fact already been held 
in March in Beijing; the second will 
take place in South Korea). The three 
countries will promote further col-
laboration among local governments, 
enterprises and research institutions, 
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9 October 2014: Pollution from north-eastern China blows over the Bohai Sea on its way to Korea and Japan
Source: earthobservatory.nasa.gov
Spot the difference: Beijing National Stadium (‘The Bird’s Nest’)
Photo: Jeffrey Kesler
and share technologies and informa-
tion on controlling carbon emissions. 
Ishihara Nobuteru and Yoon 
Seon-kyo also agreed to share infor-
mation on PM2.5 levels and conduct 
scientific research on trans-border air 
pollution, encouraging China to join 
in. Li Ganjie, who blamed China’s air 
pollution on long-term industrialisa-
tion, indicated that China’s attitude 
is positive and open to three-sided 
or bilateral co-operation with South 
Korea and Japan.
A Rumour in Inner Mongolia 
On 18 May 2014, a newspaper in Beijing 
reported that 300 polluting enterprises 
would move out of Beijing by October. 
The newspaper said that Beijing would 
ban twelve high-polluting industries 
such as lime, stone, architectural ce-
ramics, casting, forging, printing and 
dyeing from the city. These would 
move to nearby cities in Hebei, around 
Tianjin and in Inner Mongolia once 
they had upgraded their technologies 
to eliminate or ameliorate pollution.  
The news spread fear through 
the communities surrounding Beijing. 
People worried that the industries that 
had polluted Beijing would now move 
en masse and un-reconstructed, to pol-
lute their hometowns. A microblog-
ger in Inner Mongolia who posted a 
protest against what he (mistakenly) 
described as ‘three hundred polluted 
enterprises moving from Beijing to 
Inner Mongolia’. He wrote: ‘An indi-
vidual may be powerless, but united, 
our power is infinite … our hometown 
is not a garbage dump! Please forward 
this message, friends of Inner Mongo-
lia, so that our children can breathe 
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clean air. Thank you!’ Arrested for 
spreading rumours, the authorities 
sentenced the microblogger to ten days 
of administrative detention and a fine 
of 500 yuan. Inner Mongolia was keen 
to make clear that it was not about to 
share Beijing’s destiny, at least not in 
terms of air pollution. 
‘Chindia’ 中印大同
China, the United States of America, 
the European Union and India are the 
world’s biggest contributors to global 
emissions, generating more than half 
of global greenhouse gases in 2013. Yet 
neither President Xi Jinping of China 
nor Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
of India were among the 120 heads of 
state who attended the United Nations 
Climate Summit held on 23 September 
2014 in New York, where one of the 
main topics was reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Xi did, however, send 
Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli 张高丽 as 
his special envoy. 
One week before the Summit, 
China’s State Council approved 
the ‘National Climate Change Plan 
(2014–2020)’ 国家应对气候变化规划 
(2014–2020), which pledges that by 
2020 China will reduce its carbon 
emissions per unit of GDP by forty to 
forty-five percent from 2005 levels. 
At the UN summit, Zhang Gaoli 
stressed that China is committed to 
working with international partners 
to respond actively to the challenge of 
climate change. Zhang promised that 
China would soon be announcing its 
post-2020 plan. Zhang also said that 
China would energetically promote 
South–South co-operation on climate 
change and provide US$6 million to 
support the United Nations Secretary 
General in advancing this co-operation. 
Furthermore, China would double its 
financial support from next year with 
the establishment of a co-operation 
fund.
The Chinese government has 
long been criticial of the domination 
of international negotiations on cli-
mate change by developed countries. 
South–South co-operation enables a 
strategic alliance between China and 
other developing or newly industri-
alised countries to resist what they 
consider to be unreasonable pressure 
from developed countries. In 2009, a 
Chinese government initiative united 
China, Brazil, South Africa and India 
in BASIC 基础四国. BASIC is a collec-
tive of newly industrialised countries 
committed to acting jointly on climate 
change. A month before the UN Cli-
mate Summit 2014, New Delhi host-
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ed the eighteenth BASIC Ministerial 
Meeting on Climate Change, which 
reaffirmed the importance of the prin-
ciple of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. 
A week later, Chinese Vice- 
Premier Zhang Gaoli met with rep-
resentatives of ‘developing countries 
with similar positions’ 立场相近的发
展中国家. Chief among these is India. 
Zhang Gaoli at the United Nations Climate Summit in September 2014
Source: news.cn
China has consistently advocated a 
joint strategy and a united voice for 
what the Chinese call Zhong Yin datong 
中印大同 (loosely, ‘the Sino-Indian 
Commonwealth’) and Indian MP 
Jairam Ramesh has named ‘Chindia’.  
It is clear that the issue of air pollution 
is one of shared destiny with India, 
as it is with China’s neighbours to the 
northeast — and the world at large.
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THE SWORD OF DISCIPLINE AND THE 
DAGGER OF JUSTICE
Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi
XI JINPING AND THE PARTY leadership have 
been reshaping China’s justice and security agendas 
to strengthen both the authoritarian rule of the Party 
and the authoritarian rule of law. They advocate 
what they call ‘rule of law thinking’ 法治思维 to 
rebuild public trust in the country’s politico-legal 
institutions, which include courts, procuratorates 
(the institutions encompassing public investigators 
and prosecutors), police, national security and para-
policing agencies. This is a strategic shift, following 
a decade of weiwen 维稳, or ‘Stability Maintenance’, 
a political program closely associated with the Hu 
Jintao–Wen Jiabao era that covers a range of politico-
legal activities aimed at preventing and/or breaking 
up collective protests and dealing with court cases 
raised by individual complainants.
Image: A drug dealer being sentenced in a public trial
Source: Aly Song/fofg.org
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At the height of its use in the mid- to late 2000s, and as discussed in previ-
ous China Story Yearbooks, the weiwen program gave local courts consid-
erable flexibility in resolving civil and administrative disputes, encour-
aging judicial mediation over litigation. Mediation arguably favours the 
interests of local government and local developers more than it does those 
of the complainants. This trend, often referred to as the ‘localisation of 
justice’, fostered judicial corruption and errors of justice, further fuelling 
the very discontent and instability that weiwen was meant to quell (see 
the China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, Chapter 4 ‘Under Rule of 
Law’, p.202). 
Xi Jinping’s idea of Shared Destiny within China is based on the re-
quirement of ‘unity of thought’ 统一思想, especially in relation to social 
and political problems that may threaten stability. In promoting the rule 
of law, he seeks to create a strong underlying judicial and legal framework 
that will encourage public trust in the legal system and enhance the effi-
cacy of the current political structure. Rebuilding the credibility of polit-
ico-legal institutions is a declared objective of reforms across the justice 
spectrum. The party leadership has demanded that all of China’s courts, 
prosecution, police, national security and para-policing agencies work 
together towards this goal, which aims not just to ensure public security 
(and the security of the Party) but also to create a stable environment in 
which the Party can carry out its ambitious economic reform agenda.  
Party-inspired ‘unity of thought’ is by definition largely intolerant of 
pluralism and dissent. This can make for a seemingly uneasy relationship 
with rule of law thinking: at the same time that Chinese leaders are seek-
ing to strengthen judicial institutions to inspire popular trust in the pro-
cess of law, they are cracking down on public expressions of dissent, in-
cluding those that some would argue fall within the legal or constitutional 
rights of Chinese citizens. In late 2013, for example, the government crim-
inalised the online spreading of rumours by including such behaviour 
within the definition of the crime of defamation. Arresting independent-
ly-minded public intellectuals and pro-human rights lawyers such as 
Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 in the lead-up to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
1989 Protest Movement was also, presumably, a pre-emptive strike to dis-
courage disunity in thought and practice over this sensitive period.
The Handle of the Dagger
Xi Jinping requires unity in practice as well as thought within the nation’s 
justice and security agencies. As noted above, from late 2012, Xi’s leader-
ship has downplayed the ‘Stability Maintenance’ strategy of Hu Jintao. In 
late 2013 and in 2014, the Party moved to strengthen its central oversight 
of the administration of law and justice. 
The party leadership was aware that it had to win back the hearts 
and minds of people whose trust in the law had been seriously eroded 
by political and judicial corruption, and who had become more inclined 
to seek justice through collective protests and petitions than through the 
legal system. ‘Unity of thinking’ on law and justice thus seeks to shift pub-
lic understanding of the locale of justice from 
the streets back to officially regulated spaces 
within the legal system.
 In his keynote address at the National 
Conference on Politico-legal Work on 8 Jan-
uary 2014, Xi Jinping who, as noted earlier, 
heads the new National Security Commis-
sion and Central Leading Group for Internet 
Security among other posts, declared that 
China’s politico-legal organs need more than 
ever before to play a pivotal role in bring-
ing about sustainable economic growth and 
social stability. Over the coming years, he 
said, introducing a key new metaphor, polit-
ico-legal organs will be required to act as the 
The term ‘the handle of the dagger’ 
became popular after Xi Jinping 
used it in his keynote address at the 
2014 National Conference on Polit-
ico-legal Work. The term implies a 
battle: a fight against corruption, 
dissent and terrorism
Photo: Weibo/chinadigitaltimes.net
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BIG GAME: FIVE ‘TIGERS’, by Jeremy Goldkorn
Liu Tienan 刘铁男
In December 2012, just one month after Xi Jinping took over the 
reins of the Communist Party, Liu Tienan, former vice-chairman 
of the National Energy Administration, was the first big tiger to 
fall. Luo Changping 罗昌平, the deputy editor of the financial 
magazine Caijing 财经, used his Sina Weibo account to accuse 
Liu of faking his academic credentials, taking kickbacks, having 
a mistress — and threatening to kill her. 
Liu denied the allegations. But it seemed the authorities had 
already placed him under investigation. The following month 
they detained his son for corrupt business dealings, sacked Liu 
from his official position in March 2013 and then arrested him in 
May along with his wife who was also allegedly part of his illicit 
schemes. At his trial in September 2014 in Langfang, Hebei, the 
prosecution accused Liu of taking 35.6 million yuan in bribes. 
He was dismissed from the Party but no sentence has been an-
nounced.
Gu Junshan 谷俊山
In March 2014, General Gu Junshan, the former deputy head of 
the PLA Logistics Department, faced charges of bribery, embez-
zlement and abuse of power. No further details were provided, 
but General Gu, a farmer’s son from Henan province, had report-
edly been at the heart of PLA corruption for many years, collect-
ing kickbacks from military contracts and presiding over a land 
development racket.
General Liu Yuan 刘源, the Political Commissar of the Logis-
tics Department and the man in charge of cleaning up corruption 
in the department, first tried to bring General Gu down in late 
2011. At the time, he encountered significant resistance, accord-
ing to The New York Times.
Xu Caihou 徐才厚
The fall of Gu Junshan exposed an even bigger tiger: General Xu Caihou, the Vice-Chair-
man of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and son of factory workers from Liaoning 
province. It is alleged that the practice of buying and selling promotions was rife during 
General Xu’s term on the CMC (which ended in 2013). Expelled from the Communist Party in 
June 2014, the onetime Politburo member would face trial for taking bribes and abusing the 
powers of his office, although it was not certain he will face the courts as he is reportedly 
critically ill with bladder cancer. 
In March 2014, General Gu 
Junshan faced charges of 
bribery, embezzlement and 
abuse of power
Photo: wenweipo.com
In September 2014, former 
vice-chairman of the National 
Energy Administration Liu 
Tienan was dismissed from 
the Party for alledgedly 
accepting 35.6 million yuan 
in bribes
Photo: news.163.com
Jiang Jiemin 蒋洁敏
In June 2014, the Party expelled Jiang Jiemin, who until re-
cently had been the chairman of China’s largest state oil 
company, China National Petroleum Corporation, from its 
ranks. From March 2013, Jiang had also been the director 
of the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission, the body that supervises China’s largest 
government-run businesses. He was abruptly removed 
from both posts six months later and disappeared into the 
hands of investigators. Four other senior oil executives 
vanished along with him at the time of writing. No charges 
had been laid. But it appeared that the investigations were 
part of the preparation for the case that would be made 
against the former Politburo Standing Committee mem-
ber Zhou Yongkang, for Jiang was one of Zhou’s prominent 
associates.
Zhou Yongkang 周永康
Xi Jinping and the anti-corruption investigators have ap-
proached the biggest tiger of them all, the first Politburo 
Standing Committee member to face investigation in dec-
ades, with extreme caution. The son of an eel fisherman 
from Jiangsu province, Zhou rose through the oil industry 
to eventually take charge of China’s security apparatus, 
including its law courts. Anti-corruption investigators first 
detained several of his key allies, including not only Jiang 
Jiemin, but also Li Chuncheng 李春城, the former deputy 
party secretary of Sichuan, and Li Dongsheng 李东生, a 
former deputy public security minister.
They then began detaining members of his family, 
including his son Zhou Bin 周斌 and his daughter-in-law 
Huang Wan 黄婉. Finally, in July 2014, state media formally 
announced that Zhou himself was being investigated for 
corruption. Several state media editorials promised that 
Zhou was far from the last tiger in the campaign’s sights. 
In June 2014, the Party expelled 
Jiang Jiemin, who was the chair-
man of China’s largest state oil 
company
Photo: finance.sina.com.cn
In July 2014, former Politburo 
Standing Committee member Zhou 
Yongkang was investigated for 
corruption
Photo: polymerhk.com
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‘dagger-handle’ of the Party 党的刀把子. This language implies a battle: 
a fight against corruption, dissent and terrorism. (For the etymology of 
the term, see Chapter 4 ‘Destiny’s 
Mixed Metaphors’, p.146ff.)
While the Party’s leader wields 
the metaphorical dagger, in the 
words of China’s anti-corruption 
chief Wang Qishan, the Discipline 
and Inspection Commission (the 
internal party agency that inves-
tigates corrupt party members) 
wields the ‘Sword of Damocles’. 
Tony Saich, a scholar whose re-
search focuses on Chinese politics and governance, has labelled this ‘the 
most ambitious anti-corruption campaign since at least Mao’s days’. Some 
Chinese commentators describe the goal in language reminiscent of the 
Cultural Revolution: to ‘sweep away all monsters and demons’ 横扫一切
牛鬼蛇神.
The use of Maoist rhetoric, including terminology such as ‘dag-
ger-handle’, may seem incongruent with rule of law thinking; Mao, after 
all, referred to the politico-legal system as the ‘tool of the proletarian dicta-
torship’. The prominent Hangzhou-born commentator Qian Gang , direc-
tor of the China Media Project at Hong Kong University, was among those 
analysts taken aback by Xi’s use of Maoist terminology. Qian distinguishes 
between ‘light red’ discourse such as the ‘China Dream’ and harder core 
‘deep red’ Maoist terminology, noting: ‘A dagger-handle is what greets us 
when we open the door to 2014.’ This ‘deep-red’ metaphor informs Xi’s 
political approach to reform and indicates his determination to conquer 
entrenched socio-political problems left over from the time of Hu Jintao, 
who supported high-speed economic growth at any cost.  
Wang Qishan serves as Secretary of the Central Com-
mission for Discipline Inspection and is the public 
face of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign
Photo: gbtimes.com
The Fourth Plenum’s Rule of Law Ideology
Rule of law is now the Party’s umbrella term that signifies its overall gov-
ernance intentions for the next eight years. The Xi Jinping leadership seeks 
to build its legitimacy and to improve its legal system not by distancing the 
Party from the affairs of the justice system, but the very opposite. This 
clearly emerges from the resolutions issued after the Third and Fourth 
Plenums of the Eighteenth Party Congress in, respectively, November 2013 
and October 2014. Both documents reiterated Xi Jinping’s focus on the rule 
of law and the re-invigoration of the authority of the Party in Beijing. 
The Party will enhance its oversight of legal and governmental insti-
tutions so that they operate within a tight ‘Rule of Law Framework’ 法治
的框架内, as Premier Li Keqiang puts it, and implement policy from the 
top down. The Resolution of the Party’s Fourth Plenum (CCP Central Com-
mittee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions on Comprehensively 
Advancing the Country in Accordance with the Law issued on 28 October 
2014), states that the Party’s supremacy and socialist rule of law are com-
patible 党的领导和社会主义法治是一致的. In fact, the document insists 
that the Party will now ‘implement its leadership role through the rule of 
law’ 把党的领导贯彻到以法治国.
Rule of law discourse also has an important ideological role to play. 
The Party intends it to guide both the thoughts and behaviour of the citi-
zenry and their political masters alike. To this end, the Resolution intro-
duces the idea of integrating two principles of governance: ‘ruling the na-
tion in accord with the law’ 以法治国 and ‘ruling the nation in accord with 
virtue’ 以德治国. The latter intends to foster a sense of morality in Chinese 
society and state. At the same time, the Party intends to ‘rule the nation 
in accord with the law’ by making central, provincial and local party po-
litico-legal committees responsible for unifying thought and action in the 
realm of law and politics. They are to do this by ‘standardising’ judicial 
decision-making and improving the transparency and credibility of the 
judicial process. 
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 The Resolution includes mention of the Constitution because the ide-
ological principles established in the Preamble of the Constitution explicit-
ly give the Party the leading political role in governing China. The Pream-
ble ostensibly places the Party above all laws and other provisions in the 
Constitution. 
Recentralising the Nexus of Law and Politics
Xi’s push for the rule of law had begun to gather pace from mid-2013 on-
wards, culminating in the Resolution of October 2014.  A succession of 
statements by Xi in 2013, a series of Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and the 
Party’s Central Politico-Legal Commission (CPLC) reform announcements 
from July to October 2013, and the Party Congress Third Plenum Resolu-
tion of November 2013 revealed plans to ‘de-localise’ justice agendas and 
to ‘re-centralise’ party, SPC and politico-legal power. Key phrases coming 
out of the Third and the Fourth Plenums included: ‘transparency’, ‘super-
vision’, ‘institutionalisation, standardisation and proceduralisation’, ‘judi-
cial openness’, ‘judicial independence’, ‘judicial fairness and credibility’, 
‘standardising judicial decision-making’ and ‘preventing miscarriages of 
justice’. 
The overall focus is on promoting stronger oversight of political 
and judicial authorities at the local level. In July 2013, the Party’s main 
law-and-order body, the CPLC, issued a strongly-worded directive, titled 
Provisions on Preventing Miscarriages of Justice 防止冤假错案, aimed at 
thwarting abuses of power and miscarriages of justice in local courts. The 
Chinese law expert Jerome Cohen describes the directive as ‘stunning’ in 
scope, and largely empty of ideological clichés. The Provisions ‘go beyond 
the [usual] recitation of relevant norms’, Cohen says, to specify how the 
Party expects prosecutors to supervise the work of police and judges; how 
judges must withstand pressure from local interests (whose main concern 
is likely to be maintaining social stability) during the adjudication pro-
cess; and how party politico-legal committees, which 
will still coordinate the work of the courts, police and 
prosecutors, must refrain from interfering in judicial 
decision-making. 
The Provisions and other reform documents 
published in 2013 and 2014, including the new SPC 
five-year plan for court reform issued on 9 July 2014, 
indicate that the SPC has made a priority of recon-
figuring central-local judicial decision-making so the 
centre can exercise greater control over local courts. 
They list important justice reforms such as shifting responsibility for re-
sourcing courts from the local to the provincial level. This move makes 
it much harder for local political authorities to threaten local judges and 
courts with withdrawing revenue in order to obtain favourable outcomes 
in administrative and civil disputes with local residents. The SPC intends 
to limit judicial discretion and inconsistency — especially in administra-
tive or civil disputes that touch on social stability concerns — while en-
hancing transparency, including by posting judgments on court websites. 
Reform documents strongly encourage courts to ‘unify’ 统一 their 
decision-making. To this end, the SPC has stepped up its case guidance 
system, promoting a number of model cases that illustrate best practice. 
These models enable local courts to ‘standardise’ 规范化 disparate and un-
even decision-making to achieve greater consistency in adjudicating and 
sentencing. This will make it possible to declare with confidence that ‘sim-
ilar judgments are made in similar cases’ 同案同判 across the nation: unity 
of thinking and action within the justice system.
Enhancing Judicial Accountability 
The SPC employs a number of high-profile reformist judges, including its 
President, Zhou Qiang 周强, and Deputy President, Shen Deyong 沈德咏, 
Jerome A Cohen is an 
expert on Chinese law and 
an advocate of human 
rights in China
Photo: its.law.nyu.edu
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
Th
e 
Sw
or
d 
of
 D
is
ci
pl
in
e 
an
d 
th
e 
D
ag
ge
r o
f J
us
tic
e
Su
sa
n 
Tr
ev
as
ke
s 
an
d 
El
is
a 
N
es
so
si
272
273
who are both keen to abandon the Stability Maintenance practices (in-
cluding the ‘aggressive mediation’ detailed above) that have sullied the 
reputation of courts in recent years. To this end, Xi Jinping has ordered 
politico-legal officials to ‘carry the sword of justice and the scales of equal-
ity’. The courts must safeguard social justice and equality, while protecting 
people’s interests.
 Three important SPC opinions promulgated in late 2013 bring into 
sharp relief the reforms that the SPC and the Party intend to pursue in the 
coming years:
• Opinion on Improving Judicial Credibility (28 October 2013)
• Opinion on Improving Judicial Transparency (21 November 2013)
• Opinion on Preventing Miscarriages of Justice (21 November 2013).
While these Opinions do not carry the same weight as law, they are 
nevertheless important indicators of a change in the general direction of 
legal development in China. The Opinion on Improving Judicial Credibility 
unveils the broad agendas for judicial reform. It appeals to judges to focus 
on ‘justice for the people’ and practical changes in the work style of the 
courts, as stated above: limiting judicial discretion and standardising and 
‘unifying’ judicial decision-making in order to discourage venal practices 
that have led to the favouring of the interests of local developers and gov-
ernment over those of local citizens.
Among the model cases posted by the SPC in early 2014 are seven new 
cases relating to the ‘livelihood of the masses’. In one, the litigant sought 
compensation for the forced demolition of a property; another dealt with 
a copyright infringement case. There is also a judicial review case involv-
ing a farmer’s complaint about water pollution and another involving two 
men pursuing compensation for wrongful incarceration. 
The Opinion on Improving Judicial Transparency announced ‘three 
platforms of openness’: judicial transparency in regard to trials in process; 
the disclosure of case results; and the disclosure of information regarding 
the enforcing of court verdicts. It involves providing general information 
on court websites about provisions 
and procedures relating to litiga-
tion processes, documents, fees, 
risks and alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms such as media-
tion. 
The Opinion on Preventing 
Miscarriages of Justice, meanwhile, 
confirms provisions made in the 
revised 2012 Criminal Procedure 
Law on excluding evidence obtained through torture and other illegal 
means. It requires judges to follow strictly legal procedures and reminds 
courts of appeal that they are responsible for counterchecking judgments 
in cases where the evidence was sketchy or the facts unclear. It also pro-
vides for senior judges to adjudicate in cases involving capital punish-
ment. (The number of executions carried out each year remains a state 
secret.) The Opinion also attempts to put a halt to the trend over the last 
decade of courts and judges sometimes acquiescing to populist demands 
— especially when state officials are perceived to have provoked suspects 
or defendants to violent acts of revenge. The Opinion on Preventing Mis-
carriages of Justice declares that: ‘people’s courts … should not make any 
judgments that contravene the law under the pressure of public opinion 
or of involved parties’ appeals, or in the name of “maintaining social sta-
bility” ’.
An example is the case of Xia Junfeng 夏俊峰, an unlicensed street 
vendor arrested in 2009 for the murder of two chengguan 城管 (urban law 
enforcement officers). Xia alleged that the chengguan had beaten him and 
that he acted in self-defence (see Forum ‘The Execution of Street Vendor 
Xia Junfeng’, p.300). The SPC came under considerable popular pressure 
not to approve Xia’s execution but it refused to bow to public sentiment.
On the other hand, following continued public outcry over scandals 
involving the treatment of petitioners in ‘reprimand centres’ and ‘black 
The execution of street vendor Xia Junfeng 
for killing two chengguan, urban law enforce-
ment officers, sparked an outcry on Chinese 
social media sites
Photo: Xinhuanet.com
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jails’, in February 2014 the Party’s Central Committee and the State Council 
introduced new guidelines for reforming and regularising the way that 
politico-legal institutions deal with petitioners voicing grievances against 
officials and calling for redress. The document stresses the importance of 
the rule of law in handling petition cases and expands the public channels 
by which petitioners may appeal to officials, including the establishment 
of a website that encourages virtual petitioning rather than requiring that 
petitioners visit government buildings in person. 
Abolishing Re-education Through Labour
The international media have highlighted the deci-
sion announced by the Third Plenum to abolish the 
system of Re-education Through Labour (RTL劳动
教养), the use of administrative detention that has 
been employed for decades to allow police and oth-
er authorities to incarcerate people for up to four 
years for minor crimes without the inconvenience 
of going through a trial. Such crimes included pet-
ty theft, prostitution and the trafficking of illegal 
drugs, but also religious or political dissent: for 
example, attending the prayer meetings of a pro-
scribed church group or speaking out on a subject 
the authorities deemed unacceptable. 
According to the Resolution of the Plenum, an 
enhanced system of ‘community corrections’ would 
replace RTL. During the last ten years, the authorities in some jurisdic-
tions have experimented with a system of ‘community corrections’ 社区
矫正 whereby offenders spend their sentence in community service. To 
date, it is still unclear how this mechanism will be used and what the pro-
cedural requirements for its application will be. The Ministry of Justice is 
Tang Hui 唐慧, from Yong-
zhou, Hunan province, 
was sentenced to one and 
a half years of labour 
re-education for demand-
ing tougher punishment 
for those who allegedly 
raped and forced her 
daughter into prostitu-
tion. She was released 
eight days later following 
a huge public outcry 
Photo: backchina.com
now working toward a final draft of a new Community Corrections Law 
to solve these uncertainties, standardise diverse practices of ‘community 
correction’ around the country and to regulate this expanded institution. 
The reform of RTL has also generated debate about the legality of oth-
er forms of detention, including those replacing RTL. These include the 
‘custody and rehabilitation’ 收容教养 of juveniles, prostitutes and those 
who procure their services; ‘black jails’ 黑监狱 for petitioners who have 
not been charged with a crime but whom the authorities deem inconven-
ient or offensive; ‘criminal detention’ 拘留 for pre-trial criminal suspects 
and ‘residential surveillance’ 监视居住. The last was originally an alterna-
tive to pre-trial detention but is now used as a form of extra-legal house ar-
rest for activists, their close relatives (such as the imprisoned Nobel Peace 
Laureate Liu Xiaobo’s 刘晓波 wife, Liu Xia 刘霞) and individuals accused 
of undermining stability.
On 21 March 2014, a group of human rights lawyers were arrested in Jiansanjiang, Heilongjiang province, after 
they visited a black jail. On 25 March, six lawyers began a hunger strike outside the Qixing Detention Centre 
when their request to meet with the detained lawyers was refused
Photo: voanews.cn
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Authoritarian Rule of Law in Practice
In 2014 (as in previous years), the government showed the authoritarian 
nature of Beijing-style rule of law when it detained or arrested a num-
ber of lawyers who have been arguing for citizens to enjoy the rights pre-
scribed in Chinese law and the constitution as well as anti-corruption cam-
paigners and advocates of greater political and fiscal transparency. 
During the first half of the year, in the lead-up to the sensitive twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the 1989 Protest Movement and its violent suppression, 
the authorities imposed charges of ‘disrupting public order’ on individu-
als and groups to silence its critics, some pre-emptively. Among them was 
the lawyer Xu Zhiyong 许志永, a founder of the New Citizens’ Movement 
新公民运动 (see Forum ‘Xu Zhiyong and the New Citizens’ Movement’, 
p.292) and one of the most high-profile human rights lawyers and activists 
of the last decade. 
On January 2014, the Beijing 
Number One Intermediate Peo-
ple’s Court sentenced Xu to four 
years in prison for ‘gathering a 
crowd to disrupt order in a public 
place’ 聚众扰乱公共场所秩序 ac-
cording to Article 291 of the 1997 
Criminal Law. The charge referred 
to his role in organising and call-
ing on people to unfurl banners, 
distribute leaflets, attract onlook-
ers, make a racket and obstruct po-
lice officers from enforcing the law 
during a series of protests in 2012 
and 2013. Three months later, the 
Beijing Higher People’s Court up-
held Xu’s guilty verdict on appeal, 
22 January 2014: Well-known human rights lawyer 
Xu Zhiyong was sentenced to four years in prison 
for breaching the 1997 Criminal Law by ‘gathering a 
crowd to disrupt order in a public place’ 
Photo: 37dts.com
sparking outrage among human rights advocates both inside and outside 
China. 
Repression in the name of public order became more common in 
the months leading up to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1989 Protest 
Movement. Emblematic of Beijing’s attitude towards ‘disunity of thinking’ 
On 4 June 2014, tens of thousands of people gathered in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park 
to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Beijing massacre.  In mainland 
China, commemoration of the anniversary is strictly forbidden
Cartoon: Baiducao, TAM/oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/category/news-clippings/ 
cartoons/
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was the case of lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, de-
tained on 5 May on suspicion of ‘picking 
quarrels and provoking troubles’ 寻衅
滋事 (Article 293 of the Criminal Law) — 
in this case, he was guilty of attending a 
small, private commemoration of the 1989 
student protest. A Global Times commen-
tary published on 8 May on Pu’s detention 
claimed that by meeting to commemorate 
the Tiananmen events, the human rights lawyer had ‘clearly crossed the 
red line of law’. 
These developments in early 2014 revealed the party-state’s new ap-
proach to quelling dissenting voices. Rather than pursue outspoken critics 
on charges of subverting state security, they charge them with common 
public order offences. The Dui Hua Foundation research group claims that 
the number of people charged with subversion, separatism and incite-
ment to subvert state power decreased by twenty-one percent in 2013 to 
880 individuals, while the number of those charged with disrupting public 
order has increased dramatically — from around 160,000 in 2005 to more 
3 May 2014: A citizen journalist for the 
US-based website Boxun, Xiang Nanfu, is 
arrested and paraded on state television
Photo: CCTV
27–30 April 2014: Xi Jinping visits the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region where he 
vows to ‘strike first’ against terrorism
Photo: Xinhua
than 355,000 in 2013. Other dissenters besides Pu Zhiqiang who have been 
charged with the seemingly innocuous offence of ‘picking quarrels and 
provoking troubles’ include the labour activist Lin Dong 林东 and the Box-
un 博讯 journalist Xiang Nanfu 湘南富, among others. 
This strategy is reminiscent of the way in which the dissident artist Ai 
Weiwei was dealt with in 2011: the authorities charged the outspoken crit-
ic of the Party with tax evasion. Similarly, in June 2014, they charged the 
Australian-Chinese artist Guo Jian with ‘visa fraud’ before deporting him 
to Australia. Both instances are examples of the way the party-state cyn-
ically attempts to deflect criticisms of human rights abuses by smearing 
the character of dissidents, implying that they were fraudsters or common 
criminals.
The authorities are more comfortable with pinning charges of subver-
sion and separatism on those in the restive north-western ethnic region 
of Xinjiang who do not share Xi Jinping’s vision of their place in China’s 
Community of Shared Destiny. The robust ‘unity of thinking’ underlying 
On 27 May 2014, fifty-five people were sentenced at a mass trial in Yili, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
At least three people were sentenced to death. Others were jailed for murder, separatism and organising 
or participating in terror groups. Xinhua claimed that around 7,000 locals and officials withnessed the mass 
sentencing
Photo: voanews.com
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Xi Jinping’s approach operates in this case, however, as a double-edged 
sword. As the journalist Chris Buckley noted in The New York Times, Xi has 
‘cast himself as a paternal leader devoted to improving the lives of ordi-
nary people’ and sees the assimilation policies towards the Uyghurs not as 
the source of discontent but as the means to its resolution.
In May, the central authorities called on the three arms of state jus-
tice — the police, the procuratorate and the courts — to coordinate their 
work against terrorism 暴恐主义, declaring a year-long ‘People’s War on 
Terror’ (see Forum ‘Terrorism and Violence in and from Xinjiang’, p.308) 
primarily aimed at Xinjiang separatists. Within one week of this decla-
ration of war, on 27 May, police, prosecution and judicial forces rounded 
up both suspects and convicted criminals and put them on display at a 
major public shaming rally in the city of Yili. They paraded these criminal 
and terrorist suspects and convicted offenders at a large public arena in 
the style of the Strike Hard 严
打 anti-crime campaigns of 
the 1980s and 1990s. The sus-
pects received their sentenc-
es in front of over 7,000 peo-
ple, including schoolchildren. 
Although in the 1980s 
the Supreme People’s Court 
outlawed the public parading 
and humiliating of convict-
ed criminals and suspects, 
including by driving them 
through the street in trucks, 
an exception was apparently 
made for this opening salvo 
of the ‘People’s War on Ter-
ror’. The following day, the 
Legal Daily 法制报 applauded 
In October 2014, fifteen suspects were driven through the 
streets of Yueyang, Hunan province, on the back of a truck 
labelled the ‘Prisoner Van’, before being taken to a public 
trial that was watched by thousands
Photo: Weibo
the public ritual: ‘These kinds of rallies are an important way for the peo-
ple to see for themselves the outcomes of our efforts. They will improve 
the resolve of criminal justice organs (to fight the war) and will console the 
victims of terrorism.’
Contesting the Rule of Law
Muslim separatists and human rights advocates alike reject the idea of 
a Party-led rule of law. It is also clear that some in the party hierarchy, 
including its leftist wing, are not comfortable with the new rule of law 
thinking. A week before the Fourth Plenum Communiqué was announced, 
an article on law and politics in the Central Party School mouthpiece Red 
Flag 红旗 declared that it is not rule of law but ‘the people’s democratic 
dictatorship’ that must be urgently realised across the nation. ‘The Party 
must guarantee the fundamental interests of the labourers and masses 
and not substitute these interests for those who will benefit from the rule 
of law.’ 
Others have chosen more practical means of contesting Xi’s rule of 
law ideology. On the very day that the Fourth Plenum Communiqué was 
announced, another old-fashioned Maoist public sentencing rally hit the 
news headlines in Mao’s home province of Hunan. Authorities in Hua-
rong county convened a joint ‘public arrest and public sentencing rally’ 
to put on public display sixteen suspects and eight convicted criminals, 
who were then placed in trucks and paraded on the streets following the 
outlawed practice. ‘The three heads’ (of the local police, prosecution and 
court) jointly organised the event to mark their local ‘strike hard’ cam-
paign against robbery. While the event itself occurred three days before 
the Plenum, Hunan authorities waited until the day the Fourth Plenum 
Communiqué was released to broadcast the vision of the parading trucks 
on the television news. While social commentators and bloggers noted this 
‘coincidence’, Beijing was initially silent. Three days later, Xinhua issued 
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an editorial in the Beijing News 新京报, declaring in high dudgeon tones 
that the event ‘proved that ruling the people is easy while ruling (local) 
officials is the difficult part’.
Conclusion
One constant that has been on display in the justice arena in China over 
the last three decades is the idea that broad national political discourses 
— Harmonious Society, Stability Maintenance and so on — set the context 
for how justice is dispensed. These political watchwords shape the way in 
which justice is conceptualised and practised. To this list, we can now add 
‘comprehensively advancing the rule of law’, a recycled catchphrase from 
the Deng Xiaoping era but now with some additional ‘Xi Jinping charac-
teristics’.
Xi Jinping’s interpretation of the rule of law includes his ability, as the 
head of the new National Security Commission and the Central Leading 
Group for Internet Security, to wield the dagger against terrorists while 
the Discipline and Inspection Commission under Wang Qishan wields the 
sword against corrupt officials. 
Xi Jinping’s commitment to ‘recentralising’ justice is not some kind 
of ideological battle for judicial independence, nor an effort to wrest ‘law’ 
from the clutches of ‘politics’. His purpose is to decouple law from the 
dirty politics of local corruption and protectionism, and to meld it with the 
supposed ‘clean’ politics of central party oversight; this is what he means 
by governing ‘in accordance with the law’. Standardising and unifying ju-
dicial and policing practices across the legal system will indeed help im-
prove judicial fairness and efficiency. It will also help to legitimise Xi’s 
administration and policies. 
Yet Xi’s insistence on doing this ‘the party way’ places potentially ir-
reconcilable, contradictory demands on the courts and other agents of 
justice. It will be difficult for them to deliver ‘justice for the people’ while 
‘unifying’ with the centre. Indeed, the government’s requirement that the 
judicial organs join the battle to ‘unify thinking’ places the credibility of 
the justice system in question even as it is ridding itself of some of its most 
questionable historic practices.  
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FORUM
FORUM
THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS 
OF THE LAW
Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble 
·  JEREMY GOLDKORN
Xu Zhiyong and the New Citizens’ Movement 
·  SUSAN TREVASKES
An Old Approach to New Protests 
·  SUSAN TREVASKES
The Execution of Street Vendor Xia Junfeng 
·  LINDA JAIVIN
Almighty God: Murder in a McDonald’s 
·  AIDEN XIA
Terrorism and Violence in and from Xinjiang 
·  JAY WANG 王造玢
Orange as the New Black 
·  JOANNA (YEEJUNG) YOON
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P IC K I N G  Q UA R R E L S  A N D 
P R OVO K I N G  T R O U B L E
Jeremy Goldkorn
DURING 2013–2014, the authorities increasingly used the criminal charge of ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’ 寻衅滋事 to detain activists, 
writers and dissidents, including all those listed below. Another criminal charge 
authorities have used against political dissidents or critics is that of ‘gathering 
a crowd to disrupt public order’ 聚众扰乱公共场所秩序罪, for which the noted 
lawyer Xu Zhiyong is currently serving a four-year prison sentence (see Forum 
‘Xu Zhiyong and the New Citizens’ Movement’, p.292).
2013 
14 September: Cao Shunli 曹顺利
Cao Shunli, a lawyer and rights ac-
tivist, is detained at Beijing Capital 
Airport on her way to a human rights 
conference in Geneva. A month later 
she is formally arrested on charges of 
‘picking quarrels and provoking trou-
bles’. Despite suffering from tubercu-
losis, liver disease and uterine fibroids, she is denied medical help and dies in 
detention on 14 March 2014, two weeks short of her fifty-third birthday. 
Cao Shunli, a civil rights activist, was arrested on 
charges of ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’
Photo: renminbao.com
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2014 
8 April: Wang Quanping 王全平
The lawyer Wang Quanping drives to 
Beijing from Jiangmen city, Guang-
dong province to attend the trial of 
members of the New Citizens’ Move-
ment (see Forum ‘Xu Zhiyong and the 
New Citizens’ Movement’, p.292) in a 
car covered with satirical slogans such 
as ‘Citizens are welcome to disclose 
their assets — public servants except-
ed’ 欢迎人民公开财产 人民公仆就免了. 
He is detained by plainclothes security 
personnel at the courtroom door and 
charged with ‘picking quarrels and 
provoking troubles’. 
22 April: Lin Dong 林东
Lin Dong, a prominent labour activist 
whose organisation helped organise 
strikes for social security and oth-
er benefits of some 40,000 workers 
at sports shoe factories in Donggu-
an, Guangdong province, is detained 
for thirty days. He is subsequently 
charged.
3 May: Xiang Nanfu 向南夫
A citizen journalist for the US-based 
website Boxun, Xiang Nanfu is put un-
der criminal detention and paraded on 
state television in a green prison vest 
(see Forum ‘Orange as the New Black’, 
p.316).
6 May: Pu Zhiqiang 浦志強
Pu Zhiqiang, a civil rights lawyer 
who gained prominence through his 
campaign to abolish labour camps, 
is detained after attending a private 
commemoration of the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown (see Chapter 6 ‘The Sword 
of Discipline and the Dagger of Justice’, 
p.260). One of at least four other hu-
man rights lawyers detained in May 
2014 ahead of the anniversary, Pu is 
formally charged on 13 June.
14 September: Tie Liu 铁流
The eighty-one-year 
old writer, under-
ground publisher 
and vehement critic 
of the Communist 
Party, Tie Liu (real 
name Huang Zerong 
黄泽荣) is detained 
and accused of ‘picking quarrels and 
provoking troubles’.
 
Tie Liu
Photo: rfa.org
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X U  Z H I YO N G  A N D  T H E  N E W 
C I T I Z E N S ’  M OV E M E N T
Susan Trevaskes
XU ZHIYONG WAS until recently a lecturer at the Beijing University 
of Post and Telecommunications and 
is among China’s best-known human 
rights lawyers. He was awarded a PhD 
in law in 2002 from Peking University 
under the supervision of the famous 
legal scholar Zhu Suli 朱苏力. In the 
aftermath of the Sun Zhigang 孙志刚 
incident (in which Sun, a young man, 
was beaten to death while in police 
custody in Guangzhou) in 2003 he was 
one of the three legal scholars who 
wrote to the National People’s Con-
gress advocating the abolition of the 
system of Custody and Repatriation 收
容遣送. 
Together with the lawyer Teng 
Biao 滕彪, he founded Gongmeng 
公盟 (The Open Constitution Initiative) 
in 2003. Originally called the Sunshine 
Constitutionalism Social Science Re-
search Centre, Gongmeng promoted 
the rule of law and the protection 
of citizens’ constitutional rights. In 
2009, the authorities forced the clo-
sure of Gongmeng and detained Xu 
on charges of tax evasion. Following 
his release, Xu and supporters con-
tinued advocating for the promotion 
and protection of human rights. They 
Xu Zhiyong 
Photo: news.sina.com.cn
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collectively called themselves ‘citizens’ 
公民, a term that, according to Xu, en-
capsulates individual autonomy, free-
dom and individual social responsibil-
ity. 
The New Citizens’ Movement 
emerged in May 2012 in the context of 
the promotion of the idea of a ‘New Cit-
izens’ Spirit’, a concept of citizenship 
that holds individuals as being rights 
bearers against the state. According 
to Xu, citizens have legal and political 
rights and the basic inalienable free-
doms of belief, thought, expression 
and life. Today, the movement claims 
approximately two hundred activists 
in thirty cities around China.
Xu was put under house arrest 
on 12 April 2013. He was formally de-
tained on 16 July and arrested on 22 
August that year. On 22 January 2014, 
the Beijing Number One Intermediate 
People’s Court sentenced him to four 
years in prison for ‘gathering a crowd 
to disrupt order in a public place’ (Ar-
ticle 291 of the Criminal Law) in a trial 
of first instance. The Beijing Higher 
People’s Court upheld the verdict on 
11 April 2014.
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A N  O L D  A P P R O AC H  TO  
N E W  P R OT E S T S
Susan Trevaskes
IN THE VIEW OF the party-state’s continuing sensitivity to social unrest, col-lective public protests remain a perceived threat to political stability. In May 
2014, fearing that a proposed waste incinerator plant for Hangzhou’s Yahang 
district would contaminate their water supply, over 20,000 residents took part 
in a public protest, blocking a major highway. The following day, the local police, 
the procuratorate, courts and justice bureau jointly issued an ‘Important Notice’ 
In May 2014, fearing that a proposed waste incinerator plant for Hangzhou’s Yahang 
district would contaminate their water supply, over 20,000 residents took part in a 
public protest
Photo: Shared by a protestor via takungpao (大公报)
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accusing ‘criminals’ 犯罪者 and pub-
lic order ‘offenders’ 违法者 of inciting 
others to beat up police, damage prop-
erty and disturb the public order. 
The notice posted photographs of 
the wanted trouble-makers on their 
list, warned of harsh punishments and 
urged those on the list to surrender to 
police in exchange for lenient treat-
ment. By threatening people not yet 
convicted of an alleged crime and iden-
tifying them as criminals, the notice 
calls to mind the old practice of police, 
prosecution and courts ‘jointly han-
dling cases’ 联合办案 and the courts 
‘intervening in a case in advance’ 
提前介入, as was routine during the 
many hard-line anti-crime campaigns 
of the 1980s and 1990s.
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T H E  E X E C U T IO N  O F  S T R E E T 
V E N D O R  X I A  J U N F E N G
Linda Jaivin
XIA JUNFENG  WAS a laid-off factory worker who sold grilled 
meat kebabs with his wife, Zhang 
Jing 张晶, in the city of Shenyang. On 
16 May 2009, around ten chengguan, 
urban law enforcement officers, con-
fronted the couple. 
Chengguan, who have a reputa-
tion for brutality, have the thankless 
task of clearing city streets of stalls 
operating without a business licence, 
and are deeply unpopular with the 
public. Xia claimed it was in self- 
defence that he killed two and injured 
one with a fruit knife. But, on 11 No-
vember 2009, the Shenyang Interme-
diate People’s Court sentenced Xia to 
death for manslaughter. 
A two-year-long appeal by his 
wife and a volunteer legal team earned 
the family nationwide sympathy, but 
the final verdict by the Liaoning Pro-
vincial People’s High Court, on 9 May 
2011, upheld the death sentence. The 
authorities informed his family only 
hours before giving Xia a lethal injec-
tion, on 25 September 2013, and only 
Anonymous cartoon posted on Weibo 
criticising Xia Junfeng’s execution. The 
background drawing was done by Xia’s 
son
Source: executedtoday.com/tag/shenyang/
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allowing them to see him for half an hour 
first. They refused Xia’s last request to take 
a photograph for his then thirteen-year-old 
son. His execution, and the fact that the au-
thorities apparently told the press about it 
before informing his family, sparked wide-
spread outrage; for a day after the news 
broke, Xia’s name was the most-searched-
for term on Weibo. 
A cartoon by activist cartoonist Kuang Biao, circulated on 
Weibo, condemning Xia’s execution 
Source: executedtoday.com/tag/shenyang/
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A L M IG H T Y  G O D :  M U R D E R  
I N  A  M CD O N A L D ’ S
Aiden Xia
A T AROUND 9:00PM, on 28 May 2014, five people attacked and killed a wom-an in a McDonald’s restaurant in Zhaoyuan 招远, Shandong province. A by-
stander filmed the murder on a mobile phone and the footage spread rapidly on 
the Internet. Within days, the police announced that the suspected killers were 
all members of the Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning 
On 21 August 2014, members of Church of Almighty God were put on trial for homicide and 
‘using a cult to undermine the law’. State media widely publicised the trial
Photo: Weibo/news.sohu.com
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东方闪电 or The Real God 实际神), an organisation founded in 1990 by a physics 
teacher named Zhao Weishan 赵维山 and banned as a cult in 1995. 
On 31 May, CCTV aired footage from an interview with the main culprit, 
Zhang Lidong 张立冬, who said that his group wanted to convert the victim, but 
she refused to give them her phone number. He expressed no remorse, calling 
the victim a ‘demon’ 魔鬼. Shortly after the incident, state-run media published a 
list of fourteen illegal cults. 
On 21 August, the five suspects were put on trial in Yantai, Shandong prov-
ince. All of them were accused of intentional homicide, and three of them of ‘us-
ing a cult to undermine the law’. State media widely publicised the trial. 
On 11 October, two of the five accused, including Zhang Lidong, received 
death sentences. Another received life without parole, and the remaining two 
accomplices received seven and ten years respectively.
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The last year has seen an unprecedented number of violent attacks in or linked to 
Xinjiang. These include attacks on civilians in railway stations and markets that 
were recorded on mobile phones and have been recognised by the international 
community (or at least US Secretary of State John Kerry) as terrorist attacks.  The 
Chinese government sees these attacks as linked both to the Xinjiang independence 
and global jihadist movements. Below is a timeline of attacks and government re-
sponses. 
T E R R O R I S M  A N D  V IO L E N C E  
I N  A N D  F R O M  X I N J I A N G
Jay Wang 王造玢
28 October 2013: Five people die when Usmen Hasan crashes into a crowd at Tiananmen Square
Photo: Weibo/thehindu.com
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28 October 2013: Deliberate Car 
Crash, Tiananmen, Beijing
A man later identified as Usmen Hasan 
乌斯曼•艾山 crashes an SUV into a 
crowd of tourists and passersby at Jin-
shui Bridge in Tiananmen Square, kill-
ing two bystanders along with himself 
and two passengers in his vehicle — 
his wife and mother. Thirty-eight oth-
er people are injured in what official 
media call the first terrorist attack in 
Beijing’s recent history. 
16 November 2013: Knife Attack, 
Seriqbuya 色力布亚 
A violent incident in April 2013 results 
in the deaths of twenty-one people 
in Seriqbuya township near Kashgar 
喀什 in Xinjiang. Authorities order 
a security crackdown. This prompts 
protests from the local Uyghur popu-
lation against the harsh measures. Ac-
cording to Chinese media reports, on 
16 November, nine Uyghur individu-
als, armed with knives and axes, storm 
the police station, and are shot dead. 
Two local police employees die in the 
attack, while another two are injured. 
15 December 2013: Clash Between 
Police and ‘Terror Gang’, Kashgar
Police kill fourteen Uyghur members 
of what the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
calls a ‘violent terror gang’ near Kash-
gar; two police officers also die. 
30 December 2013: Knife and Explo-
sives Attack, Yarkand 莎车
According to regional government 
reports, ‘nine thugs carrying knives’ 
attack a police station, throw explo-
sives, and set police vehicles on fire in 
Yarkand county near Kashgar. Eight of 
the attackers are shot dead and one is 
captured by police.
1 March 2014: Massacre of Civilians 
at Train Station, Kunming
At 9:20pm local time, a group of six 
male and two female assailants clad in 
all-black attire and armed with knives 
and cleavers rush into the ticket lob-
by of the Kunming Railway Station in 
Yunnan and indiscriminately attack 
civilians. The stabbing attack leaves 
twenty-nine civilians and four of the 
suspected killers dead, with one fe-
male assailant captured on the spot. 
Another 143 individuals (including 
seven police officers) are injured. On 
3 March, China’s Ministry of Public 
Security announces that an additional 
three suspects have been arrested. 
28 April 2014: Xi Jinping Visits Police 
and Villages, Kashgar
On 26 April, state media report that Xi 
Jinping has told a Politburo study ses-
sion that the Chinese public must build 
a ‘wall of bronze and iron’ to fight ter-
rorism, and ‘make terrorists become 
like rats scurrying across a street as 
everybody shouts “beat them!” ’. Two 
days later, he visits a Kashgar police 
station and a Uyghur village, and 
watches military counter-terrorism 
training at a nearby base. 
30 April 2014: Suicide Bombing at 
Railway Station, Ürümqi
At 7:10pm on the final day of a four-
day tour of Xinjiang by Xi Jinping, two 
assailants detonate suicide bombs 
at the exit of the Ürümqi South Rail-
way Station, after initially attack-
ing passengers with knives. The 
attack leaves three dead and seventy- 
nine others injured. 
15 May 2014: Police Counter-terror-
ism Training, Xinjiang 
Following Xi Jinping’s April visit to 
Xinjiang, China’s Ministry of Public Se-
curity selects thirty specialist officers 
from around the country to train local 
police in Xinjiang on counter-terror-
1 March 2014: Six male and two female assailants indiscriminately attack  
civilians with knives and cleavers at Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan. The 
attack leaves twenty-nine civilians and four of the suspected killers dead 
Photo: Xinhua/scmp.com
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ism tactics and combat skills, includ-
ing the use of weapons and emergency 
response training.
20 May 2014: Mass Sentencing Rally 
Ürümqi
The Xinjiang People’s Higher Court 
sentences thirty-nine people to prison 
terms of varying lengths for crimes in-
cluding inciting ethnic hatred, organ-
ising terrorist groups and the illegal 
manufacture of guns. 
22 May 2014: SUV Crash and Bomb 
Attack, Ürümqi 
On 20 May 2014, police open fire in 
Aksu 阿克苏 prefecture in western 
Xinjiang on a crowd that has gathered 
to protest restrictions on religious at-
tire. Two days later, five assailants in 
two SUVs fling explosives at shoppers 
on a busy street market in Ürümqi and 
run over passersby. Forty-three people 
are killed in the early morning attack, 
including four of the assailants, who 
die in a head-on collision between the 
two SUVs. More than ninety others are 
wounded, most of whom are elderly 
Han Chinese. 
1 July 2014: Officials Banned From 
Fasting for Ramadan, Xinjiang 
A number of government departments 
forbid Muslim civil servants from fast-
ing during Ramadan. State-run media 
declare that the ban extends to party 
members, teachers and students, and 
expound upon the dangers of fasting. 
Such bans are not new, but state me-
dia give them special prominence this 
year. 
28 July 2014: Mass Knife and Axe 
Attack, Yarkand
According to Xinhua, large groups of 
assailants attacked a police station and 
government offices in the neighbour-
ing towns of Elixku and Huangdi in 
Yarkand county. Thirty-seven victims 
of the attack and fifty-nine of the at-
tackers die, according to police, who 
arrest 215 other people. The govern-
ment names Nuramat Sawut 努拉买
提•萨吾提, leader of the East Turke-
stan Islamic Movement Uyghur sepa-
ratist group as the mastermind behind 
the attack, and claim that the assail-
ants had foreign assistance.
8 August 2014: Ban on Beards and 
Burkas, Karamay 克拉玛依
The majority-Han city in northern 
Xinjiang temporarily bans men with 
long beards as well as women wearing 
burkas, headscarves, and veils from 
taking city buses for the duration of 
a sporting event that finished on 20 
August. The temporary restrictions 
also prohibit anyone wearing star and 
crescent symbols from taking public 
transportation. 
21 August 2014: Financial Rewards 
for Mixed Marriages, Xinjiang
As part of a trial effort to soothe ethnic 
tensions through assimilation, prefec-
ture-level officials from various dis-
tricts in Xinjiang offer annual payouts 
of 10,000 yuan for five years for mixed-
race marriages between Uyghurs and 
Han Chinese. 
1 September 2014: Rewards for Tip-
offs, Ürümqi
Officials in Ürümqi announce a pro-
gram of rewards of up to one million 
yuan for tip-offs from citizens that pre-
vent large-scale terrorist attacks and 
activities. 
21 September 2014: Bomb Attack on 
Market and Police Stations, Bugur 
County 轮台
Rioting mobs converge on an open-air 
market and two police stations in cen-
tral Xinjiang, setting off explosives that 
kill ten people, including two police 
officers, two police assistants, and six 
bystanders, while injuring fifty-four 
Ban on beards and burkas in Karamay: The five so-
called ‘five abnormal styles’ that were prohibited
Source: thatsmag.com
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others. The police response results in 
the deaths of forty of the attackers, 
who are either shot dead or take their 
own lives using explosives.  
23 September 2014: Economics 
Professor Sentenced to Life Impris-
onment, Ürümqi
The Intermediate People’s Court of 
Ürümqi sentences Ilham Tohti 伊力
哈木•土赫提, a Uyghur professor of 
economics at Beijing’s Minzu Univer-
sity (formerly known in English as the 
Nationalities University), to life im-
prisonment on charges of separatism 
and inciting ethnic hatred. Ilham, who 
was detained in January, ran a Chinese 
language website that discussed social 
and economic issues facing Uyghurs 
and promoting Han-Uyghur dialogue. 
12 October 2014: Knife and Bomb 
Attack on Market, Kashgar
Four Uyghur men attack a Han Chinese 
farmers’ market in Kashgar’s Maral-
belxi 巴楚 county with knives and 
explosives, taking eighteen lives, in-
cluding an unknown number of police 
officers. All four attackers are killed 
during the raid.
Knife and bomb attack on market in Kashgar
Source: Newcastle Chinatown
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Liang Hong, 15 July 2013
Vice-President of Operations in China 
for pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmith-
Kline (GSK), Liang Hong 梁鸿, ap-
peared on the primetime CCTV News 
新闻联播 to confess that GSK had used 
bribes to expand its business in China. 
In September 2014, the Changsha City 
Intermediate People’s Court (Hunan 
province) fined GSK three billion yuan, 
the highest penalty given to a foreign 
company to date. Liang and other 
senior GSK executives received sen-
tences of two to four years for bribing 
non-government personnel. 
O R A N G E  A S  T H E  N E W  B L AC K 
Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng, 
27 August 2013
GSK employed Peter Humphrey, a 
Shanghai-based British private investi-
gator, and his Chinese-born American 
wife Yu Yingzeng 虞英曾 to identify 
the whistle-blower who had reported 
its alleged corrupt practices to the au-
thorities (see Liang Hong). Humphrey 
and Yu confessed on CCTV to having 
illegally bought and sold private infor-
mation on Chinese citizens. 
Since 15 July 2013, CCTV has aired a number of confessions made by people accused 
but not yet convicted of a wide variety of crimes. Many appeared in orange prison 
uniforms (either waistcoats or jumpsuits), with others in yellow and green. 
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Charles Xue, 29 August 2013 
On 12 August 2013, the chief of the 
State Internet Information Office, Lu 
Wei, attended a dinner with influen-
tial microbloggers or ‘Big Vs’, where 
he reminded them of their ‘respon-
sibilities’ to society. One of the Big Vs 
present was Charles Xue 薛必群 (aka 
Xue Manzi 薛蛮子),  a frequent critic 
of government policies. The following 
week, police arrested Xue for soliciting 
prostitutes. On 29 August, CCTV aired 
a video of Xue confessing to group sex 
(a crime in China) and an addiction to 
prostitutes (see the China Story Year-
book 2013: Civilising China, Informa-
tion Window ‘The Struggle Against 
Rumours’, p.432).
On 15 September, CCTV aired a 
second confession from Xue in which 
he said that his influence on Weibo 
made him feel ‘like an emperor’, that 
he had abused his power, and passed 
on unverified information as fact. In 
April 2014, before the authorities laid 
charges, Xue was released on bail be-
cause of a medical condition. 
Dong Rubin, 17 October 2013
Dong Rubin 董如彬 shot to fame in 
2009 when he blogged about the death 
of an inmate in a Yunnan jail. The po-
lice claimed the inmate had died play-
ing a game of hide and seek 躲猫猫, a 
term which then became an Internet 
meme. In his October TV appearance, 
Dong confessed to exaggerating infor-
mation for the benefit of clients of his 
Internet promotion business. 
Chen Yongzhou, 26 October 2013
Chen Yongzhou 陈永州, a journalist, 
appeared on CCTV News to confess that 
he had been bribed to run fabricated 
stories about a business in Changsha, 
Hunan province. Fellow journalists 
had expressed outrage immediately 
after his arrest, but many went quiet 
after hearing Chen’s confession.  
Tang Xianbing and Liu Han, 21 Feb-
ruary 2014 
In 2013, Liu Han 刘汉, a mining and 
real estate tycoon in Sichuan province, 
was arrested with thirty-five other 
suspected gang members for murder, 
blackmail and other crimes. Some 
media reports linked him to the fall-
en former Chongqing Party Secretary 
Bo Xilai. On 21 February 2014, CCTV 
aired a tape showing Tang Xianbing 
唐先兵, a security guard with Liu’s 
company, confessing to multiple mur-
ders on Liu’s orders. Liu and Tang 
have both been handed the death sen-
tence. 
Qin Zhihui, 1 April 2014
Qin Zhihui 秦志晖 (aka Qin Huohuo 
秦火火), an Internet publicity agent, 
appeared on CCTV News confessing 
to spreading rumours and fabricating 
stories online. He was sentenced to 
three years in jail on 11 April. 
Xiang Nanfu, 3 May 2014
Xiang Nanfu, a freelance contributor 
to the US-based Chinese news web-
site Boxun who had written on such 
topics as organ-harvesting and police 
brutality, appeared on CCTV News and 
confessed to writing false stories that 
damaged China’s image. 
Gao Yu, 7 May 2014
Gao Yu 高瑜, a seventy-year-old jour-
nalist, was arrested on 24 April 2014 
and accused of providing an internal 
Party document to an overseas web-
site (see the China Story Yearbook 
2013: Civilising China, Forum ‘Party 
Policies from One to Ten’, p.114). In 
May, CCTV broadcast blurred footage 
of a ‘Ms Gao’, a figure in orange prison 
clothing, expressing remorse for her 
actions. 
Zhang Lidong, 31 May 2014
On 28 May, members of the Church 
of Almighty God religious cult beat a 
woman to death in a McDonald’s res-
taurant in Shandong province. In his 
televised confession, the main culprit, 
Zhang Lidong, said they wanted to con-
vert the victim, but she refused to give 
them her phone number (see Forum 
‘Almighty God: Murder in a McDon-
ald’s’, p.304).
Gao Yu, a seventy-year-old journalist, was arrested 
on 24 April 2014 and accused of providing an inter-
nal party document to an overseas website
Photo: blogs.wsj.com
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Mirzat, 21 June 2014
A man identified as Mirzat 木尔扎提 
confessed to being one of three Uyghur 
men who had entered a mahjong par-
lour in Hotan city in Xinjiang and at-
tacked patrons with axes. Mirzat said 
the leader of the gang had convinced 
him that he would go to paradise if he 
participated in jihad. He apologised 
and promised never again to involve 
himself in terrorist activities.  
Zhang Yuan, 27 June 2014
Film director Zhang Yuan 张元 con-
fessed to using drugs following a pos-
itive urine test earlier that month. 
Zhang had form, having previously 
appeared on CCTV in a 2008 drug bust. 
Guo Meimei, 3 August 2014
Guo Meimei 郭美美 became notorious 
in 2011 for flaunting her luxurious 
lifestyle while claiming to work for the 
Chinese Red Cross (see the China Story 
Yearbook 2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse’, 
Chapter 8 ‘Voices from the Blogosphere 
I’, p.204). She remained an Internet 
celebrity, frequently showing off inex-
plicable riches. Her CCTV appearance 
was the first time she had been seen 
without her glamorous props: sans 
makeup and wearing an orange pris-
on vest. She confessed to lying about 
her connection to the Red Cross as well 
as to organising illegal gambling and 
charging for sexual services. 
Guo Meimei
Photo: CCTV/ent.qq.com
Independent film director Zhang Yuan 
confessed to using drugs, following a 
positive urine test. 
Photo: media.people.com.cn
Ko Chen-tung and Jaycee Chan,  
18 August 2014
On 18 August, Beijing media reported 
that Jaycee Chan (aka Fang Zuming 
房祖名), the actor and son of the Hong 
Kong movie star Jackie Chan, had been 
arrested in Beijing on drug-related 
charges together with Taiwanese actor 
Ko Chen-tung (‘Kai Ko’) 柯震东. That 
night, Ko appeared on CCTV crying 
and apologising to his fans for his mis-
behaviour. Copies of the yellow and 
blue vest Ko wore quickly became a 
trending item on the online commerce 
site Taobao.
Ko Chen-tung tearfully apologises on CCTV
Photo: law.southcn.com
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Geremie R Barmé
Image: Xi Jinping and Barack Obama ‘tieless’ at the Evening Talks at Yingtai
Source: thatsmag.com
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Bringing Order to All-Under-Heaven
Xi Jinping’s formulation of the Community of Shared Destiny was a key 
rhetorical device used in China’s regional and international policy during 
2013–2014. It promised to ‘operationalise’ resuscitated, and long-debated 
ideas related to All-Under-Heaven tianxia, discussed in the Introduction 
to this volume. Non-mainland analysts and commentators generally have 
scant interest in Chinese party-state attempts to articulate new interna-
tional relations or strategic concepts in a language that weds statist Con-
fucian concepts with those of Marxist-Leninist modernity. Perhaps it is an 
affront that a derivative Marxist state lays claim to some unique approach 
to world affairs, even though its economic and global heft are undeniable. 
Status quo thinkers rarely want to make room for unorthodox approaches, 
especially those essayed by a one-party state that has been in an agonistic 
relationship with the West since the Second World War.
 Nonetheless, the concept of Shared Destiny continued to enjoy Xi Jin-
ping’s endorsement; in recent years, the expression appeared no fewer 
than sixty-two times in the Chinese leader’s statements and speeches. As 
we noted earlier, Shared Destiny is premised on mutuality; as Xi Jinping 
put it, bilateral relationships and the regional order rely on amity, sin-
cerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness. But China is, if nothing else, a 
radically pragmatic state that cloaks its needs in high-flown rhetoric and 
bombast. On the ground it is concerned with the practical organisation of 
national relationships and it pursues this with a single-minded obsession 
with hierarchy, structuring its concentric view of the world according to 
various levels of strategic relationship, each with elaborate conditions and 
benefits attendant upon them.
 In the Maoist-era international affairs were conceptualised in terms 
of Three Worlds, that of the regnant superpowers, a cluster of developed 
nations and the riven nations of the Third World. Mao Zedong constantly 
mulled over the complex interplay between these spheres, calculating his 
strategic moves according to what he saw as fluid contradictions and ad-
vantageous opportunities for China. In the new and evolving ordering of 
the world as conceived by Beijing, the communities of shared destiny too 
jostle for attention, and they demand constant cultivation, just as strategic 
partnerships require nurturing in the hope of real-world and long-term 
pay-offs.  
Although the term Shared Destiny has a prominent place in Chinese 
discourse, over time it may well be overshadowed by the well-funded 
propaganda push from late 2014 to advance the newer concept of One 
Belt One Road 一带一路. This is a series of proffered trade and communi-
cations corridors promised to embed China further into global networks, 
and to allow China to bind others to what it has called its ‘locomotive of 
Chinese development’ 中国发展的列车.
Evening Talks at Yingtai
The year 2014 ended with blue skies for China. The cerulean vault over and 
crisp air of Beijing was cleared as a result of a months’ long government-
directed mass campaign to reduce pollution in and around the Chinese 
capital. The engineering of what would be celebrated as ‘APEC Blue’ or 
APEC蓝 for the November 2014 APEC Summit involved the policing of 
factory, vehicle and domestic emissions by over 400,000 cadres in Beijing 
One Belt One Road: China is working with sixty nations to build a modern-day Silk Road, on land and by sea
Source: chinadialogue.net 
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itself, the city of Tianjin, as well as in the nearby provinces of Hebei, 
Shanxi, Shandong, Henan and Inner Mongolia.
The blue skies of 1–12 November provided a benign covering for an-
other smoothly run global event in the Chinese calendar. For the world 
APEC 2014 was made all the more significant by the fact that it featured a 
major China–US Summit on the sidelines. Known as the ‘Evening Talks at 
Yingtai’ 瀛台夜谈 — Yingtai being the island palace at Zhongnanhai, the 
party-state compound in Central Beijing — the summit was regarded as a 
significant but similarly casual event as the June 2013 Sunnylands Summit 
in the US (see Chapter 2 ‘Whose Shared Destiny’, pp.60–61). The Beijing 
meeting between presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama was capped by 
a US–China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. A prelude to the Unit-
ed Nations Climate Conference to be held in Paris in late 2015, this agree-
ment promised ambitions post-2020 actions on climate change. The formal 
announcement declared that:
The United States intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reduc-
ing its emissions by 26%–28% below its 200 level in 2025 and to make 
best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve 
the peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts 
to peak early and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030. 
There were also undertakings to increase these targets over time.
In the age of the Anthropocene, that is the global era shaped crucially 
by human activity, shared destiny is inextricably bound up with climate 
change, resource depletion and efforts at mitigation. Given the impor-
tance of pollution in China and, indeed, the near-hysterical concern that 
the Chinese party-state has about such nebulous polluting factors as those 
found in the realm of ideas, politics and culture, we will take Pollution 染 
as the theme of the 2015 China Story Yearbook.
The Masked City
Photo: From the series ‘The Masked City’, by Sam Gallagher, 2014
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24 September: Xia Junfeng, a street 
vendor convicted of killing two cheng-
guan (urban law enforcement officers) 
is executed in Shenyang, Liaoning 
province, despite popular support 
for him and widespread resentment 
against chengguan.
25 September: Li Tianyi 李天一, the 
seventeen-year-old son of celebrity 
People’s Liberation Army singers Li 
Shuangjiang 李双江 and Meng Ge 梦鸽, 
is sentenced to ten years in prison for 
gang rape in a case that attracted wide-
spread attention and outrage in China. 
16 October: The Party’s bi-monthly po-
litical theory journal Qiushi publishes 
an article strongly denouncing democ-
racy and ‘constitutionalism’ (requiring 
the Chinese party-state to follow the 
Chinese constitution), part of a broad-
er campaign against liberal thinking. 
24 October: A court in Shandong 
province rejects the appeal of Bo Xilai, 
the former Chongqing party boss sen-
tenced to life in prison for bribery, em-
bezzlement and abuse of power. 
25 October: During a speech at a 
conference on Diplomatic Work with 
The following outline chronology covers some of the key events touched on in 
this book.
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Neighbouring Countries, Xi Jinping 
stresses ‘letting the awareness of a 
community of common destiny to take 
root in [our] neighbouring countries’. 
This is understood as a guiding prin-
ciple for China’s diplomacy with its 
neighbours.
28 October: A Jeep with a Xinjiang 
number plate and a Uyghur driver 
crashes into a crowd of people on 
Tiananmen Square, bursting into 
flames and killing two people and 
injuring forty, including foreign 
tourists. An audio recording published 
on the Siteintelgroup.com website 
claims responsibility on behalf of the 
East Turkestan Islamic Movement. 
8 November: The New York Times 
reports that editors at Bloomberg 
News in Hong Kong chose not to run 
a story on ties between a wealthy 
businessman and China’s top leader-
ship for fear of repercussions against 
Bloomberg in China. Bloomberg 
denied censoring the story, saying that 
it had not been ready for publication.
12 November: The Third Plenum of 
the Chinese Communist Party’s Eight-
eenth Central Committee concludes in 
Beijing with the release of a lengthy 
communiqué laying out the latest plan 
for economic reform. 
23 November: The Chinese govern-
ment proclaims an ‘Air Defence Iden-
tification Zone’ over a large area of the 
East China Sea including the disputed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Japan, Aus-
tralia and the United States protest the 
unilateral proclamation. 
2 December: China launches the 
Chang’e-3 嫦娥三号 lunar probe carry-
ing the country’s first moon rover.
12 December: As part of a wide- 
ranging campaign against corrupt 
practices, the State Council releases 
‘Regulations on Official Receptions 
for All Party and Government Depart-
ments’ 党政机关国内公务接待管理规定, 
requiring all government and adminis-
trative departments to observe thirty- 
eight prohibitions including those 
against the consumption of shark fin 
and other luxury items.
26 December: At a symposium held in 
Beijing to commemorate the 120th an-
niversary of the birth of Mao Zedong, 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping 
states that the Communist Party of Chi-
na will forever hold high the banner of 
Mao Zedong Thought. Before the sym-
posium, Xi and China’s other six top 
leaders visit Mao’s mausoleum on Ti-
ananmen Square and they bow three 
times in front of Mao’s statue.
28 December: Xi Jinping turns up 
unannounced at a steamed bun res-
taurant in Beijing and buys a twenty- 
one-yuan set meal consisting of six 
pork and onion buns, pork liver stew 
and fried mustard greens. Despite lit-
tle coverage in the official media, the 
news circulates widely on Weibo. 
29 December: The Party’s Central 
Committee and the State Council 
prohibit officials from smoking in 
venues where smoking is banned, 
and from using public funds to buy 
cigarettes including for use in official 
hospitality. 
2014
23 January: The Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Statistics announces that 
Beijing’s population reached 21.15 mil-
lion at the end of 2013. 
26 January: Xi Jinping visits a PLA bor-
der outpost in Inner Mongolia, and the 
People’s Daily publishes images of the 
president sharing a meal with the sol-
diers. 
9 February: CCTV broadcasts an inves-
tigative report showing police raiding 
saunas, karaoke bars and other venues 
associated with the sex trade in Dong-
guan, Guangdong province. Sixty-sev-
en people are detained in the raid and 
twelve venues shut down, and a week 
later the Public Security Bureau warns 
it will not tolerate such crimes.
10 February: The first official talks be-
tween the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
and the People’s Republic of China in 
sixty-five years take place at a sym-
bolic meeting in Nanjing, the former 
republican capital. No national flags 
are displayed and the officials present 
wear no official or party insignia. 
25 February: The Uyghur scholar and 
professor at the Minzu University of 
China in Beijing, Ilham Tohti, who had 
been held incommunicado since be-
ing detained in Beijing on 15 January, 
is formally charged with ‘separatism’ 
(advocating Xinjiang independence). 
In September, a court finds Tohti guilty 
of separatism and jails him for life and, 
in November, an Ürümqi court rejects 
his appeal and upholds his conviction.
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1 March: Some ten men armed with 
knives, all apparently Uyghurs, kill 
twenty-nine people and injure more 
than 130 at Kunming Railway Station 
in Yunnan province.  
18 March: In Taipei, hundreds of stu-
dents and other activists occupy the 
Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s unicamer-
al legislative assembly, to voice their 
opposition to the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement signed between Tai-
wan and Mainland China. The move-
ment is soon dubbed The Sunflower 
Student Movement.
7 April: After the business magazine 
Caijing reports that the city of Baoding 
in Hebei province is likely to become 
the centre of the new Beijing–Tianjin–
Hebei (or Jing-Jin-Ji 京津冀) regional 
agglomeration, property prices there 
rise by between ten and forty percent. 
24 April: Gao Yu, a seventy-year-old 
Chinese journalist, is detained in Bei-
jing. She is later shown on CCTV ap-
parently confessing to having leaked 
state secrets to an overseas website. 
On 20 November, she is charged with 
that crime in a Beijing court where she 
retracts her confession, saying it was 
made under duress. No verdict had 
been announced at the time of compil-
ing this Yearbook. 
30 April: After a group of men at the 
largest train station in Ürümqi, the 
capital of Xinjiang, attack bystanders 
with knives, a bomb explodes killing 
three and injuring seventy-nine. 
2 May: Without consultation, China 
installs an oil-drilling rig in waters 
120 miles from Vietnam’s coast and 
near the Paracel Islands, which are 
claimed by both countries. The rig 
sparks a diplomatic row as well as 
three days of anti-China unrest in 
Vietnam on 13–15 May during which 
at least twenty-one people are killed 
and nearly one hundred injured. Chi-
na recalls the rig on 16 July, a month 
earlier than scheduled.
4–11 May: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
arrives on the African continent for an 
official visit to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ango-
la and Kenya. On 5 May, he delivers a 
speech at the African Union Conven-
tion Centre in Addis Ababa in which he 
outlines his vision for a China–Africa 
strategic partnership. 
6 May: A month before the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the 1989 Beijing mas-
sacre, Pu Zhiqiang, a human rights 
lawyer, is detained by police on suspi-
cion of ‘causing a disturbance’. Pu is 
formally arrested in June and, on 21 
November, Pu’s lawyer reveals that Pu 
may face additional charges that could 
result in a ten-year prison sentence.
6 May: Six people are injured in a knife 
attack outside a railway station in 
Guangzhou, the third violent stabbing 
at a major Chinese railway station in as 
many months.
13 May: For the first time, female sol-
diers form part of China’s honour 
guard welcoming a foreign head of 
state to China: in this case, the presi-
dent of Turkmenistan.  
19 May: US Attorney General Eric 
Holder charges five members of the 
PLA with the criminal hacking of com-
puter systems belonging to US compa-
nies as well as a labour union in order 
to steal trade secrets. 
21 May: After ten years of negotiations, 
Russia’s Gazprom and China’s CNPC 
sign a US$400 billion gas deal for Rus-
sia to supply China with gas for thirty 
years; the price China will pay for the 
gas remains a ‘commercial secret’. 
22 May: Two vehicles without licence 
plates plough into crowds at an open 
air market in Ürümqi, followed by the 
detonation of explosive devices, killing 
at least thirty-one people and injuring 
ninety-four. 
23 May: Liu Han, a mining tycoon 
with ties to Zhou Yongkang, China’s 
former security chief, is sentenced to 
death for organised crime in a trial in 
Hubei province that included thirty- 
five other defendants charged with 
‘organising, leading and participating 
in Mafia-like groups’.
28 May: A woman is beaten to death 
by five members of the Almighty God 
cult at a McDonald’s outlet in Zhao- 
yuan, Shandong province. On 11 
October, two members of the cult are 
sentenced to death for the murder, 
and three others are given prison 
sentences. 
10 June: The State Council releases a 
white paper on the ‘one country, two 
systems’ policy, hardening Beijing’s 
stance with regard to Hong Kong au-
tonomy. 
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20 June: More than 350,000 residents 
in Hong Kong participate in an unof-
ficial referendum on the Beijing-ap-
proved process by which the chief 
executive is selected, a poll that the 
Chinese government denounces as ‘il-
legal and invalid’.
30 June: At a ceremony marking the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Panchsheel 
Treaty between China and India, Xi 
Jinping reiterates his assertion (first 
made in May 2014) that Chinese peo-
ple have ‘no gene for invasion or he-
gemony’.
30 June: A meeting of the Politburo, 
presided over by Xi Jinping, agrees 
to reform the internal investigation 
process. The meeting occurs after 
the Party expels Xu Caihou, former 
vice-chairman of China’s Central Mili-
tary Commission; Jiang Jiemin, former 
head of the State-Owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commis-
sion; Li Dongsheng, former vice-min-
ister of Public Security and Wang 
Yongchun 王永春, former vice-general 
manager of the China National Petrole-
um Corporation for corruption. 
7 July: The Weibo microblog and 
other social media accounts of the 
outspoken writer and social critic Li 
Chengpeng 李承鹏, who had nearly six 
million followers, disappear from the 
Internet; it is apparently the target of 
a widely publicised government cam-
paign to rein in outspoken online com-
mentators holding officially-verified 
accounts with large followings, known 
as the ‘Big Vs’. 
10 July: Australian Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop reportedly pledges to 
stand up for Australian values and 
‘manage for the worst’ when dealing 
with China, which she says ‘does not 
respect weakness’. On 14 July, an edi-
torial in both the English and Chinese 
editions of the Global Times deride 
Bishop as a ‘complete fool’. Bishop 
personally writes to Xinhua to clarify 
that she did not directly use the phrase 
‘stand up to China’ in the interview.
14–23 July: Xi Jinping undertakes his 
second state visit to Latin America, 
stopping in Brazil, Argentina, Venezue-
la and Cuba.  
15 July: Indian Prime Minister Naren-
dra Modi meets President Xi Jinping on 
the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in 
Brazil, Modi’s first summit-level inter-
action with China. Both sides describe 
the talks as unusually substantive, 
which lay the foundation for a new 
chapter in Sino-Indian ties. 
1 July: At a Sotheby’s auction in Hong 
Kong, billionaire businessman Liu 
Yiqian puts in the winning bid of 
US$36.3 million for an extremely rare 
Qianlong-era (eighteenth century) por-
celain cup with a chicken motif. It was 
the most expensive work of Chinese 
art to sell at auction in 2014 up to that 
date — but in November, Liu set anoth-
er record when he paid US$45 million 
at a Christie’s auction, also in Hong 
Kong, for a fifteenth-century Tibetan 
thangka (a Tibetan Buddhist painting). 
21 July: The proportion of Internet 
users in China getting online via their 
smartphones reaches 83.4 percent 
— more than 500 million people, 
surpassing for the first time the 
proportion using desktops or laptops.
29 July: China’s state media announces 
that Zhou Yongkang, a former member 
of the Chinese Communist Party’s Po-
litburo Standing Committee, is under 
investigation for serious disciplinary 
violations, ending more than a year of 
speculation about Zhou’s fate.
29 July: Wang Weiguang 王伟光, head 
of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), states that CASS is 
not ‘a relaxed alliance for freelancers’ 
自由撰稿人的松散联盟 but a frontline 
for the dissemination of the thinking 
of party leaders, scientific theory and 
ideology. Its top ten research grants 
for 2014 are all awarded to study Xi 
Jinping thought and ideology.     
3 August: CCTV  broadcasts a news sto-
ry featuring the Internet celebrity Guo 
Meimei  confessing to prostitution and 
gambling charges. 
7 August: A new law requires real-
name registration for all public 
accounts on instant messaging ser-
vices such as the popular mobile app 
WeChat as part of a crackdown on 
online rumours, libel, pornography 
and violence. According to state 
media, Tencent had closed twenty 
million WeChat accounts for offering 
prostitution services. 
14 August: Jaycee Chan, also known 
as Fang Zuming, the son of actor Jack-
ie Chan, is detained after police find 
more than one hundred grams of mari- 
juana at his apartment. Also detained 
is the Taiwanese actor Ko Chen-tung. 
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On 17 September, Jaycee Chan is for-
mally charged with allowing others to 
take drugs at his home.
27 August: Xi Jinping meets with Le 
Hong Anh, special envoy of the Gener-
al Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam, for talks in Beijing to address 
recent tensions in the relationship (see 
2 May).
9 September: China deploys 700 sol-
diers in a UN peacekeeping force in 
South Sudan to safeguard oil fields and 
protect Chinese workers and installa-
tions. UN officials reveal that this is the 
first time that Beijing has contributed 
a battalion to a UN peacekeeping force.
18 September: Chinese ecommerce gi-
ant Alibaba launches the largest initial 
public offering in history on the New 
York Stock Exchange, raising US$25 
billion.
19 September: More than a year after 
the announcement of an investigation 
into the British pharmaceutical giant 
GlaxoSmithKline operations in China, 
a court in Changsha, Hunan province 
finds the company guilty of bribing 
doctors and hospitals to promote GSK 
products, and fines it three billion 
yuan. 
26 September: The University of Chi-
cago suspends negotiations to renew 
its agreement to host a Confucius Insti-
tute 孔子学院. More than one hundred 
faculty members had signed a petition 
condemning the Institute’s impact on 
academic freedom at the university. 
On 1 October, a second US university, 
Pennsylvania State, announces that it 
will also close its Confucius Institute.
28 September: Following a week of 
student strikes in Hong Kong over 
electoral reforms, protests spread and 
provoke a heavy-handed response by 
police, who detain several protesters. 
11 October: China’s Supreme People’s 
Court issues new rulings dubbed ‘anti- 
human flesh engine rules’ intended to 
protect people from online persecu-
tion, but that also added another set of 
legal tools for ‘managing’ the Internet, 
a euphemism for government control 
of online public opinion.  
14 October: The State Administration 
for Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television 国家广播电影电视总局 bans 
books by at least eight Chinese writ-
ers and scholars, including economist 
Mao Yushi, legal scholar Zhang Qian-
fan 张千帆, historian Yu Ying-shih 余英
时 and columnists Xu Zhiyuan 许知远 
and Xu Xiao 徐晓.
15 October: At a ‘Forum on Art and 
Literature’ in Beijing, Xi Jinping calls 
on Chinese artists to create ‘socialist 
culture and art’ that is ‘artistically out-
standing and morally inspiring’ and 
that serves ‘correct’ viewpoints with 
regard to history, nationality and cul-
ture. He singles out patriotic blogger 
Zhou Xiaoping for special praise for 
his ‘positive energy’. Commentators 
liken it to the 1942 speech on art and 
literature by Mao Zedong that guided 
China’s cultural policies for the first 
three decades of the Communist era. 
20–23 October: The Fourth Plenum 
Session of the Eighteenth Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party 
convenes in Beijing. An official Central 
Party Communiqué is released togeth-
er with a document on ‘Governing the 
Country According to the Law’.
24 October: Representatives from 
twenty-one Asian nations sign an 
agreement to establish the Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank, a Chi-
nese initiative that will lend money for 
infrastructure development in poor-
er parts of Asia. The US, Japan, and 
Australia declined to join. The bank’s 
founding capital is US$50 billion.
10–12 November: The twenty-sixth 
annual gathering of APEC leaders 
takes place in Beijing. Factories and 
government offices are shut down and 
car use restricted for a week, giving 
rise to the phrase ‘APEC Blue’ APEC蓝 
to describe the resulting clear skies.
10 November: On the sidelines of the 
APEC gathering in Beijing, following 
an awkward handshake, Chinese Pres-
ident Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzo hold their first 
formal talks.
12 November: China reveals plans to 
establish a new bank to fund develop-
ment of the ‘New Silk Road’, reviving 
intercontinental land routes and mar-
itime links through central Asia. Four 
days earlier, Xi Jinping had announced 
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that China would invest US$40 billion 
in a New Silk Road fund for infrastruc-
ture development and industrial and 
financial co-operation in Asia. 
12 November: Presidents Xi Jinping 
and Barack Obama announce an am-
bitious bilateral agreement on climate 
change as well as the introduction of 
reciprocal ten-year, multiple entry 
short-stay visas for ordinary citizens. 
14 November: At a joint press confer-
ence with Barack Obama following the 
APEC gathering, Xi Jinping responds 
to a question from a New York Times 
journalist on press freedom in China, 
defending the Chinese government’s 
refusal to give visas to a number of 
foreign journalists, saying the barred 
journalists had only themselves to 
blame. 
16 November: In a private exchange 
at Kirribilli House with the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Min-
ister Tony Abbott admits that Austral-
ia’s policies towards China are driven 
by two emotions: ‘fear and greed’. 
17 November: Following a meeting be-
tween Australian Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott and Xi Jinping, representatives 
of China and Australia sign a ‘Declara-
tion of Intent to work towards signa-
ture of the China–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement’. 
19–21 November: China hosts the 
World Internet Conference in the town 
of Wuzhen, Zhejiang province. Partic-
ipants include the heads of all major 
Chinese Internet firms as well as exec-
utives from Western tech companies 
operating in China.  
17 November: Xi Jinping addresses 
Australia’s parliament, saying China 
aims to become a ‘modern socialist 
country that is prosperous, democrat-
ic, culturally advanced and harmo-
nious by the middle of the century’. 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott misunder-
stands the stock formulation, and says 
that Xi has made an unprecedented 
commitment to make China ‘fully dem-
ocratic’ by 2050. 
21 November: The People’s Bank 
of China cuts interest rates, a move 
widely seen as an economic stimulus 
to offset slowing growth. One of the 
immediate effects of the rate cut was 
a boost to China’s stock markets as in-
vestors rushed to move their money 
into shares. 
25 November: The Legislative Affairs 
Office of China’s State Council releases 
for public comment a draft of China’s 
first national law against domestic 
violence, formally defining domestic 
violence as a crime and streamlining 
the process for obtaining restraining 
orders.
30 November: As violent clashes be-
tween pro-democracy protestors and 
police continue in Hong Kong, Beijing 
bars a group of British politicians from 
entering Hong Kong after one of them 
declares support for the protests. 
4 December: China celebrates its first 
China Constitution Day 国家宪法日. 
9 December: China awards the third 
annual Confucius Peace Prize (found-
ed in response to the awarding of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in 
2010) to Fidel Castro. Cuban students 
in Beijing accepted the award on be-
half of their retired president. Previ-
ous recipients include Vladimir Putin 
and Lien Chan 連戰 (former premier 
of Taiwan and chairman of the Kuo-
mintang).
11 December: Police bring a peaceful 
end to the seventy-five days of occu-
pation of Hong Kong’s central Admi-
ralty district by pro-democracy pro-
testers; the last site (in Causeway Bay) 
is cleared on 15 December. Protests 
continue, guerrilla style, with people 
carrying yellow umbrellas while sing-
ing Christmas carols and carrying out 
other actions. 
13 December: China marks its first 
state commemoration of the Nanjing 
Massacre 国家公祭.
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CO N T R I B U TO R S
Geremie R Barmé is an historian, ed-
itor and translator who has published 
widely on late-imperial and modern 
China. He is the Founding Director of 
the Australian Centre on China in the 
World (CIW), College of Asia and the 
Pacific, The Australian National Uni-
versity.
Carolyn Cartier is an urban geogra-
pher who works on China and compar-
ative urban studies. She is a professor 
at the University of Technology, Syd-
ney and an Adjunct Director of CIW.
Chen Shuxia 陈淑霞 is a PhD candi-
date at CIW, researching on Chinese 
photography groups as ‘amateur’ cul-
tural actors in the 1980s. 
Antony Dapiran is a partner of 
international law firm Davis Polk & 
Wardwell, based in Hong Kong. He 
is also a writer and commentator on 
China-related issues. 
Gloria Davies is a literary scholar and 
historian of China. She is Professor 
of Chinese Studies in the School of 
Languages, Literatures, Cultures and 
Linguistics at Monash University and 
an Adjunct Director of the CIW.
Rebecca Fabrizi has a background as 
a diplomat for the UK and the EU. She 
is a Senior Strategic Research Fellow at 
CIW.  Her research focuses on China’s 
foreign policy-making apparatus, and 
on China’s relations with other major 
powers, with its neighbourhood, and 
on regional and global governance 
structures. 
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Jeremy Goldkorn is a writer and new 
media entrepreneur and founder 
of Danwei.com, the digital research 
collaborator of CIW. He relocated to 
Nashville, Tennessee in 2015 after 
twenty years of living and working in 
Beijing. 
Jane Golley is an economist focused 
on a range of Chinese transition and 
development issues. She is an Associ-
ate Director of CIW.
Gerry Groot lectures in Chinese Stud-
ies and is Head of the Department of 
Asian Studies, University of Adelaide. 
He writes on Chinese united front 
work, soft power and related issues. 
He is an Adjunct Director of CIW.
Mark Harrison is a Senior Lecturer in 
Chinese at the University of Tasmania 
and an Adjunct Director of CIW. 
His work examines knowledge and 
representation in Chinese contexts, 
exploring contemporary cultural and 
social life in Taiwan and mainland 
China.
Linda Jaivin is the author of eleven 
books, including the China memoir 
The Monkey and the Dragon, an essay-
ist, translator, co-editor with Geremie 
R Barmé of the anthology of transla-
tion New Ghosts Old Dreams: Chinese 
Rebel Voices and editorial consultant 
at CIW.
Olivier Krischer is a postdoctoral fel-
low at CIW who researches modern 
China–Japan relations through art, 
and recent networks of East Asian cre-
ative activism.
Joel Martinsen is a literary translator 
and co-founder of Danwei.com, where 
he is currently research director.
David Murphy is a PhD candidate at 
CIW specialising in industry–state 
relations and trade policy.
Elisa Nesossi is an ARC Research Fel-
low at CIW. Her current research pro-
ject focuses on changes in Chinese con-
cepts of criminal justice, 1980–2015.
Benjamin Penny is an historian of 
religions in China. He is the Director of 
CIW and Editor of East Asian History.
Qian Ying 钱颖 is a postdoctoral fel-
low at CIW. She conducts research on 
cinema, media and visual culture in 
China, and co-curates CIW’s month-
ly film series Asia and the Pacific 
Screens. She will be an assistant pro-
fessor at Columbia University in 2015. 
Richard Rigby is a former senior 
diplomat and intelligence analyst 
who is now Director of the ANU China 
Institute and an Associate Director of 
CIW.
Brendan Taylor is Head of the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at 
ANU. He is a specialist on great power 
strategic relations, including Asia-
Pacific security (especially China and 
North Korea), US–China relations and 
economic sanctions.
Susan Trevaskes is a researcher in 
the area of a Chinese criminal justice 
at Griffith University and is an Adjunct 
Director of CIW. She publishes on jus-
tice issues including policing, punish-
ment and the politics of law and order.
Luigi Tomba is a political scientist 
who has published widely on China’s 
political and social change and the ur-
ban condition. His latest book is The 
Government Next Door. Neighborhood 
Politics in Urban China (Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2014). He is an Associate 
Director of CIW and was the co-editor 
of The China Journal from 2005–2015. 
Jay Wang 王造玢 is the international 
product lead at a mobile social media 
startup, and enjoys translating in his 
spare time. 
Nathan Woolley is a postdoctoral 
fellow at CIW and an historian of 
dynastic China.
Wuqiriletu is a PhD candidate at 
the School of Culture, History and 
Languages at the ANU, and a research 
officer at CIW. His research focuses on 
informal life politics in Mongolia and 
North East Asia.
Aiden Xia 夏克余 is writer and works 
as a researcher at Danwei.com in Bei-
jing.
Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon is a recent 
graduate of Washington University in 
St Louis with a major in East Asian 
Studies. She attended the Inter-Uni-
versity Program to study Chinese from 
2013 to 2014.
Zou Shu Cheng 邹述丞 is a student of 
Classical Chinese history, thought and 
literature. He recently completed an 
Honours degree at ANU, investigating 
filial and unfilial behaviours in pre-
Qin thought.
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O N L I N E  M AT E R I A L
China Story Yearbook 2014:  
Shared Destiny
thechinastory.org/yearbooks/
yearbook-2014
China Story Yearbook 2013: 
Civilising China
thechinastory.org/yearbooks/
yearbook-2013
China Story Yearbook 2012: 
Red Rising, Red Eclipse
thechinastory.org/yearbooks/
yearbook-2012
Dossier
Chinese-language source materials and 
supplementary materials related to the 
Yearbooks
thechinastory.org/yearbook/dossier
The China Story Journal
The China Story Journal is a compan-
ion to the Yearbook where we publish a 
variety of articles, essays and enquiries 
throughout the year
thechinastory.org/journal
Key Intellectuals
Profiles of some of China’s leading 
public or citizen intellectuals, men and 
women who are vitally involved with 
the ideas, debates and concerns about 
China’s present and its future direction
thechinastory.org/thinking-
china/-key-intellectuals
Index and searchable database for 
The China Story
thechinastory.org/index
Index and searchable database for 
the China Story Yearbook 2014
thechinastory.org/index/2014
Electronic versions of this book and supplementary materials are available for 
free download in a variety of formats at: www.chinastory.org. Below are some of 
the resources available on The China Story site:
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L I S T  O F  I N F O R M AT IO N 
W I N D O W S
INTRODUCTION
Under One Heaven
Mingyun 命运, the ‘Destiny’ in 
‘Shared Destiny’
Public Appearance
Chairman of Everything 
Xi at the Helm: An Itinerary
Tigers Explain Tigers
China’s Destiny: Quotations from 
Generalissimo Chiang
CHAPTER 1
Great Expectations
The Rise of Chinese Internet Finance
Local Government Debt: ‘No Money. 
Really, No Money’
CHAPTER 2
Whose Shared Destiny?
Silent Contest
MH370
Russia–China Pipeline
INT
xi .
xv .
xxi .
xxiv . 
xxx . 
xxxv . 
CHAPTER 3
The Chinese Internet: Unshared 
Destiny
Major Global Websites Blocked  
in China
Pressed and Ironed
From the Manual of Disobedience 
Used by the Hong Kong Protestors
CHAPTER 4
Destiny’s Mixed Metaphors
Top Ten Academic Research Topics 
in 2013
Learning from Xi Jinping
New Internet Slang and Memes
The Spring and Autumn Style 春秋  
笔法
Translation: Magic, Realism
INT
27 .
28 .
INT
117 .
121 .
142 .
INT
159 .
160 . 
164 . 
166 .
184 .
INT
63 .
66 .
69 . 
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CHAPTER 5
Urban, Mobile and Global
Bling Loses its Sparkle
Where the Economic Elite Went  
in 2013
Where Middle-Class Tourists  
Wanted to go in 2014
What’s In and What’s Out
When in Hong Kong: Rules for 
Mainland Tourists
Where Chinese Travellers Go
Chinese Students Abroad
Naked Officials
CHAPTER 6
The Sword of Discipline and 
the Dagger of Justice
Big Game: Five ‘Tigers’
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217 . 
218 .
221 .
222 .
235 .
236 .
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